I agree this is an important issue. If a car is owned by a private citizen and a family member is driving it, it’s a nebulous issue if they have explicit permission from the car’s owner. I would accept a large degree of implied permission in such a case.
But the Byrd situation is a case where we have a document from the vehicle’s owner which explicitly states who does and who does not have authorization to drive the vehicle.
This example is of an actual stolen car. The Byrd case is nothing more than a breech of contract between Byrd’s friend and the rental company. Since when are the police empowered to enforce civil contracts?
If a car renter allows someone not on the agreement to drive the car does that automatically make the car stolen?
How does a car renters signature on an agreement sign away someone else’s 4th Amendment rights?
My previous examples were meant to point out the absurdness of allowing police to use civil agreements to override search and seizure protections. How far with that are you willing to go with that? Should everyone walking down the sidewalk with a Red Box DVD be detained while it’s determined if they were the actual renter? And if they aren’t is that an arrestable offense if someone loaned it to them?
Interesting question. Let’s assume the fiance wouldn’t have given permission for the car to be searched because she knew the heroin was there. Does the fact that she was not there to state her objections to the search make the vehicle searchable? Or, on the other hand, does the fact that she was not there to agree to the search make the vehicle unsearchable?
IANAL but my limited understanding is that the latter is the correct policy. The police cannot search a location where they would need the owner’s permission just because the owner is not there to deny that permission. For example, the police can’t enter and search your house when you’re not home (unless they have a warrant or there are some exigent circumstances).
This raises an issue I hadn’t considered. Was the search invalid because Byrd wasn’t an authorized driver? If that was the case then was the vehicle the legal equivalent of an unoccupied vehicle? The issue wasn’t that Byrd denied permission to search (he didn’t have that right) it was that the people who did have the right (the rental agency and the fiance) weren’t asked.
I don’t see that as the situation. This was not a case of a civil agreement overriding search and seizure protection. There never was any search and seizure protection in existence. A civil agreement might have created search and seizure protection in some circumstances but those circumstances didn’t exist here because Byrd was not a party to the agreement.
So other peoples civil agreements can nullify 4th Amendment protection of those not involved?
What if it wasn’t a rental car but an apartment. Lets say Byrds girl has a 2 bedroom apartment where she is the only tenant on the lease and the lease states she cannot have others move in. But she allows him to move in to the 2nd bedroom. Are you saying the police could search his room and effects, without a warrant or other cause, simply because he is not on the lease? That sounds like a huge runaround the 4th.
This is pertinent as Byrds case brings up the question of the rights and controls renters have of the property they don’t own but rent. What if Byrds girlfriend was in the car at the time but not driving? Could she refuse a search of the vehicle?
What if I rent a power washer for a week but my neighbor let’s me store it in his garage. Can the equipment rental company have the police search his garage and arrest him for being in possession of equipment he’s not authorized to have even though I, the legitimate renter, gave it to him and intend to return it to the rental company at the end of the week?
These sound absurd but unless a ruling against Byrd is very narrow in scope I can see over zealous police and prosecutors pulling this stuff.
If the ruling goes against Byrd, it will definitely be narrow in scope. Because vehicles are different from garages and apartments in a few ways. Houses and garages and rented tools don’t get pulled over because they have committed a traffic violation. People aren’t expected to keep their lease or deed or tool rental agreement with them at all times when they are in the house or apartment or using the tool. The police have no way of knowing if someone in an apartment who is not on the lease is an unauthorized subletter (which would be analogous to the driver) or a perfectly legal guest ( as Byrd would have been if the renter were driving and he was the passenger).
But I have a question for those who don’t believe that Byrd driving the car was or even could have been a crime. Let’s say you wake up one morning and your car is missing. Everyone else in your household is still home so none of them have taken it. You have never given anyone outside your household a set of keys. So you report the car stolen. An hour later, the police see me driving your car, and pull me over because the car was reported stolen. I claim that I didn’t know the car was stolen, I borrowed it from my friend. There’s no proof that I myself stole the car, so my story could be true. There’s also no proof that I knew the car was stolen. What happens? I assume the police don’t let me drive away with the stolen car, but do I get arrested? And if so, for what?
You’re coming at this from the wrong direction. The constitutional right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures in your house is not an automatic right that gets nullified in some situations. It’s a right that gets created in some situations ie when you’re in your house. Having a house is a necessary precondition to being secure in your house.
In this particular case a car was the legal equivalent of a house but that’s not a relevant issue. The situation was not that a civil agreement nullified Byrd’s protection. It was that the protection never existed. Byrd was never secure in his car because it was never his car. The Fourth Amendment says you’re secure in your house not in somebody else’s house. A house, or a car, doesn’t become yours just because you happen to be inside it.
So - if I follow this -
I am visiting my friends house, my friend is not home - I cannot require/request a warrant before they search my friends house.
If my friend is home, the friend can allow/disallow regardless of my wishes. (this is expected, but what happens in a spousal (SO) scenario)
The police are free to search that house because the friend is not home (but I am on premises).
This looks to me to be ripe for abuse.
Cars are not houses. 4th amendment protections for houses are different than for cars. For instance if during a motor vehicle stop I see a fold of heroin in plain view I can search the car without a warrant. If I am in a position to see into a window of a house under reasonable circumstances and see a stack of heroin in kilos I can secure the scene but I still have to get a search warrant. Any ruling on this case will be precedent for motor vehicles and not for residences.
And what prevents you from ‘securing the scene’ for a car and waiting for the warrant?
Why must cars be treated differently than houses (in this scenario)?
It is true that a person has a lesser expectation of privacy in a car than he does in his home, the holding below in this case was that Byrd had no expectation of privacy* at all *because of his not being a party to the rental agreement.
Although the Court could craft a rule making a difference between houses and cars in this scenario, the analogy is still apt because it is one of standing and not the specific type of privacy expectation.
*snip. True, but as I noted earlier, unless you are a trespasser, you have a possessory interest superior to everyone else in the world except for those with superior title.
These analogies are tough, but let’s say that you find John Smith’s wallet in the parking lot at work. You bring it inside and lay it on your desk and attempt to locate John Smith.
If I walk over and take it off of your desk, is there nothing wrong with that on the theory that you had no authority to possess the wallet?
What if Byrd stopped at a rest area? Could I lie down in the back seat and take a nap on the theory that I have just as much right to be in the car as Byrd does?
There obviously could be other laws that come into play in these analogies, but at its core, I think we all would agree that Byrd has a greater degree of ownership of the car than others, whatever that might be. And I think if Byrd could exclude me from the car under the authority of that limited possessory interest, he should be able to exclude police officers under that same theory.
I get what you’re saying but I would be very surprised if this is a landmark ruling or if the write up goes beyond the limited scope of rental cars.
As a general rule, the differences in how they are treated arise from the mobility of a vehicle. There’s no risk of a house being driven away while awaiting a warrant.
I addressed this issue in a previous post.
Byrd’s appeal is based on the argument that he was able to invoke a right to privacy over the vehicle. I reject that argument for reasons I have discussed.
But suppose Byrd had based his appeal on a different argument. Suppose he said that the vehicle belonged to somebody else who was not present (either the rental agency or the fiance who had rented the vehicle) and the police had to request their permission to search the vehicle. In that case, I think Byrd might have had a valid argument. The owner of a house or a vehicle does not surrender their expectation of privacy just because they’re not present when the police want to perform a search. The default assumption in such cases should be that the owner would refuse the search if they were present.
I agree that Byrd had some limited possessory interest in the vehicle. There would certainly be people who had less. But overall, I feel his interest was very limited. Specifically I don’t feel that his possessory interest rose the level that he was able to claim a right to privacy over the vehicle and its contents.
If he made that argument he would lose. Byrd could not vicariously assert a third party’s Fourth Amendment rights. If he says it was an illegal search because fiance did not consent, the Court would not allow him to make it. Only a party whose rights were violated has standing.
However, remember that since Jones v. U.S. in 2012, the reasonable expectation of privacy is only part of the test. A trespass upon persons, papers, houses, and effects is also suppressible. Whatever limited possessory interest that Byrd had (and I disagree with you and think it was a rather substantial interest) was trespassed upon by the police officers.
Couldn’t he argue that the contraband was found as the result of an illegal search and therefore was inadmissible?
Suppose I loan some item of contraband to my friend. He keeps it in his house. While he’s not home, the police enter his house and illegally search it without a warrant. They find the contraband which they identify as belonging to me. I’m charged with the crime of owning the contraband.
Are you saying I can’t appeal to have the evidence declared inadmissable because it was found during an illegal search?
Could you argue that, or could your friend?
That’s correct. You must have standing, or an assertion that a particular area in which you had a possessory interest or a reasonable expectation of privacy was invaded. In your example, you have no protected privacy interest in your friend’s home. Your friend does, but they are not using the illegally seized evidence against him.
That’s the key issue in Byrd’s case: Did he have a privacy interest in the automobile?