Hamlet: Though I understand the distinction you’re trying to draw, I believe that in practice, there is little or no difference between the paradigms. The “wall” was always much more permeable than it sounds. For instance, it was during the years when the “wall” was the prevailing notion that the courts issued opinions approving congressional chaplains, “In God We Trust,” and any number of other related practices. At the same time, the “neutrality” notion is actually much less accomodationist than many advocates of faith-based government would like. A great example of that is the football prayer case, where a plausible (but anti-factual) case could be made that the school was neutrally allowing students to say whatever they wanted.
Maybe the best example that there isn’t much practical difference is Lynch v. Donneley (sp?), the case involving the city Christmas display. Burger’s majority applies the traditional Lemon analysis and decides that it has a secular purpose oif recognizing history and such, so it passes Establishment scrutiny. But O’Connor issues a concurring opinion using her “neutrality” or “endorsement” reasoning, and reaches the exact same conclusion.
Now you’d certainly reach a different outcome in a lot of cases by following Scalia’s theory that actual coercion is required for an Establishment violation, but that’s a different kettle of fish altogether. In terms of wall vs. neutrality, I just don’t see much difference.
Nitpick for Poly: The Second Amendment has never been incorporated through the 14th Amendment to to apply against the states. It remains one of the few “unincorporated” portions of the Bill of Rights, though the Supreme Court has not taken the opportunity to rule on that issue–just the lower courts.