US Court Cases about Quarantines

[CoastalMaineiac]

The recent talk of ebola quarantines has me wondering. Has anyone ever been put under quarantine by a state or federal agency and challenged it? Have there ever been any court cases that answer the question of whether or not the state or feds have the authority to quarantine potentially contagious individuals?

[Mr.Kobayashi]

Here’s a story about a nurse intending to sue the U.S. government over ebola quarantine on the basis that her treatment was unconstitutional;
“Kaci Hickox, being held in isolation at a Newark, New Jersey hospital, planned to contest her quarantine in court, her attorney said, arguing that the order violated of her constitutional rights.”

[CoastalMaineiac]

@Mr.Kobayashi

Here’s a story about a nurse intending to sue the U.S. government over ebola quarantine on the basis that her treatment was unconstitutional;
“Kaci Hickox, being held in isolation at a Newark, New Jersey hospital, planned to contest her quarantine in court, her attorney said, arguing that the order violated of her constitutional rights.”

She’s all over the news here, now, as she has since come to Fort Kent, Maine (about 6 hours north of where I live).
The district court up there issued an order pending hearing about it.
http://www.courts.maine.gov/news_reference/high_profile/hickox/order_pending_hearing.pdf

Are there any actual legal precedents concerning quarantine in the US?

[Richard_Parker]

Yes, there are precedents, mostly involving tuberculosis. But they don’t take us very far.

The general rule seems to be that a state can detain someone only when they have a contagious disease and when there is a substantial risk (generally indicated by the individual’s past behavior) that the individual will behave in such a way as to expose others to a serious contagious disease. See City of Newark v. J.S., 279 N.J. Super 178 (1993). It is a general rule in these circumstances, as in the case of mandatory evacuations and the like, that detention is justified only when it is the least restrictive alternative to accomplishing the state’s goal.

It is unsettled whether someone can be detained if we don’t know whether they have the disease or not, and it is unsettled whether “quarantines” such as restrictions on some kinds of travel or contact would be analyzed under the same framework.

[Really_Not_All_That_Bright]

There isn’t a lot of recent case law on this. Is there a specific issue you are curious about? Ex parte Martin is a California cases from the 40s where some prostitutes were quarantined due to suspected venereal infections.

This case involved a federal inmate who caught MRSA and sued the prison for failing to quarantine others:

Here, though Buechel was clearly complaining about his medical treatment—i.e. “Lack of Medical Treatment / Refuse to treat a highly contagious disease”—he was also complaining of the prison’s failure to quarantine infected inmates properly, including Hansen but not necessarily limited to him. (“[A]lso the inmate that I caught this highly contagious disease to continue to interact in general population;” “the institution failed to quarantine [Hansen] to prevent transmittal of disease;” “medical and executive departmental employees are intentionally disregarding basic mandatory medical biohazard containment quarantine and decontamination procedures of infectious diseases;” “[Hansen] was allowed to return to his job assignment … after being diagnosed with [a staph infection].”)
Buechel’s claim set forth his observations and his lay beliefs concerning how he contracted MRSA. As a pro se claimant without legal or medical training, he was not required to do more than that. It was up to the prison administration to fill in the gaps, to the extent possible. Buechel provided enough information from which a legally sophisticated reader could recognize that when he claimed he had contracted MRSA after coming into contact with Hansen and that the prison was disregarding biohazard and quarantine procedures, he was making a more general claim that FCI–Greenville was not adhering to sound MRSA-containment policies.

As noted above, the district court’s summary judgment ruling had seemed to recognize this. Buechel, 2012 WL 948368, at *5 (noting that Buechel had explicitly alleged the government “failed to quara[n]tine” and “prevent tran [s]mittal,” based also on allegation that a sick inmate “like Hansen” had come into contact with Buechel). But the summary judgment ruling and the September 13, 2012 pretrial order then imposed a hurdle for Buechel’s negligence claim that would be unreasonably difficult for any complainant to meet at the stage of the administrative claim or complaint, never mind that Buechel had been acting without outside legal or medical advice. By limiting Buechel’s pro se claim to contact with Hansen, Buechel, 2012 WL 948368, at *5, and/or the prison laundry, Dkt. 141, the court effectively required Buechel to pinpoint when and how he had contracted MRSA in order to state a viable negligence claim. This imposed too heavy a burden for any claimant and plaintiff, but especially for a prisoner acting pro se.

Buechel v. US, 746 F.3d 753

Usually quarantine comes up in law either with respect to animals, or is just mentioned as a contextual matter in cases involving public health orders.

We find support for our construction of these statutes in cases construing the predecessor to section 120175, former section 3110 (Derrick v. Ontario Community Hospital (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 145, 151–152, 120 Cal.Rptr. 566), and former section 3285, which contains language similar to the language found in section 120575 (Jones v. Czapkay (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 192, 200–201, 6 Cal.Rptr. 182). These cases noted that the local health officer has a mandatory duty to take measures to prevent the spread of disease, but he or she has the discretion to determine the appropriate measures to be taken in a given case. (Derrick v. Ontario Community Hospital, supra, at pp. 151–152, 120 Cal.Rptr. 566; Jones v. Czapkay, supra, at pp. 200–201, 6 Cal.Rptr. 182.) In Jones v. *703 Czapkay, for example, the health officer was directed to use every available means to ascertain the existence of, and to investigate suspected or reported cases of, tuberculosis. ( **299 182 Cal.App.2d at p. 199, 6 Cal.Rptr. 182.) The health officer, however, had discretion to determine whether quarantine or isolation or both was necessary in a given case to protect the public health. (Ibid.) Likewise, In re Martin (1948) 83 Cal.App.2d 164, 188 P.2d 287, a case the Foundation relies on, confirms the health officer’s discretion to act in a particular manner, that is, to determine whether to quarantine two females believed to be exposed to venereal diseases.6 (Id. at pp. 167–168, 188 P.2d 287.)

Castillo v. Solano County Jail, 2011 WL 3584318

[Mr.Kobayashi]

Meant to say the State of Maine and New Jersey, not the federalés.

SCOTUS has ruled in the past that “clear and convincing evidence” is needed to warrant confinement, that was in a psychiatric context though. In 1900 (warning - link to a paper from the time that includes racism) a circuit judge lifted a quarantine in San Francisco’s Chinatown on the basis that there was no evidence for a plague.

The Washington Post reports there was a similar case in 1963 - involving smallpox not ebola - where the courts upheld the quarantine, noting;

[The] judgment required is that of a public health officer and not of a lawyer used to insist on positive evidence to support action; their task is to measure risk to the public and to seek for what can reassure and, not finding it, to proceed reasonably to make the public health secure. They deal in a terrible context and the consequences of mistaken indulgence can be irretrievably tragic. To supercede their judgment there must be a reliable showing of error.

[Really_Not_All_That_Bright]

Addington is about permanent (or at least indefinite) confinement.

[Senegoid]

The latest news about Kaci Hickox seems to be:

(1) On Thursday, the state of Maine got a 24-hour detainment order. If I read the news right, she was restricted to her home with daily monitoring. The order was only for 24 hours, pending further consideration by the court.

(2) On Friday (today), the court substantially relaxed but did not totally rescind the order. Now, she may travel about (for example, going for a walk or bike ride) but may not go to places where people may congregate, and may not be within 3 feet of any other person (except when engaged in getting medical treatment), for the remainder of the 21 days, which I think is until Nov. 20.

That’s where it stood the last I read of it, a couple of hours ago.

ETA: The article where I read that. More ETA: Hickox herself is apparently satisfied with this.

[Broomstick]

Probably because that follows the CDC recommendations which are based on medicine and science rather than fear and hysteria.