As bump points out, I thik Dunnigan’s point is being wildly misunderstood.
His point was not that there was any sort of equivalence between 2011 and 1944 armies. There isn’t; the former would annihilate the latter. His point was that combat could be modelled in the same way, which is a very different concept - essentially, that if you are simulating a war, the variables of the simulation of a war in 2011 work essentially the same as the variables of simulating a war in 1944.
In general I believe Dunnigan is right, assuming you limit the simulation to conventional arms. However, there’s a few areas which give one pause:
- Scale and lethality. Armies in 2011 are much smaller and vastly more lethal than armies in 1944. Lethality is a critical issue in simulating war; the percentage of casualties taken by an armed forces in combat is, for obvious reasons, really important.
In a war between modern armed forces lethality would be astoundingly high by World War II standards. The German conquest of Poland in 1939, which took five or six weeks, was considered an amazing victory; had the Warsaw Pact and NATO gone to war in 1988 I think most would have been shocked if the war had lasted any longer than that one way or the other. The lifespan of a tank was measured in days. The range, accuracy and battlefield depth of weapons today is comparatively astonishing. Airplanes in 1944 fought as visual ranges; airplanes in 2011 fight miles away and there is little chance of escape from the man with the better radar.
Consequently, you will chew though your available forces in 2011 much faster than you did in 1944, assuming there is relative equivalence between the two sides. If there isn’t relative equivalence the war’s over in a week or less. In that regard a simulation designed to properly handle 1944 casualty rates doesn’t work for 2011.
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Battlefield intelligence today is much different from 1944. Electronic warfare in WWII was comparatively primitive.
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The scale of armies today is SMALL. People often don’t realize this but even big armies today are modest compared to what countries were fielding pre-1945, in part because weapons systems have become unbelievably expensive.
In 1941, a Supermarine Spitfire cost a Commonwealth air force about half a million dollars in 2011 terms (about twelve to fourteenthousand 1941 pounds.) Production was huge, over 20,000 fighters, and that was just one of a number of British fighters. So the Commonwealh spent about ten billion dollars on Spitfires.
Today, the cost of a fighter is two orders of magnitude higher. Canada plans to buy 65 F-35 Lighting IIs… at a program cost of (depending who you believe) anywhere from $16 billion to $30 billion. So Canada, hardly a superpower, is proposing to spend more money to buy 65 fighters than the entire Commonwealth spend to buy 20,000 fighters. And that’s considered normal now. The USA spent about as much buying 165 F-22 Raptors as it spent on its entire fighter force in World War II.
So one thing that isn’t equivalent between fighting a simulated 1944 and 2011 war is you just won’t have as much stuff. World War II games tend to assume really alrge VOLUMES of stuff. You can’t have that in 2011; nobody could possibly afford it.