To give Montgomery the benefit of the doubt it’s perhaps fortunate that he did ascribe his victory to his own genius. The allies couldn’t possibly have claimed every victory was due to good luck. It wouldn’t take long for our opponents and allies(both of whom were kept in the dark about enigma) to figure out we had rather too much good luck in fighting these battles. Im saying this in part flippantly. I can understand why folks would be upset at Monty for ascribing his genius to his victories, but we really could not always give luck as the reason for our victories and at the same time maintain a plausible denial of Enigma.
BBC’s Bertie & Elizabeth – advance to 3:10.
A TV dramatization of events based on scriptwriter fantasies about what was said by various personages to each other does not represent anything resembling valid history.
If anyone found Montgomery’s beret objectionable it would have been up to British Army Chief, General Alan Brooke, to raise the matter and forbid its use.
Ah yes. Good old Winnie.
If Allied forces had been defeated at El Alamein or even at the battle that preceded El Alamein, the battle of Alam El Halfa, Rommel’s final throw of the dice in August/September 1942, Churchill would have been forced to resign as Prime Minister. However, he showed no gratitude at having his political bacon saved by The Eighth Army.
From General Alan Brooke’s diary entry of 12 October 1944:
Winston Churchill once mentioned half jokingly: ‘History will be very kind to me. I shall write most of it.’
Many of the things he put in his history of WWII were disputed by numerous British military commanders, but with little impact on the historical record.
Neither Overlord nor Market Garden have been surpassed in size. And decades before the term photo bomber was invented, look who’s standing behind two heads of state:
They all look like they’ve got one foot in the grave.
There’s only one (former?) head of state (President of the American elective dictatorship) in the picture, and one (former?) head of government (Prime Minister of the British elective oligarchy - i.e. committee of elected dictators).
Going on the accounts by historian Nigel Hamilton, the generals who loathed him the most were those that he wanted transferred elsewhere on the grounds that they were, in his view, “useless”.
These included generals Ramsden, “useless”, Corbett, “useless”, Lumsden (does not follow orders), Dorman-Smith “a menace”.
As for General Auchinleck who was sacked by Churchill, Montgomery also regarded him as completely useless.
Going on post war memoirs, most of the remaining staff of his Desert Army HQ thought quite highly of him, as did the allied commanders (New Zealand, Australia, South Africa) in the Alamein front.
Montgomery was never in charge of Army HQ in Cairo and had no authority to close down the brothels of Egypt.
If it happened at all, Army HQ, presumably under Auchinleck, would have given the order.
Regardless, I doubt that it happened at all. Which American historian/fiction writer, if any, are you quoting from?
Montgomery did get into some trouble involving brothels as Divisional commander stationed near Lille, France, just before the outbreak of war.
Nigel Hamilton’s Monty - The Making of a General quotes an incident where he issued a Divisional Order that troops must take precautions when engaged in what he described as “horizontal refreshment”. He ensured that condoms were available from the army store and with his medical staff identified those brothels in Lille that were hygienic and those that were less so.
This landed him into a lot of trouble with the Army chaplains who complained about it to the Army commanders, Generals Gort and Brooke, who forced a withdrawal of the order.
Another reason the chaplains detested Montgomery occurred when he was first appointed commander of the 3rd Division in Southern England before it was moved to Lille, France, as part of the BEF, he abolished the compulsory Sunday church parade, a rare thing for an army commander to do in those days. His view was that how a soldier practiced his religion was a personal matter and not the Army’s responsibility.
I’ve suddenly woken up to the fact that this is a revival of a long dead thread. God only knows how many horrible howlers are on the previous four pages.
I think I’ll sleep on it.
It sounds like you have a bee in your bonnet there…
They all look prosperous and relaxed. Coupled with the fact that people will continue to talk about them should make for a happy, contented end. Good luck to the rest of us?
Well, apparently Rommel thought highly of Montgomery :“he did not make a single mistake” (on El Alamain). However, Montgomery was very cautious, and his reluctance to attack (until he had total superiority) led to many missed opportunities (like allowing the Germans to escape Sicily). his idea (about invading German via NE Holland had some merit, but he was overruled.
Really, all of the British and American generals had to operate with caution-they had a press back home that didn’t like reports of heavy casualties. Whereas Russian generals didn’t care-they just wanted to win, whatever the cost in lives.
And they knew what would happen to them if the driving force behind that approach decided they weren’t up to it.
Not really.
I try to look at institutions as they really are, not as institutions claim to be.
It helps to reduce the effect of political cultism. Something to which everyone is susceptible to, to varying degrees.
Jesus effing C.
Neither Montgomery nor Patton were responsible for arranging the interdiction of the air and sea transporters that moved almost all of the German contingent across the Messina Strait to the Italian mainland. That was the responsibility of British General Alexander and US General Eisenhower who were supposed to be in charge of the invasion.
Alexander did “suggest” to the commanders of air and naval forces that they take action to hamper the evacuation of German forces, but a suggestion is not the same as an order and little was done.
No ,you are right…He was hugely overrated…Market GARDEN was an embarrassment.
North Africa means nothing against a stranded Rommel left alone by Hitler …
One doesn’t need to be AMERİCAN to acknowledge facts…
I still think Market Garden was a brilliant plan --that failed. And if only the powers had a different mind set, and let Monty be the overall ground commander of the western forces, Berlin might have fallen six months ahead.
Indeed. Alexander’s loose and hands off approach to leadership in his position as an Army Group commander was a major failing of his; even more so when the Army Group he commanded in Sicily and Italy was a mixed British and American force, to say nothing of the multitude of other nationalities that fought under Allied command in Italy. Even orders from Alexander when he actually gave them weren’t taken as much more than suggestions. After the Sicilian campaign was over, Patton complained about the unfairness of Alexander’s Route 124 directive in a conversation with Montgomery:
There was so much wrong with the Market Garden plan it’d take an essay to cover it all. It required taking and holding every bridge intact along a narrow corridor in order to keep to the timetable, which didn’t happen right from the start when the 101st had a bridge at Eindhoven blown up. The corridor was vulnerable to being cut at any point, which it was on September 22nd between Grave and Veghel and again on September 24th south of Veghel when German counterattacks cut the road - the only road being used to support the entire advance. There weren’t enough transports to drop the entire force at once, it would require several days if the weather cooperated to drop the entire force. The drop zones at Arnhem for the British 1st Airborne were between 5 and 8 miles from the city and the bridge. A good part of the route, including the entire route from Nijmegen to Arnhem was polder, soil saturated with water that made it impossible for tanks to maneuver off the road. The road from Nijmegen to Arnhem was also an elevated road, which silhouetted tanks on it quite nicely; the entire advance could and was stopped by a single 88mm AT gun. All of that is just for starters of the problems in the plan.
Market Garden was a good plan. It was a risky operation that had a good chance of failing. But the cost of it failing was low and the benefits if it succeeded would have been high so it was worth the effort.
But while it was Montgomery’s idea, he was a terrible choice to lead the operation. As I noted, this was an operation based on risk and Montgomery was risk-averse.
The cost of it failing was very high, and as you admit yourself it had a good chance of failing. I’m not just talking about the casualties - the British 1st Airborne Division was effectively destroyed at Arnhem, losing 8,000 men and never seeing action again. I realize this is a two year old zombie thread, but if you look way back at the beginning of it, but the cost of launching Market Garden was it delayed starting operations to clear the Scheldt Estuary by at least two to three weeks, during which time the Germans were able to retreat the 15th Army across it and place it in position to put up a bitter fight for it, keeping it from being cleared until November 8th. As a result the port of Antwerp was useless to the Allies until the Estuary was first cleared and then de-mined; the first ship did not enter Antwerp until November 28th.