You make the mistaken of assuming my aim is identical to yours
I could not care less what you believe. If you post that black is white and when I point out your error you still insist you are right then fine by me. I will continue challenge yor claim black is white every time you post it.
So keep believing whatever you want. I could not care less.
(post shortened)
Operation Market-Garden was concieved after the landings at Normandy had proved successful. Unlike the well known need to liberate as many French and Belgium seaports as possible, hopefully intact. The failed Dieppe raid in 1942 showed that Atlantic Wall ports were too well defended. And they had only been getting stronger. That left a beach landing(s) as the next best option to gain a foothold in France. Once a foothold had been established, deep water ports like Le Havre, Dieppe, Boulogne, Calais, Dunkirk, Ostend, and Arnhem could be taken from the land side. And the Canadian 1st Army was tasked with liberating those ports. During the attempt to retake Dunkirk, Monty moved the Scheldt to the top of the Canadian’s list. Dunkirk and the others would have to wait their turn.
Market-Garden was an inland operation. Up to Arnhem, turn right, and on to Berlin. When it failed, due to strong, determined, Nazi opposition, the relatively intact Arnhem port and the Scheldt became a major objective of the British 2nd Army.
*…The Battle for the Seaports
by Ruud Bruyns
Battle for the Channel ports
On the 4th of September the British 2nd Army managed to capture the vital port of Antwerp, the second largest port in Western Europe after Rotterdam, unscathed with the help of the Belgian resistance. With the capture of Antwerp the supply problems of the Allies seemed to be solved overnight, but the approaches were firmly in German hands making the Scheldt estuary impassable for Allied shipping. The German 15th Army was still on the Belgian and Dutch coast to deny the use of the ports, which were the closest to England from where the supply were transported to the European mainland.
The capture of Antwerp also heralded the end of the continuous advance since August. Allies outran their supply lines, partly because of their own strategy of bombing the French and Belgian infrastructure to deny its use by the German army. Railroads and bridges were thoroughly destroyed and the Allies had to find another way to supply their troops. In order to tackle the increasing supply problems the Allies resorted to the Red Ball Express, a system of convoys by trucks to keep the supply running. Almost 6.000 trucks were constantly riding to and fro by a system of roads which were blocked for non-military traffic. The Red Ball Express was basically a patch-up system of a planned temporary situation of supply via the Normandy beaches. In order to sustain the offensive the Allies needed a deepwater seaport.
It has often been said that Montgomery lost a chance to trap the German 15th Army in the Scheldt estuary as he directed the British 2nd Army towards Arnhem to capture a bridge over the Rhine. I am inclined to say that Montgomery has drawn a large portion of this German army away from defending the Scheldt estuary by his attack on Arnhem. If the German had more troops buckled up in this area the conquest might have been more severe or even ended in a failure to dislodge the Germans in a foreseeable future. Success at Arnhem also might have resulted in a vital weakening of the German 15th Army by cutting its supply lines with Germany. The actual encirclement of a relative small portion of Germans around the Scheldt estuary did not make the conquest so much easier. Imagine it be defended by a whole army. Still, the main body of the German 15th Army still hung on to defend the area around the Scheldt, despite the fact that it ‘escaped’ encirclement.
In the beginning of September 1944, the British 2nd Army was mainly deployed in the interior along the axis of Brussels and Antwerp, while the rather weak Canadian 1st Army was appointed the unenviable and inglorious task of besieging the German strongholds of the most heavily fortified section of the ‘Atlantic Wall’, which were sufficiently manned and supplied to last a siege. In the French port of Le Havre near Normandy there were still 12.000 Germans, in Boulogne 10.0000 and in nearby Calais 10.000 soldiers. All these port were captured in the course of September 1944 by the Canadians. Still, the main body of the German 15th Army managed to escape by ferry and blocked the road to Rotterdam, the largest port in Western Europe, by putting up fierce resistance in the following months. It was not until November 1944 that the Germans were expelled from this area.
The most intriguing part of the deployment of German troops on the Belgian and Dutch coast was that the German were not only maintaining the original garrisons, but also used newly raised divisions for the defence of the ports: the 226th Infantry Division was garrisoned in Dunkirk, the 64th Infantry Division was located in Breskens on the southern bank of the Scheldt estuary, while the 70th Infantry Division was located on the northern bank on the island of Walcheren. Apparently these divisions could be missed in the defence of the German homeland, while the American army was already crossing the German border on several places in the beginning of September. All together the Germans left no less than 100.000 soldiers to defend the ports on the English Channel to deny their use to the Allies.
…The German had already fortified the harbours along the coast of France, Belgium and Holland with the knowledge that no Allied invasion or advance could be sustained without the possession of at least one deep water port for bringing in troops and supplies. The Allies acknowledged this and constructed temporary artificial harbours on the Normandy coast, the Mullberries. Most efforts of the Allies were directed to acquire a port which could handle the increasing demand of men, supplies and fuel.
In September 1944 most ports in France were thoroughly demolished by German engineers or occupied by German garrisons. The liberation of Antwerp on the 4th of September brought no immediate relief, because the Germans were still holding out on the Scheldt estuary. The dislodgement of the German 15th Army was daunting task, which took three months of bloody battles and hard sieges. The fact that the Germans committed fresh divisions to the defence of the ports is proof that there was a strategy to keep the ports out of the hands of the Allies. In the end, the approximately a little more than 200.000 German soldiers were committed to this task, while the German borders were deprived of troops to man the West Wall.
The German strategy was almost successful at drawing Allied forces from the direction of Germany as the American 3rd Army of Patton was almost drawn into costly but futile sieges in Brittany in August 1944, while the Canadian 1st Army was spending more than three months clearing out the German garrisons along the coast of the English Channel. The most important result of the German strategy was the lack of much needed supplies to continue the Allied drive into Germany. This gave the German army time to recover from the setbacks of the summer and launch an abortive counteroffensive as a last bid to recapture the main Allied supply hub at Antwerp.*
http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/articles/battleforseaports.aspx
What relation does Market-Garden have to do with the Normandy landings?
Again, so what? How many times do you need to read Monty’s own words before it actually sinks in?
Market-Garden delayed the taking of the Scheldt and the opening of the port of Antwerp for weeks. All parties involved in the operations agree on that point, you have Monty’s agreement in his own word right there.
Now you are officially just spouting complete gibberish. Arnhem isn’t a port.
My mistake. The relatively intact Antwerp port…
Said “challenge” consisting of your unsourced opinions, and thus worth next to nothing, you see.
That is your opinion.
Oh, I’m sure you value your unsourced opinions quite highly, but don’t value mine much. I’m in the same boat with regard to yours. So, here we are. That appears to be all, then.
That is just another opinion…
So it is. And it’s your opinion that my post was an opinion. And it’s my opinion that your post stating that my post was an opinion was an opinion. Since, as stated, you don’t care about mine, and I’m only interested in ones with factual support, that’ll do it for me. Have a fine day.
So you say, That makes it your opinion.
Hugo First and Human Action, knock it off.
[ /Moderating ]
The reference to the Normandy landings is a point in time. The liberation of the ports were planned before Normandy. Market-Garden was planned after Normandy.
Nazi opposition delayed completion of many of the best laid plans of the Allies. So did the weather, miscalculations, and lack of fuel, food, ammo, etc…
From your link -
*Montgomery claimed that Market Garden was “90% successful” and said:
It was a bad mistake on my part – I underestimated the difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp … I reckoned the Canadian Army could do it while we were going for the Ruhr. I was wrong … In my — prejudiced — view, if the operation had been properly backed from its inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces, and administrative resources necessary for the job, it would have succeeded in spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area. I remain Market Garden’s unrepentant advocate*.
…In 1948, Eisenhower wrote that “The attack began well and unquestionably would have been successful except for the intervention of bad weather.”
…Responsibility for the failure “began with Eisenhower and extended to Montgomery, Brereton, Browning, and, on the ground side, Dempsey and Horrocks, neither of whom … galvanised their tank units while there was still time to have seized and held Arnhem bridge”. In the end Browning and Montgomery made Sosabowski (who had been ignored) and the Poles the scapegoat.
Montgomery had assigned the liberation of the ports, which would have included the Scheldt, to the 1st Canadian Army. And that had been decided before the Normandy landing. The Canadians, as well as every other unit in Europe (including the Nazis), could have used more men, more fuel, more armor, and more air cover.
The choice of which army to supply for a single push into Germany was between Bradley and Montgomery. Monty was still counting on the Canadians to clear the coast and had rearranged the Canadian’s priorities to clear the Scheldt sooner. I’m unaware of any supplies that Monty withheld from the Canadians that were then used to supply Market-Garden.
Title of this thread is somewhat prejudiced. Associating someone as “s…” suddenly implies negative meaning. It is also amusing. During Montgomery’s command of South West England one officer described him to another new officer as “an efficient shit” Emphasis should be efficient word I think. Because compared to other Allied commanders Montgomery was efficient. He got the job done. He was popular among troops because he disliked needless casaulties. He was aware of low manpower reserves of Britain and the fact that he was commanding last field army of Britain and Commonwealth. He was a veteran of Great War and seen the slaughter in trenches in Western Front. He was also aware of the fact that despite material superiorty troops in Allied armies and civilian societies in Allied nations had a fragile morale , easy to demoralize , lose confidence to high command.
We are talking about a man who rose ranks from simple officer to Field Marshal. And despite dislike of high ranking US officers , Eisenhower did trust Montgomery enough to give him command of US Armies , plan major operations and execute them. The main reasons his reputation suffered so much after the war is I think his oversized ego and bad manners like vanity , pomposity , PR - nmedia hungriness , frank , blunt and rude style , undiplomatic approach (his boss Imperial Chief of Staff Alan Brooke said Montgomery had an inability to emphatize with others , to look matters from others perspective) Besides he was not brilliant as his detractors and his own memoirs descried him to be in high command. But he was compatent , responsible , reasonable and saw big strategic picture better than anyone else. He was also excellent motivator , marale raiser , organizer and trainer for troops. He was decisive when needed and flexible when conditions required.
A lot of Montgomery critics confuse today with WW2 conditions or ignore the difference between combatants. During World War 2 Allied armies were not German Army and German army was not Allies in quality , organization , training and doctrine. Allied armies were mainly made of conscripts , “civilians in uniform” and ameteurs compared to Germans in tactical and operational skills. Allied tactical outlook to war was remained from World War I and did not change or evolve. They learned or rediscovered a çlot of things on the job. Germans were at the other hand were excellently prepared for short quick knockout campaigns in quality of forces , doctrine , training , equipment. Germans were improvisors , opputunists which exploited every breakthough and seeked to have initiative. Their “mission oriented approach” served well. The problem was they had very faulty or non existent strategy mostly. Allied armed forces were different in these regards. Allied armies were accustomed to be controlled from above from a central command , slow , and afraid to holding initiative and stuck to WWI style fighting on ordered fronts. Whenever they tried to copy or imitate Germans and tactics and used them against Germans they failed. (check out entire North African Campaign)
Montgomery had to keep these factors in mind while planning , preparing and executing his operations. That’s why sometimes he seemed cautious , slow or overpromising. Numerical or quantity advantages were less important because changing factors in battlefield , terrain and tactical difference between combatants could also reduce or erase these advantegous factors as well as increase them during entire war. Montgomery was aware that his forces performed best when fighting in WWI style ordered unbroken fronts and defence lines with massive firepower and logistical advantage and controlled from above. He also realized that Germans couldn’t handle Great War style attrition warfare because their resouces were also limited. Montgomery was also aware that tactically British or American armies might not be as proffesional as Germans in mobile maneuver warfare but to keep winning and keep up troops morale he needed as safe winning formula. His answer was going back to WWI conditions and more over forcing enemy also to do the same. That way he dictated battlefield conditions over Axis and increased his advantages and odds to win , not Germans. In summary he refused to play in conditions and terms of Germans ( Rommels in desert or later Von Rundstedt’s in Europe) Again maybe that seems classic unimaginative or slow but Allied armies tactical structure and organization was like that and suited best to that kind of warfare. To compare or grade Monthgomery’s career or performance you need to take account of the his forces , quality of these forces , their opposition and their record until Montgomery came into play and took active command.
As I said efficient shit like somebody else described but as long as he took positive results he was worth to everything in Allied war effort. Later other Allied commanders also copied his methods like having a numerical superiorty before committing an operation and turning every condition like logistics and intelligence to their fasvour as much as possible to increase odds. They would be fools not to. If he could check his ego better I am sure his legacy would be remembered in better terms.
He was famous for his bickering with Patton and Eisenhower; it seemed he didn’t like Americans much. Patton described his tour of the troops resembled “Christ cleansing the temple.”
He often wrote about “his” victories with no mention that the Americans who were there at all. Things turned around for the British in North Africa after Montgomery arrived, and he took full credit. But of course, the fortunes of the British only began to change in North Africa when American lend-lease equipment and American forces arrived.
I don’t think anyone has mentioned that Montgomery was loathed by those who served under him. Apart from all the self-publicity, here’s another reason:
"During the Second World War, there were separate brothels for officers and men… General Montgomery also closed down the (regulated and inspected) brothels in Egypt. One army doctor complained “Within three weeks every bed in the previously almost deserted VD ward, and every bed that could be crammed onto the verandah, was full.”
Officers who harm their men to prove a moral point are not popular.
I might have mentioned this last year, but the Patton-Montgomery rivalry existed almost entirely in Patton’s own head. There was no race to be the first to take Messina during the Sicilian campaign; Montgomery was in favor of shifting the weight of the Allied advance to the American sector once his own drive up the eastern coast was stalling out. The movie Patton makes a great deal of this imagined rivalry, including the entirely invented scene of Montgomery throwing his pen down on the table and exclaiming “Damn” when informed that Patton had taken Palermo. While a good movie, it is a very poor biography of Patton, and if you pay close attention you’ll notice that the actual unflawed hero in the movie is Bradley. This is hardly surprising as the movie was based partly upon Omar Bradley’s memoirs, and Bradley was the military advisor in the production of the movie. Bradley also had an intense personal dislike of Patton and contempt for Montgomery, which shows through in the movie. Carlo D’Este’s Bitter Victory: The Battle for Sicily goes into depth on the whole Patton-Montgomery rivalry.
There’s an interesting contrast between the way way that Montgomery and Chester Nimitz handled a similar situation. Both men had won a major battle (El Alamein and Midway) and a big factor in their victories had been allied code-breaking. Each man knew the exact plans and disposition of forces he was facing and was able to place his forces exactly where they would be best suited. This was a huge advantage that contributed to their victories.
But for security reasons, neither man could reveal that they had had this information. Germany and Japan couldn’t find out that their codes had been broken. So Montgomery and Nimitz couldn’t explain how it was that their forces had been at the exact right spots at the starts of the battles.
They handled it differently. Nimitz was as reticent on the subject as he could be but when pressed he ascribed it to luck. Montgomery, on the other hand, said that his placement of forces had been due to his military genius. He claimed that he had figured out, all on his own, where Rommel’s forces would attack and placed his forces accordingly. Which was bullshit - the only reason Montgomery knew where Rommel was going to attack was because he had been told by London code breakers.
Not sure how he made Monty look like a pecker head, Rommel’s successes were against other Generals, Monty won all his battles in North Africa.
Ultra was only a small part of the Intelligence picture that the Middle East command had of the Afrika Korp. While very useful, it was things like photo reconnaissance and interpretation, the road watch of LRDG, the various deceptions played on the Germans that bore fruit. At El Alamein, the was no flanking to be had, it was a small front between the sea and Qattara depression, once operation Lightfoot stalled in the minefields, it became a battle of attrition from which there would be only one winner and with Hitler’s interference meant it was a decisive victory.
It’s hard to make a comparison with other successful generals in WW2. Time Magazine named him one of the three deadliest generals of the 20th century mainly because he planned and commanded the two biggest operations of their kind in history: the Normandy invasion and the Arnhem attack.
The other two were Curtiss LeMay for strategic bombing, and Vo Nguyen Giap for guerilla warfare.
“In retreat, indomitable; in advance, invincible; in victory, insufferable.”
– Winston Churchill on Montgomery