(Sorry for the typo on your name, Esprix.)
Damn! You people have now ruined drunk driving, heroin, cocaine, sodomy, obesity, driving with an open fifth, and no seatbelt, porn, smoking and being male. Just what in hell am I supposed to do this weekend?
Actually, Bricker seems to be making the most sense, it’s just tough determining that “reasonable foresight”.
Oh, and there’s this:
Hell, I’d vote for you. Pour enough booze into me, and I’d probably even be your running mate.
Waste
Flick Lives!
Is that a euphemism, GL?
I can just see my campaign posters: a giant ass, with “Vote YES to sodomy!” blazoned across it. Heck, the “o” in “to” can be the…uh, I’ll let you envisage the mental picture on your own. 
How about attempting suicide? Oh wait, that’s illegal in some places too.
There’s a little bit of circular reasoning going on here. One can’t use the existing set of laws to define the consistency of the law.
When we’re debating the moral basis of a good law, we can’t then invoke the concept that something illegal is therefore wrong.
That being said, there really is a fairly good dividing line we can use is Brickers “reasonable foresight:” an activity which a reasonable person, i.e. a person capable of reason, would foresee as exposing others to an unacceptable risk of harm. The vast majority of people hold this concept and thus it forms a fundamental moral basis for enacting a law.
Driving a car while intoxicated clearly satisfies this condition. We have obvious empirical evidence (accident statistics) and causal theory (the physiological effects of alcohol) that this is so.
Note that the specific empircal evidence that pertains is the percentage of drunk drivers that get in accidents, not the number of accidents that involve drunk drivers (because 98% of accidents involve people who drink milk on a regular basis).
The causal physiological evidence clearly shows the causal link between alcohol consumption and impared ability to drive, thus excluding the ignoring the common cause fallacy.
The drunk driving law embodies the moral principle described above and codifies and specifies the precise actions and conditions which will lead to displine or punishment.
Using drugs per se has not been proven to expose others to an unacceptable risk. Most specifically, analysis shows common causes for drug abuse and crime: e.g. poverty, lack of education, lack of employment opportunity, stupidity.
Therefore, since the situation does not fit the fundamental moral basis, it can’t be used to justify the drug laws.
There’s another fundamental basis that I think is worth examining.
The vast majority of people would agree that we have a duty to protect those people who lack the rational capacity to protect themselves: children, the mentally deficient, insane, etc.
A good case can be made that most users of highly addictive drugs fall into that category, merely because the practice is really that stupid.
Of course, if a reasonable person really did decide that the benefits were worth the risk, he might be given an opportunity to convincingly demonstrate his rationality and thus obtain the substances.
This argument supports the idea that drugs should be heavily regulated but does not support a blanket prohibition.
“Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it, doesn’t go away”. - Phillip K. Dick
Otto: No, no, no. . .suicide attempting was last weekend. Didn’t take (again), but I figure I’ll just keep swinging. I don’ need no stinkin’ laws.
And Gaudere? Thank you for that ::ahem:: vivid thought that I cannot get out of my head. I’m off to shower and have coffee with a sidecar now. (extra points for anyone who spots the cultural reference)
And yeah, it’s a euphemism. And it was meant smart-assedly. Just like everything that I say. Didn’t you realize that right off the bat? Did you think I suddenly stopped weighing everything that I say to gauge it’s ability to make other people squirm? See here, young lady, I can still take you over my knee.
Waste
Flick Lives!
On the one hand, I agree - I think drug use should be legal, and, like cigarettes, the public made well aware of its potential effects.
On the other hand, what about people who legitimately develop a dependency problem? Do we help them? Do we intervene? Is it still “victimless?”
Esprix