Bone
May 31, 2018, 3:50pm
101
Not really. The court took up a narrow question - from the cert petition:
Whether the Fourth Amendment’s automobile
The question before the court was not about exigent circumstances. The case history is briefly described in the opinion (my bold and line breaks):
Collins was indicted by a Virginia grand jury for receiving
The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed. It assumed
**The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed on different
So essentially, the issue of exigent circumstances wasn’t addressed in the State Supreme Court of Virginia. They resolved it with the vehicle exception. So in Collins, SCOTUS ruled only on that rationale, and remanded to the lower court to address any other potential ways the search could be reasonable. Collins could still have the evidence used against him at trial if the court rules there were exigent circumstances.
Bone
May 31, 2018, 4:30pm
102
And as a follow up to earlier discussion about what constitutes curtilage, an article by Kerr goes through some of the history surrounding the anlaysis:
Here’s a history of the curtilage concept to bring us up to speed. The Court first hinted at the idea of curtilage in Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), a short and breezy opinion by Justice Holmes. Officers found booze on land not far from the suspect’s house. Held: This was a search of an “open field” not protected by the Fourth Amendment, as by its text the Fourth Amendment only protects “persons, houses, papers and effects”":
This evidence was not obtained by the entry into the house, and it is immaterial to discuss that. The suggestion that the defendant was compelled to give evidence against himself does not require an answer. The only shadow of a ground for bringing up the case is drawn from the hypothesis that the examination of the vessels took place upon Hester’s father’s land. As to that, it is enough to say that, apart from the justification, the special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their “persons, houses, papers and effects” is not extended to the open fields. The distinction between the latter and the house is as old as the common law. 4 Bl.Comm. 223, 225, 226.
There’s a series of cases that then address the issue more substantively. In 1987, in US v. Dunn, the court offered a 4 factor test:
Drawing upon the Court’s own cases and the cumulative experience of the lower courts that have grappled with the task of defining the extent of a home’s curtilage, we believe that curtilage questions should be resolved with particular reference to four factors: the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U. S. 207, 476 U. S. 221(1986) (POWELL, J., dissenting) (citing Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 25 (CA10), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932 (1956); United States v. Van Dyke, 643 F.2d 992, 993-994 (CA4 1981)). We do not suggest that combining these factors produces a finely tuned formula that, when mechanically applied, yields a “correct” answer to all extent-of-curtilage questions. Rather, these factors are useful analytical tools only to the degree that, in any given case, they bear upon the centrally relevant consideration – whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the home’s “umbrella” of Fourth Amendment protection.
I personally find the guidance whether something is curtilage to be nebulous. Barn, no. Driveway, yes, sometimes. Porch, yes. Kind of sketchy to me. The whole article is a good read.