Was Bush right to withdraw from the International Criminal Court?

Well, if we can lay aside the panic-mongering of a Cato-boy (and I refer readers to the Economist’s series of articles on the issue, which are considerably more even-handed and less ideologically shrill.):

No, it is a rather different and childish form of symbolism Having the signature on the paper allows for, as noted, influencing the ICC from within, whereas removing the signature not only is a virtually unprecedent form of petulance, also removes leverage.

Not to mention that the imagery is not only contrary to our desired world image, but also sets poor precedent for other treaties and the like, ones which we would prefer to keep.

Um, cite? At the very least, I don’t recall seeing a Newsweek poll showing that 98% of American voters opposed the ICC treaty.

And one can definitely argue that at least Bill Clinton was elected by the populace to represent his country, while George W. Bush was hand-picked by five conservative judges in a virtual coup.

They cannot prosecute for anything not in the Rome Statute. The four crimes have been spelt out. Since there is no seperate Article for ‘Acts of Agression’ the acts of agression are included in the other articles, for war crimes, etc.

They would have modify the Rome Statute in order to prosecute for something not in it. We have an Amendment Process for our Constitution, do you also have a problem with that? After all, the entire BILL OF RIGHTS was something ‘to be defined later’.

Why is it not a good thing to give international courts the right to decide on the validity of national court trials? It’s called Federalism and we practice it in the US. What if I don’t want the US Federal Government not to pass validity judgement on my municiple court?

Who decides if a local court made a genuine decision in the US? The ICC justices, of which there will be 40+, including the prosecutor will decide if the trial of the crimes was legitimate. Was a genuine effort made? The ICC will decide, and I have no reason to think that they won’t make a good choice.

I have as much trust in the ICC make a fair judgement as I am the SCOTUS.

Yes it does if the war criminal is a US citizen and we refuse to try him (which would be the only way the ICC would be able to prosecute an American citizen if we joined up).

Which we should. Genocide, War Crimes, et all, are international crimes, not necessarily national ones. Therefore we should have a court which has jurisdiction over national claims.

You still haven’t adequatly explained this other than pretending this boogyman will have real bearing on anything. I don’t see any evidence AT ALL that there will be bargining. The ICTY (the ad hoc committee to try the Yugoslav war criminals) did not make any ‘deals’ with Yugoslavia. It simply waited, and that is what the ICC will do if the country does not efficiently hand over the arrested. It won’t deal with them.

So shall we include the procedural rights of every country that signs the Rome Statute :rolleyes:? What makes the US so special that it needs its special procedural rights to the letter in the ICC, while everyone else can compromise?

Explained above.

All I see is an irrational fear of international organizations. Almost seeming to be bordering black Sirkorsky’s coming to get us from the UN. The ICC is not going to be some corrupt anti-American organization that is trying to get our servicemen whenever the need arises. The ICC will be fair, probably more fair than the SCOTUS has been over the years, since it’ll be composed of many more justices. Safeguards are there, and have been modified due to US insistance, and even after that we refuse to ratify. Ridiculous!

Sometimes I can be ashamed of my country. This isolationism makes me very sad, and I hope when the US does eventually fall from the sole superpower the rest of the world forgives our hubris and forgives us when we try to get back in good graces.

Oh Lord, not this again. The recounts prove that Bush would have won Florida if they went through… and the newspapers would love to break a story the other way, especially left leaning ones like the New York Times :D.

The Supreme Court stopped it on Equal Protection grounds, which 2 Dems agreed the recount was violating, but decided it should go through anyway… hmmm, partisanship by the Dems, anyone? :slight_smile:

  1. ICC
  2. Kyoto Treaty
  3. Supporting Venezuela Coup
  4. Farm Bill
  5. Guantanamo’s prisioners of “not war”
  6. Axis of evil
  7. Middle east
  8. anti ICBM shield (is Bush still on this?)

Did I miss anything else? Bush is truly dangerous, in a little more than a year he has managed to piss of the rest of the planet. I am sorry that was an overstatement he is Pakistan, Israel, Afganistan best friend. What an idiot!!!

It’s good to see someone finally admitting that they are advocating lowest common denominator justice. I, for one, am not willing to “compromise” the rights enumerated in my nation’s constitution in order to curry favor with others.

It’s really simple: If the treaty offers fewer protections to defendants than the US Constitution, then we should not join it.

I think we should stay in negotiations with them though, that certainly sounds reasonable. Maybe we can talk them out of this no-jury debacle.

Jeez, you guys keep claiming that anyone who opposes the ICC must be a conspiratorial, isolationist nutbar. While I’m sure there are some fringe Buchananites who oppose the ICC on such grounds, there are plenty of others who oppose it for valid reasons.

Foreign entanglements can be tricky. Countries that are allies today can be enemies tomorrow. Countries ARE going to disagree with the rulings of the ICC at some point, and it’s unclear how that will shake out.

There are also alternatives to the ICC, just as there are alternatives to Kyoto and the ABM treaty. You don’t have to be an isolationist madman to prefer alternatives. For instance, you can sign mutual agreements between other countries that you trust, and avoid these sweeping blanket treaties.

Think of extradition treaties. We have them with some countries, and not with others. We decide on a case-by-case basis. And that gives us lots of flexibility - if a country goes in a bad direction, we can withdraw our extradition treaty from it without causing political problems with every other country we maintain such a treaty with. I would much rather see that approach. It’s an idea at least worthy of debate.

Take Kyoto - a horribly flawed treaty that did very little to curb real greenhouse gas emissions, which exempted countries like China which will be the one of the largest greenhouse gas emitters in just a few years, and which had lots of loopholes for other countries, like giving them credits for natural ‘carbon sinks’, which allows some countries to have much dirtier industries than others.

So the U.S pulled out of it, in favor of smaller, more manageable treaties. Incorporating greenhouse gas controls into NAFTA, for example. I like maintaining that kind of flexibility. I like being able to fine-tune international relationships for maximim dimplomatic and practical effect.

There are countries on the ICC that have many reduced rights for the accused as compared to the U.S… There WILL be disputes. Many of them. For example, Europe is currently in a tizzy about Israeli ‘war crimes’, while saying almost nothing about Palestinian atrocities. The U.S. takes the other side. It’s certainly not clear to me that it’s in the U.S.'s best interests to support a tribunal made up of such countries.

There’s another problem as well, which is that I think international law is not set up well at this time to deal with the problem of terrorism. Take the problem of the prisoners in Guantanamo bay - should they be held as prisoners of war, or as common criminals? The answer is neither, in my opinion. Prisoners of war are given special status because it’s recognized that they are acting as members of a state. Once the country they belong to surrenders or negotiates a peace, prisoners of war are no longer a threat to the nation holding them, and can be released. Terrorists clearly don’t fit that description.

On the other hand, it doesn’t work to treat them as criminals, either. That brings in rules of evidence and procedure that are almost impossible to follow on a battlefield. The law hasn’t got up with the current situation, and I don’t want an overreaching body to have jurisdiction over issues that are still that fuzzy. Now, if you could get a world body together to draft new rules for the treatment of captured terrorists, and if it was acceptable to the U.S., I could get behind that. But today, the ambiguity of the situation would threaten to turn the ICC into a political football.

First, I want to distinguish myself from some of the unbounded Bush bashing. My critiques are as to policy execution.

Well, the funny little signature maneuver is rather what I have been talking about. The ICC itself is another issue, although I find American neo-cons rhetoric on this to be, as usual, overheated and note that my favorite British conservatives have managed to take a more… reasoned approach.

Well, if our concern is that France, Germany, and GB – all Sec Council members and thus guarantees in part to the prosecution (Sec. Council being able to derail charged prosecutions) are going to turn against us in the foreseeable future then we have rather more to worry about than anyone here but the most paranoid loony tune had ever imagined.

One rather has to wonder about such analysis.

Insofar as
(a) Multilateral treaties generally have less of a cost in terms of gaining coverage for those issues where ‘leakage’ and ‘free riding’ are problems --e.g. Kyoto, ABM issues-- it is far more rational to aim for the multilateral.
(b) Avoiding multilaterals simply for ideological reasons as often seems to be the case in the comic book crowd hardly gets one forward if those countries one trusts themselves, after rational analysis of their choices, prefer multilaterals over the expensive, time consuming process of bilateral treaties, which again for many subjects don’t deal with free riding and leakage.
your strategy doesn’t make very much fucking sense.

Extradition is another kind of beast --perhaps not in the case of ICC but certainly in the case of the other issues mentioned. It is quite simply sloppy undisciplined thinking to lump the issues together. Moreover, the problems with bilateral extradition treaties --that is they have to be painfully negotiated with individual countries, such that we lack treaties with certain countries. Rather than giving ‘flexibility’ it complicates the whole matter. The sole flexability which actually counts is actually in treaty terms such that one can choose to extradite or not based on pre-set conditions, a flexabilty which is by no means precluded from a multilateral treaty. Ergo, the point fails, and miserably for what we have gained is simply incomplete coverage at higher per unit cost.

I am a severe critic of Kyoto, however your description is not in any way balanced.
(a) Given application Kyoto could do much to reduce Greenhouse admissions.
(b) the non-coverage or non-initial reduction of developing countries was the initial step, with sweeteners for getting them on board when capacity to reduce emmissions got up to sustainable levels.
© the bit about ‘largest’ emmitters in re China is something of an exageration, it will take more than ‘a few years’ --more scaremongering
(d) The carbon sink is a US desired point, and not at all of necessity a bad thing, nor the idea that some countries will be able to have ‘dirtier’ – although this is poor usage as carbon emissions are not pollutants in the standard sense so I rather dislike the muddying of the waters.

The real issues were in regards to proper benchmarking, tools for economic reduction of carbon emissions and a more realistic target regime going forward with clearer more flexible procedures for adjusting targets according to technological advances. Not the sort of hand-waving panic mongering one usually hears, but there it is.

Complete and utter rot. Smaller and less efficient solutions for a non-bounded problem. This is just bloody ignorance, regional reductions in carbon emmisions outside of a global framework simply provide incentives for trade diversion and carbon regulatory arbitrage and is quite simply the less economical and less efficient solution. Bloody hell, this is simple trade economics.

Oh rot, I suppose Sam you’re closely following the Euro papers, eh? Or are simply getting our news from the same sources as our equally well-informed december? I direct you to Chris Patten’s recent criticism of this little propaganda game.

This sort of foolish smear, bizarre although understandable in its goals insofar as if we can not be said to share the same values as our closest European Allies then indeed I suppose Isolationism is the way to go.

While I am opposed to the Statue, Collounsbury makes some compelling arguments for not withdrawing the signature. It’s political lip service if you’re not going to ratify it, but there is some logic to it, even if it seems disingenuous.

So, on the Treaty itself:

ISiddiqui

Because the American People did not cede that authority to an international body. The individual states ceded certain rights and responsibilities when they joined the Union.

Are you a Diplomat or member of the American Armed Forces? I’m curious because it seems much easier to trust people who have no jurisdiction over you.

Disingenous?

Diplomacy.

Or “Public Relations” (if one wants a more commercially minded example, lest one think that disengenous is simply a thing of politicians and politics).

Think of it as image management.

As for the treaty itself, I can understand reluctance. Standing at the sidelines during a shakedown period is prudent and given the US’ peculiar position in the world, probably in the national interest.

Standing at the sidelines and trying to break up the game like a petulant football parent whose argument with the ref was lost is simply not advancing one’s interests in any rational manner.

The Bush administration is too prone to allowing self-indulgence rather than crafty image management drive is application of policy. I said the same in re Kyoto, and ABM. Decisions which might be defendable if executed in a better manner.

self indulgent hijack
Makes you wonder if Powell will accept a position if the administration goes another term.

ISSIDIQUI –

I’m sorry, but this is simply incorrect. “Acts of aggression” are listed as a separate offense; they are not subsumed into “War Crimes,” which is a different thing. The Rome Statute specifically state:

Translation: “We’ll decide what that means later.”

Yes, but “Acts of Aggression” is in it (look again, it’s right there in Article 5 – see it?). It’s just not defined.

First, defining a treaty term and/or crime is not the same as amending the constitution. There is no reason to expect that the treaty would have to be amended before Acts of Aggression could be defined. Indeed, the treaty itself pretty obviously does not contemplate that.

Second, the Bill of Rights reserved rights to individuals, and the contours and context of those rights did not need to be specifically defined before the rights could be reserved. In contrast, a crime – particular conduct subject to punishment – must be defined in order to put the public on notice of what conduct is proscribed – i.e., what, precisely, you are making illegal. So these are not analogous at all.

It is not a good idea because it infringes on national sovereignty – something you might be willing to give up in the interests of globalization but I, as a general rule, am not. We are not part of a one-world government to which we have ceded sovereignty, like your town or city is ultimately part of a one-nation governing structure, under which it does not have true sovereignty. Though, as to that, the U.S. Federal government has only a very limited ability to judge the ability of the decisions made by your municipal court, so long as a federal question (like constitutionality under the U.S. constitution) is not implicated.

I admire your trust in their judgment. I am not, however, willing to share it just yet.

Wel, good for you. I don’t. The procedural safeguards in place for U.S. citizens appearing before the U.S. Supreme Court are apparently not yet in place for U.S. citizens appearing before the ICC. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court cannot be “opted out of” by states choosing (or not choosing) to prosecute crimes themselves, nor may submission of matters to the Court be bargained for amongst the states.

Are you saying that if the crime is international, then the nation should not have the right to prosecute the criminal intra-nationally (i.e., within the nation itself)? Because that is precisely what the ICC says may be done. Then the ICC will decide if that prosecution is “genuine.”

You still haven’t adequatly explained this other than pretending this boogyman will have real bearing on anything. I don’t see any evidence AT ALL that there will be bargining.
[/quote]

It goes to the issue of jurisdiction. Generally, jurisdiction over a crime – i.e., what court gets to sit in judgment on it – is territorial - it happened in your country, so you have jurisdiction. Or the victim was one of your nationals, so maybe you have jurisdiction. Article 12 of the ICC allows for territorial jurisdiction to be “delegated” – if a national of a non-party state commits a crime in a party-country, that party-country may choose to cede its territorial jurisdiction to the ICC. (Is the consent of the criminal-national’s country also required? This is unclear, but it appears not – another potential problem.) This, in turn, leaves open the possibility that a country could bargain to delegate or refrain from delegation as a chip in international negotiation of other matters: You agree to buy more of our rice, and we agree not to turn over a zealot-bomber national of yours to the ICC.

What makes the U.S. “so special” is precisely the fact that it safeguards the rights we are speaking of, and zealously. It does not cede them except with greatest reluctance, knowing that doing so could impact the treatment of its nationals. This is IMO a good thing. Besides which, I find “everyone else is doing it, why can’t you?” to be a singularly uncompelling argument.

I’m not even certain if he’ll last through this one.

(What’s a moderate like you doing in an Administration like this? :wink: )

And every state really did not have a referendum on joining the US… sometimes just the state legislatures did. So the people didn’t cede authority to the US… unless you say that if their representatives can give that up. So why can’t the US reps cede that authority?

The state courts of California have no jurisdiction over me, but I trust them.

If they add anything for acts of aggression, they will have to modify the statue. After all, we in the US have experience with this, when the founders decided to include a Bill of Rights during ratification, but decided to wait until the Congress began to create them. They had to change the Constitution.

And they will by amending the treaty.

The United States has infringed on national sovereignty many, many, many times in the past. Overturning elections, supporting rebels, invading nations with governments we didn’t like. I’m not saying it was all wrong, but we have done it in the past. So I don’t think the US can make the ‘national sovereignty’ claim.

Are you advocating a ‘wait and see’ approach? If so, and that is perfectly acceptable, then we shouldn’t have taken our name off the signers list, and just not send it to the Senate until we saw how it worked.

No, if a nation doesn’t prosecute an international crime, than an international tribunal should be able to prosecute that. If a nation doesn’t prosecute a national crime, than that is their own business. But international crimes are the international community’s business.

And how often do you think this will happen?!! This is why I put in the throw away sentance about the conspiracy theories. How many countries that are party to the ICC would bargin with war criminals?! I don’t think many… especially with the threat of sanctions hanging over their head if they didn’t turn the people over.

IMO it is incredibly arrogant That our rights are so special, but other countries that believe that an international court should exist for international rights realize that it can’t incorporate ALL the rights of every country.

The Federal Courts do not offer all the protections that some state laws do… do you protest that as well?

ISSIDIQUI –

This is simply incorrect, and it doesn’t become any more correct by you repeating it. Anyone who doubts this may review the treaty themselves through the links above. “Acts of Agression” are clearly listed as a separate grounds for prosecution, to be defined later. Anyone wishing to confirm this may do so simply by reading the relevant portion I quoted above. I do not intend to argue this any further, since the fact that you are in this respect 100% totally wrong may also be confirmed via the links.

Of course we can. Are you arguing that having infringed on others’ national sovereignty, rightly or wrongly, the U.S. now has some moral or legal obligation to surrender its own? Because I don’t think that logically follows, and I disagree with it in any event.

Actually, IMO, a “wait and see” approach would have indicated the treaty should not have been signed in the first place.

This is not what the treaty says, however. It says that nations with acceptable legal systems may decide to prosecute the crimes you would deem “international” in nature in their own national courts – regardless of whether they are the “international comunity’s business.” Or they may cede (delegate) jurisdiction to the ICC. The ICC apparently does not have original jurisdicition over these actions (or, if original, original but concurrent).

The problem is not the frequency with which the problem might arise, but that the problem might arise at all. How often woud it have to happen to undermine the authority and impartiality of the court?

[quote]
IMO it is incredibly arrogant That our rights are so special, but other countries that believe that an international court should exist for international rights realize that it can’t incorporate ALL the rights of every country. [/

The Federal Courts do not offer all the protections that some state laws do… do you protest that as well?

Whoa. Hit post too soon, before I was finished. Ahem:

It is not the business of the U.S. to see that ALL rights of every country are incorporated, but we certainly have the right to refuse to participate in a treaty that does not meet ALL our conditions, if we consider those conditions to be deal-breakers. I do not consider it arrogance for any country (or any individual) to safeguard its own rights and best interests. YMMV.

I’m hardly in a position to do so, am I? Because the Federal courts did not ask my permission before exercising jurisdiction over me, nor do they need my permission before prosecutiong me. If I were expected to sign a document agreeing to submit to the jurisdiciton of a court that did not give me the rights some other course did – hell yes, I’d protest that as well.

Rubbish, absolute rot.

There are two aspects to int’l treaties, well three. There is the legal aspect, of course, which in some respects is the least important.

Then there is the PR/diplomatic aspect. I believe I have already fuly developed this. Were this treaty a dog and none of our allies (when I speak of allies one should understand this to mean the big movers and shakers, G7 plus influential smaller players such as NZ etc.) would be on board. They are. Insofar as we want to at least maintain the perception, for our own narrow interests, playing with the international rules --and for those of you who narrow mindedly think not, please do review the frequency to which we officialy make reference to int’l community etc., e.g. in re Iraq.

Finally there is the positional aspect. Even a bad deal can give one an option to future developments. E.g. certain of my firms’ operations in MENA and sub-Continent are not profit spinners presently. Dogs really when you look at near term cash flows versus our outlays. Why do it? Option for future developments which we consider valuable.

Your analysis reflects near-term thinking. Even allowing for the treaty being flawed, and frankly this really depends on effective application, that only frames the the operation. Insofar as the treaty is a work in progress and insofar as signature gives us some options for influencing future developments with few if any costs while gaining some free benefit in terms of image, signature is the rational decision, leaving aside emotional and non-rational considerations.

Ratification, on the other hand, is another matter.

Perhaps this is all too cynical for those rather more used to the considerations of domestic politics, but the rules-less international arena is not for shrinking violets.

I’ll make one clarification here: Clearly, I don’t think that Europe is going to be an ‘enemy’ of ours in the foreseeable future, so I chose a wrong word. I should have said that their interests may diverge from ours, and turn the ICC into a forum for posturing and strategic manipulation.

Now for the rest of your comments, without the personal cheapshots and profanity. I must say, it’s hard to take you seriously as the nuanced, thoughtful thinker you try to present yourself as, when you can’t even keep a civil tone on a message board. Someday you need to learn that your own arguments would carry a lot more weight if they weren’t continually wrapped in abusive and condescending language.

Anyway…

Your first point is a valid point in favor of multilateral treaties. That doesn’t mean the ICC is a good idea, but that the implementation costs of alternatives must be considered.

The second point is a strawman (suggesting that opposition is for ‘ideological’ reasons, rather than rational analysis and strategy), and of course, mixed in with the typical Collounsbury cheap shot and profanity. And speaking of muddy thinking, implicit in your second point is that if other, smaller countries find that multilateral treaties make more sense, then it must follow that the U.S. should find the same. The fact is, because the U.S. is the largest, the marginal cost of maintaining more complex and expensive treaties is lower for the U.S… In addition, the fact that the U.S. is in geographic isolation makes it less important to join sweeping agreements. That’s one reason why the Bush administration is working hard to strengthen and expand NAFTA (which I support wholeheartedly), while distancing itself from the Europeans.

But don’t get me wrong - I’m about as far from an anti-globalization guy as you’re going to find. I’ve been plenty critical of Bush for moving away from free trade with Europe, for example. But the ICC is simply fraught with problems. Here’s one I never mentioned before: The ICC is supposed to be autonomous - each nation provides various legal professionals, and then steps back and in theory has no control over the ICC so that it can’t be influenced. The problem with that is the same one the U.N. has - the ICC itself has no funding, no resources, no police forces, no jails. So inevitably, it will find itself under pressure and subject to political manoevering by member nations.

Speaking of sloppy, undiscplined thinking… I hope upon re-reading that you realize that I was not trying to claim that they were in any way the same thing. I was just pointing out that there are advantages to bilateral treaties, and used extradition as an example.

That’s why the State Department gets the big bucks. Before you continue to use ‘complexity’ as an argument, you need to establish that ‘complexity’ is a serious issue with serious consequences. If ‘complexity’ means that the State Department’s budget needs to be 5% larger than it would be with multilateral treaties, then that’s a cost to be considered, but not necessarily a conclusive argument against. It may even turn out to be a trivial argument - I don’t know whether the transactional costs of these treaties are a substantial burden on the U.S. - do you?

The problem is that withdrawal from and disagreement with multilateral treaties carries a much higher political price. Once so entangled, it’s very difficult with extricate yourself, as we’re seeing now with the furor over Bush withdrawing from a treaty which hasn’t even been ratified.

It wasn’t MEANT to be ‘balanced’. I made a few short points to show some of the flaws of Kyoto. I wasn’t trying to write an essay on Kyoto’s strengths and weaknesses. There are more weaknesses than I mentioned, and plenty of good points, too. It’s simply outside of the scope of this discussion.

And I’m aware that the U.S. was in favor of the carbon-sink adjustments, but that doesn’t mean that they are a good thing.

It all depends on how you look at it. If all you are looking at is the total amount of CO2 emitted by each country, then it makes sense to include the natural carbon sinks each country has. But if we are going to consider natural factors like that, shouldn’t we also consider other environmental factors? As a Canadian, I want a special exemptiion for the fact that I live in a freaking deep-freeze for 8 months of the year. That’s one reason why Canadians are some of the highest per-capita energy users in the world.

But the other problem with carbon sinks allowances is not on environmental grounds, but in terms of economic distortion. If countries with natural carbon sinks are allowed to have dirtier industries, then they gain a natural economic advantage from the treaty that they didn’t have before. Their factories can cost less to operate than those of a country that through a fluke of geography doesn’t have large carbon sinks.

As I recall, one of the reasons Japan was so in favor of Kyoto was because it was claiming so many credits for its carbon sinks that it would cost Japan significantly less to meet Kyoto targets than other countries, giving Japan a new manafacturing advantage. In addition, Japan and other countries have been looking at exploiting a loophole in Kyoto that gives them credits for forest land, but no debits for deforestation. Therefore, Japan has been studying plans to clear-cut old-growth forests and replace them with plantations of Eucalyptus and other fast-growing plants that sink more carbon than old-growth forest does.

This is one of those ‘unintended consequences’ that tend to spring up when bad treaties are put into law.

Also, there is new science suggesting that some tropical rainforests are actually carbon emitters instead of being carbon sinks. So either you ignore that, or you turn those types of forests into carbon emitters for purposes of the treaty and tax countries that have them. But then, you’re just encouraging them to clearcut rainforest, which isn’t exactly what we want, is it? So now you have a case where you have to turn a blind eye towards science and rationality in order to stick to a fllawed treaty that didn’t make a lot of sense to begin with.

The last study I looked at said that by 2100, the net effect of Kyoto would be to delay warming by six years. In other words, the world will be about as warm in 2100 without Kyoto as it would be in 2106 with it. That doesn’t sound like much of a reduction to me.

Oh, please. According to The Brookings Institution, China will surpass the U.S. in greenhouse gas emission by 2020, and will at that time be the single largest emitter of greenhouse gases. According to the USIA, the developing world as a whole will surpass the industrial nations in greenhouse gase emission by as early as 2010. And the developing world is largely exempt from Kyoto. That’s one major reason why Kyoto turns out to have such a small effect in overall warming trends.

In fact, the problem is even worse than that, due to the unintended consequences I was talking about. The economic effect of Kyoto will undoubtedly cause many factories to relocate from industrial nations to the developing nations. That in turn may cause them to operate with even fewer emissions controls than they have now.

As I just pointed out, Kyoto is FAR from a ‘global’ framework. In my opinion, it was a bad treaty rushed along by a number of democratic nations seeking to score points with the electorate during a period of unusually high attention to environmental matters. It was poorly thought out, and suffers from the exact problems of trade diversion and arbitrage you just suggested it would avoid. In addition, it gives many U.S. competitors like China a strategic advantage. It is grounded in poor science, its ramifications and unintended consquences were given only cursory consideration. It simply wasn’t a very smart treaty.

Oh, I’m sorry. Was there a refutation in there somewhere? Or were you just amusing yourself by firing a cheap shot at me, while smearing December at the same time?

Sorry, I’m having a hard time parsing that sentence. If you’d like to re-state that point I’ll be happy to debate it.

COLLOUNSBURY –

[quote]
Rubbish, absolute rot. [/quoe]

Sez you, ya ascerbic bastard. :wink:

Sorry; couldn’t resist.

Eh. I’m probably congenitally incapable of thinking that the legal aspect of a treaty intended to set up a legal court of law – especially a criminal one – is the “least important aspect” of it. If it doesn’t work, legally, then it’s not a good idea. That said, even I can see that a flawed treaty is probably better than no treaty, under the premise that we have to start somewhere.

I see this as well, but I wonder about the long-term costs of appearing to be in favor of a treaty that the nation (based on the unlikelihood of ratification) is not really in favor of. I’m not convinced of the value of appearing to support something we don’t really support. It seems like the short terms gains would be outweighed by the long term detriment of balking at ratifying something we had heretofore seemed to support.

I don’t believe the situations are analogous, since we are not required to “option” future involvement. AFAIK, we can sign up for it any time, even if we don’t do so today. We could even wait until the enterprise is up and running and tested and then say “Hey! This is a good idea! Sign us up!” That said, I again do see that we cede the right to work to change the treaty and/or ICC if we walk away from it entirely – to the extent that having walked would not itself be an incentive to fix the problems the U.S. is concerned with, if our participation is considered crucial.

I don’t belive my analysis of the matter has been either emotional or non-rational. Flawed, perhaps. But rational just the same.

Once again – eh. I’m not much for appearing to intend to do something you do not, in fact, intend to do, because I’m not sure the short-term gains of influence and public image would not be ultimately outweighed by the outrage at the duplicity of being an apparent enthusiastic supporter and then failing to ratify. If that makes me appear to be a naif if the area of international law, so be it.

But I see your points, and I’m not sure I disagree. Damn. :wink:

I am always very happy when Sam decides to come out to play, being very amused by him.

Good, I would not disagree that the last point is * possible* albeit not a foregone conclusion.

All interests, diverge. The question is degree and magnitude.

Ah, Sam, I do so love you and am endlessly entertained. It matters not to me how seriously you take but the enjoyment I get from sparring with me.

Well, leaving your criticism aside, and some parts are quite valid, some are something of a shrinking violet nature, let us get on to the meat of matters. (and once more, can anyone repair this quote function, it is bloody broken and bloody annoying.)

Precisely, indeed my own feelings on the ICC are ambiguous.

Now, Sam, let’s not call strawmen analysis and vice versa. My position is that the neo-con rot is largely motivated by ideology and analysis comes second. I will freely grant that developing this theme requires (a) a subjective (although rational) reading of the texts/writings and (b) rather more material than so presented. On the other hand, the same may be said for the assertion that the treaty is X,Y and Z where there are numerous areas of discussion and where learned observers (even of a conservative bent) disagree strikes me as an area where many assertions as to operation and problems fall down. I maintain that the undisciplined assertions in regards to the issues noted above (previously) are indeed quite ideological rather than analytical.

Now, in regards to the issue of marginal cost of indivudiual treaties versus multilaterals and the US, here we hit upon an issue of no small un-clarity. Where are we to judge this? In relation to a small nation’s costs or in relationship to same actor costs. It strikes me that unless there is some compelling reason to opt for higher costs per action/unit, one should opt for the lower cost option.

The problem being of course that few think of this in terms of costs and benefits, but rather un-qualifited or quantified emotive ideas like sovereignty and the like.

As for ‘geographical isolation’ – well this is a much less relatevant in our modern world, indeed I will argue that it nears being anachronistic given US dependence in absolute terms on outside capital flows. Indeed neither recent --in the past 10 yrs-- growth nor recent funding of investment would have been possible without international capital flows and international trade. It strikes me as provincial, at best, to assert the US has little to no concern as to its relations, whether they are commercial or political, with ex-North America. Never mind the fact that one can rarely distinguish in a fully meaningful way between commercial and political.

As such, it strikes me that your point, weak as it was in the beginning, has hardly grown stronger, although I did enjoy the reply.

[sub]
(See Sam, if you want to spar, just reply in this manner. I get all reasonable. It’s more sporting that way and I get far more entertainment out of it.) [/sub]

I grant that immediately, and I am sure you know that I am, well , a fairly virulent if nuanced free trader myself. We can agree on this point readily.

Maybe yes, maybe no. I’ve been trying to focus on the issue of signature and ‘un-signing’ rather than ICC itself as I have not come to a solid opinion on the treaty per se. As such, while I have some opinions, I am trying to avoid getting into a debate where I do not feel learned enough to contribute.

Well, if one does not want to set up weak parallels, one should not do so.

Certainly this is something which is hard to quantify. perhaps impossible.

However, one can look at the effort needed to negotiate a single treaty versus the marginal additional effort to widen the treaty versus the additional marginal benefit.

Now this really requires some deeper inquiry, which I should try to provide when I sober up.

Leaving that aside:

Well, Sam, the political price is high relative to the benefits and costs, but I’ve already made that argument. i am sure that the neo-Con comic books are just all so very happy about this, but that doesn’t change the final analysis.

Now I shall try to forgo a Kyoto analysis here but

Yes, 20 years from now, Sam. 20. We all know how excellent 20 year economic projections are.

Oh bother, if one uses worst case assumptions, but I’m too drunk and tired to go on.

I was expressing my disregard for your collective sourcing and understanding of Europe and current commentary. Which is to say, I find your sources to be crap.

Now there is also Jodi but I am worn out.

Um Jodi… as you posted:

The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

Of course you TOTALLY jump to conclusions. Did you ever look at articles 121 and 123?!

*Article 121
Amendments

  1.     After the expiry of seven years from the entry into force of this Statute, any State Party may propose amendments thereto. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall promptly circulate it to all States Parties. 
    
  2.     No sooner than three months from the date of notification, the Assembly of States Parties, at its next meeting, shall, by a majority of those present and voting, decide whether to take up the proposal. The Assembly may deal with the proposal directly or convene a Review Conference if the issue involved so warrants. 
    
  3.     The adoption of an amendment at a meeting of the Assembly of States Parties or at a Review Conference on which consensus cannot be reached shall require a two-thirds majority of States Parties. 
    
  4.     Except as provided in paragraph 5, an amendment shall enter into force for all States Parties one year after instruments of ratification or acceptance have been deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations by seven-eighths of them. 
    
  5.     Any amendment to articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this Statute shall enter into force for those States Parties which have accepted the amendment one year after the deposit of their instruments of ratification or acceptance. In respect of a State Party which has not accepted the amendment, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the amendment when committed by that State Party's nationals or on its territory. 
    
  6.     If an amendment has been accepted by seven-eighths of States Parties in accordance with paragraph 4, any State Party which has not accepted the amendment may withdraw from this Statute with immediate effect, notwithstanding article 127, paragraph 1, but subject to article 127, paragraph 2, by giving notice no later than one year after the entry into force of such amendment. 
    
  7.     The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall circulate to all States Parties any amendment adopted at a meeting of the Assembly of States Parties or at a Review Conference.*
    

*Article 123
Review of the Statute

  1.     Seven years after the entry into force of this Statute the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene a Review Conference to consider any amendments to this Statute. Such review may include, but is not limited to, the list of crimes contained in article 5. The Conference shall be open to those participating in the Assembly of States Parties and on the same conditions. 
    
  2.     At any time thereafter, at the request of a State Party and for the purposes set out in paragraph 1, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, upon approval by a majority of States Parties, convene a Review Conference. 
    
  3.     The provisions of article 121, paragraphs 3 to 7, shall apply to the adoption and entry into force of any amendment to the Statute considered at a Review Conference.*
    

So, who’s '100% totally wrong…‘confirmed via the links’ now? :stuck_out_tongue:

I think it does. Unless we confirm we are hypocrites, because we will continue to violate national soveriegnty as it suits us.

As said, wrong. Signing it but not ratifying it means that you are advocating a wait and see approach. Not signing it at all, means you disagree that such a court should ever exist.

You’ve seem to created a totally new excuse for rejection, creating the term of ‘acceptable legal systems’, which ‘isn’t what the treaty says’. It says that if the country proceeds with a trial then then the ICC won’t prosecute. HOWEVER, if that trial is thought to be ingenious, or there is a refusal to trial, then the ICC may step in. By saying ‘acceptable legal systems’ you are being somewhat decietful. They do not look for if the system was acceptable or not, they evaluate each trial, on a trial-by-trial basis. They make NO judgments on the systems that exist, contrary to what you say.

So do you believe a Supreme Court of the US should not exist because their might be the threat of political shenanagans, because they are appointed by politicians?

Yes, we have that right, and yes, it makes us seem very arrogant. You can’t always get ALL you want, especially when there are more than 2 sides.

Then protest away :D. The federal courts don’t have the protections that your state courts might. So if you are hauled in front of federal courts, you might not be getting the rights your state or even your municipality has. It is the compromise that Americans make.