The first case is Byrd v. U.S. Byrd’s fiance rents a car from a car rental agency and allows him to drive in violation of the car rental agreement. Does he have standing to assert a violation of the 4th amendment in a search of the car?
The second case is Collins v. Virginia. A motorcycle is sitting under a tarp in a driveway. Having probable cause to believe that the motorcycle was one that recently eluded police in a high speed chase, a police officer walked into the driveway, lifted the tarp, read the VIN and discovered it was stolen. Which doctrine applies, the automobile exception which allows warrantless searches of automobiles based on probable cause or the holding that the driveway is “curtilage,” e.g., intimately associated with the home so as to require a warrant.
I’m generally conservative, but I side with the Defendants in both cases.
With this newly-gleaned information, I am certainly much less sympathetic to Mr. Collins’ plight, but I am unsure if the officer did anything improper.
How much does the “imminent” factor come into play?
BTW, there’s a picture there of what the officer saw when he approached (or entered) the property.
With that - “enough of the bike was exposed” comment - that sounds like plain view - lifting the tarp is where i have an issue - but the bike was already identified at that point.
No - I was meant how they became ‘focused’ on this particular house and motorcycle - not how they determined that this bike was the one they had chased. The article linked to gives that info.
That’s the way I see it. The police certainly had enough grounds to get a warrant. But I don’t see any circumstances that required them to act immediately without waiting for a warrant.
I’m not going to take a hard stand on this one but my feeling would be to find against Byrd. The police who stopped Byrd had already established he was not on the rental agreement. So I feel Byrd did not have the constitutional right to deny a search to the vehicle. I feel you should have to be the legal occupant of a location in order to assert constitutional protection over it.
Does a violation of the rental agreement make his occupation illegal? It might be a breach of the rental terms, but he really has no rights whatsoever to the car, similar to a thief?
As mentioned in the oral argument today, other terms of the contract are no cell phone use or no driving on gravel roads. If an officer sees the driver talking on his cell phone, does that make his occupancy of the car illegal, and then the driver has no Fourth Amendment protections?
The problem in the Byrd case is the laughable suspicion that was the basis of the search in the first place, that he was driving with his hands in the 10 and 2 position, the way you are supposed to drive a car. If I recall the details correctly the police officer followed the car based on that suspicion until he claimed to have see a traffic violation, then pulled him over and requested the search. I expect the SCOTUS to accept this reasoning though.
I’m not seeing that as a parallel. If I’m driving my car improperly, it’s still my car and I can invoke ownership rights over it. I’m even willing to extend the concept of ownership to situations like a rental and agree people should be able to deny a search of an apartment or car that they’ve rented.
But a rental car that was being driven by somebody who hadn’t signed the rental agreement? That’s too far to me. If you accept that this guy had rights over the car, you’re essentially saying that all that’s required to establish a right is mere occupation. A person could declare that a zone of constitutional protection against searches surrounds them anywhere they go and automatically applies to any building or vehicle they’re inside of.
The thing is, he drove the vehicle with the knowledge and consent of the renter. The rental company might not be happy with that, but there’s no real reason why that should have made any difference to the police. The aren’t parties to the rental contract (which is a civil matter to begin with, not a criminal matter).
Regarding the Byrd case I’m surprised something like this hasn’t happened before. It seems inline with cases such as Georgia v Randolph, Fernandez v. California, and State v. Sobczak (WI), though none a perfect fit by any means.
36 years on the job I can’t tell you how many times we’ve washed our hands of situations by telling someone something is a civil matter and we can’t get involved. Yet Byrd seems to suggest the police can enforce civil agreements.
Let’s look at it concerning different forms of property:
Joe lives in an apartment. He’s the only one on the lease agreement. He invites Byrd to stay for a night while he goes out of town. If the police show up and want to search the apartment does Byrd have no ability to refuse consent?
What if it’s not an apartment but a hotel room?
What if it’s a DVD rented from Red Box? If Joe rented it and gave it to Byrd to watch, can the police confiscate it from Byrd because he had no agreement with Red Box to posses it?
At what point does an agreement between the owner and the renter become the business of the government to enforce? I would say only when the parties are in a civil courtroom arguing over it but not before. But Byrds prosecutors seem to think it’s their duty to take action even with no complaint from the car rental company. I say any misuse of the vehicle or the rental contract is between Byrds girlfriend and the rental company, not the police.
Had Byrd taken the vehicle without the renters consent I’d say it was a different situation. What if Byrds girlfriend had borrowed the car from Joe, and then allowed Byrd to drive it? Would that give him no power to deny a search? What if Joe came along later and stated he had no problem with the girlfriend allowing Byrd to drive his car? Would that negate the search?
But what if he was guilty of driving with his hands in the 10 and 2 position while black? I don’t know if he is black, but if so, then that makes the stop A-OK (at least in many police officers’ eyes) right?