“Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.”
-Sun Tzu
Or possibly “used” Iraqi and Afghan army weapons. Never fired. Only dropped once!
So how come the Iraqis do jumping jacks like they are retarded while the terrorists can climb the shit out of those monkey bars? My own WAG is that unlike professional militaries in the West, they don’t exactly get the best and brightest recruits. I would not be surprised if 90% of them were just a bunch of rejects looking for a quick paycheck.
“No, I’m sorry Amir. I know you want to go kill infidels but look at you, you can’t even jump to get both feet off the ground. Our next mission will be to blend in as part of a flash mob and unleash terror half way through the macarena. You’ll jeopardize the entire plan you uncoordinated son of a jackass. Why don’t you go join the Iraqi army, Amir? They take anybody with all their limbs and most of their fingers.”
I have heard it said that one of the big reasons that Arab armies have struggled so much in the various wars with Israel is the lack of a robust NCO structure. Your observation fits that motion.
I trained in small unit tactics, platoon sized and smaller sometimes with supporting weapons.
The training I have probably had minimal effectiveness. A cohesive needed to know that other teams and supporting powers would perform. This was never a certainty. There were individual people who did what was needed but a team requires work from everyone. This requires a level of trust that can’t be instilled in a short amount of time.
In a chaos environment I believe that the total lack of discipline would benefit those who use terror tactics. If team A goes into a fight thinking ‘OMF everybody on team B are killers’…then team A is at a disadvantage.
I agree with what Bear is saying for the most part.
Tactics makes the tools…strategy is how to best use what you have to attain your goals.
[QUOTE=msmith537]
My own WAG is that unlike professional militaries in the West, they don’t exactly get the best and brightest recruits. I would not be surprised if 90% of them were just a bunch of rejects looking for a quick paycheck.
[/QUOTE]
In other words like every army in history. :rolleyes:
If the students are not dong well, the fault is the teachers.
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[QUOTE=Tom Tildrum]
I have heard it said that one of the big reasons that Arab armies have struggled so much in the various wars with Israel is the lack of a robust NCO structure.
[/QUOTE]
Considering Israel does not have such a robust NCO structure either and relies heavily on its junior officers for leadership I doubt it’s true.
Probably not more “selective”, but terrorists/insurgents/rebels there are typically going to get the more motivated people. The people in the arbitrarily created “nations” left being by the retreating colonialist empires typically have little loyalty to a nation that was never really their idea in the first place. That tends to result in miltaries composed of conscripts (Saddam Hussein even conscripted foreigners for example), people in it just for the paycheck/loot, or people chosen by the leaders for personal/political loyalty over competence (since they have no real pool of actual patriots to draw on). Maliki in Iraq became well known for the latter, with the result that the competency and motivation of the Iraqi military crashed.
The personnel of a military composed of conscripts or mercenaries have little incentive to do more than the minimum they can get away with, and one composed of people chosen for their political loyalties is going to be composed largely of incompetents.
ISTR that on question, on an earlier thread on the IDF junior leadership structure, it was stated that conscription based armies everwhere relied on officer’s rather than NCO’s as in professional ones.
But what difference does it make?
If a platoon of 20 guys is working as a cohesive team, it’s because they are all motivated and well trained. Sure, they need a good leader. But what difference does it make if the guy in charge is an officer who wears his rank insignia on his shoulder epauletee, or is an NCO with his rank sewn onto his upper sleeve?
If the men respect him, and he leads by personal example, it’s going to be a good fighting unit.
If the men disdain him for being given his rank because of family connections, and if he doesn’t respect his men enough to lead by example, then the platoon will lose on the battlefield as soon as it meets a cohesive enemy with high morale…
Political gain is always a factor. But I think the main driving force is the variable reward schedule. Sometimes it works.
People who want to fight, believe in their cause and value their contribution to that cause can be taught. People who don’t…. can’t.
Exactly right.
Four things in that post:
The ‘easy’ stuff is small unit tactics.
No, that’s the hard stuff.
This is why you teach people to charge into oncoming fire.
Who teaches this? How about set up a base of fire element and then sent an assaulting element to the flank. That is what you should be teaching people. Are Marines really taught to “charge into oncoming fire”? There is exactly one single situation where such a tactic should be used and that is in a near ambush.
The hard part is teaching leaders logistics.
Logistics is easier to teach than tactics.
How to bring the mostest the firstest? How do you resupply the firstest to keep the mostest?
Any farmer growing crops for his family or shopping at the local market will already have a basic idea of logistics. Every local store owner or shop worker will know how to get supplies from A to B.
No. But I have heard the same.
It can have some degree of success if the soldiers actually want to fight and are willing to learn. The fact that so many Iraqi soldiers are so quick to drop their uniforms and quit their post at the first hint of danger is the same reason they are so difficult to train. They simply don’t want to be there. They’re just looking for some type of employment.
The group I worked with in Afghanistan was not really interested in soldiering. They didn’t want to even go out on patrol if we wouldn’t be back before lunch. They would regularly not show up for patrols, turn around and go back to bed when told how long it would be, complain about everything, etc. Clearly they had no goal to motivate them. They were not there fighting for “Afghanistan” or any concept of nationalism. They probably just needed a paycheck.
There are some groups that are a little more committed and therefore easier to train. There has been some success with training the ANA Commando units. Maybe most of them had families killed by the Taliban or something so they have a grudge. Who knows? But if the men are not on board with the cause, then they’re not going to pay much attention to any instruction.
[QUOTE=Bear_Nenno]
(snip) Clearly they had no goal to motivate them. They were not there fighting for “Afghanistan” or any concept of nationalism. They probably just needed a paycheck.
[/QUOTE]
So? Do you think the the Indians from British India who fought in the World Wars had any concept of fighting for “King and Country”? They did well enough for their pay. Or French colonial soldiers from Africa? Or hell even the Irish in UK armies, who hated being part of the Empire, and were often there just to get enough to eat?
Men have fought well enough for pay throughout history. Not caring much about the cause at all.
So is the difference between “good” foreign trainees and “bad” ones a matter of motivation? Of a genuine sense of fighting for a cause (or a government) they believe in? Or maybe fighting against something they hate?
I’ve always heard good things about South Korean soldiers, though I don’t know if that was true during the war. And I’ve heard practically nothing good about South Vietnamese soldiers, when they still existed.
Interesting points. The motivating goal doesn’t always need to be “the cause”. It could be any number of things, just so long as it outweighs the perceived risk. Or, in some cases, that the risk of not fighting is greater than the risk of fighting.
What, in your opinion, could their motivation have been?
What was the penalty, if any, for quitting? If British Indians were not drafted and served merely for pay, could they quit at any time? Were there punishments for running away in battle? If they couldn’t quit, it behooves them to learn to fight. If they can quit whenever they want, then there isn’t much motivation to learn.
A Soldier who joins for a paycheck and can simply quit whenever he wants or run away from a firefight without getting punished? I have no idea what could motivate such a person to be a good Soldier.
I think that plays a major role, if not the biggest.
Either one of those, but not just limited to those. A group of bandits or pirates motivated by loot and bounty would probably be very receptive to training and would apply those skills well under fire.
Another major factor has already been addressed, and that’s the lack of an NCO Corps. One of the things that an NCO Corps provides is the constant repetition and retraining necessary for young soldiers to grasp certain concepts. Nobody is going to get understand everything completely the first time. It takes training, practice and constant reinforcement.
The British had the regimental system. They used that. Men were expected to have the regiment and its soldiers as their primary loyalty. Units with long histories and battle honours. Units the men would be proud to join. It was often said that the men might fight for their King, but they would die for their regiment.
But that’s exactly the kind of stuff I’m talking about. There isn’t any concept like that with them. If the issue was that I made it seem like one’s country was the only thing to be committed or loyal to, then I apologize. That isn’t what I meant. I was just trying to say there was no cause or goal or loyalty acting as the motivation and driving force.
And never once said that they would fight or die for a meager paycheck.
Across the border the British and later Pakistan did infact successfully build up regimental loyalties with the exact same ethnic groups like the Pashtuns as you have in Afghanistan. So it’s not like the concept is not implementable in that culture. Why the US never saw fit to build up regiments in the ANA? You would know better,