Look, Monty was a WW1 veteran, and he because of that hated frontal assault which caused huge losses for little gain and the U.K no longer had the men to send to the grinder (and the Normandy and N France campaign had casualty rates higher then the Somme in 1916, 2200 IIRC a day versus 1700).
Market-Garden was the type of warfare that the Brits had fought for centuries.
You have a point. Clearing the Scheldt was a major goal and it was delayed for several weeks because of Market-Garden. And that also falls in Montgomery’s lap; he should never have allowed the Germans to build up their forces along the Scheldt.
But overall, the loss was a delay of a month or so and the cost of 15,000 casualties. It didn’t change the outcome of the campaign in the west. If Market-Garden had worked, it could have cut several months off the war and prevented 150,000 casualties.
The primary justification for Market Garden was the inability of the Allied supply situation to support a broad front offensive. Had the resources and effort spent on the high risk operation that Market Garden was been spent instead on opening Antwerp to become the primary supply port for the Allies in a timely manner there’s no reason it couldn’t have been opened by say mid-October rather than on November 28th. The going would have been much easier had 15th Army not been allowed to escape and fortify on the Scheldt. Had the Allied supply situation cleared up six weeks sooner that too could have shaved months off of the war without being such a huge gamble.
Just to add, a good portion of the reserves that the Germans were able to scrape together with which to stop Market Garden came from the very same 15th Army:
I’d have to disagree with that. Market-Garden was developed more with the idea that it would make a broad front strategy unnecessary not that a broad front strategy was unworkable. The idea was that rather than pushing back along the entire German line, resources should be concentrated on breaking through the line in one place and that would cause the rest of the German line to collapse.
Politics and ego were as much a factor as military necessity. Many generals, including Montgomery, would have rather been the single general leading the main offensive rather than one of a team of generals advancing together in a group offensive.
To phrase it differently, there simply were not enough supplies to go around for everyone to be attacking on a broad front. Allied supplies still had to be driven all the way from the beaches at Normandy at this point; and the Allied supply lines were reaching their limit to continue to support offensive action along the entire length of the Western front as it had been since the breakout in Normandy and the race across France. There was no real option at this point but to curtail offensive action along most of the front until the supply situation stabilized and concentrate supplies for major offensive action at only one point on the front. The decision was ultimately made to use these resources to launch Market Garden, when in retrospect it would have made far more sense to concentrate this effort on opening the port of Antwerp, thus stabilizing the Allied supply situation so that the hard choices about where the available supplies were to used and what parts of the front line were going to have to do without enough fuel or ammunition to keep going forward wouldn’t have had to be made. Once it was open Antwerp was the major supply port for the Allies; its importance as such made it a primary objective for the Germans in the Ardennes offensive and the #1 target for V-2 rockets. More V-2s were fired at Antwerp than at London, even though both remained in range.
The somewhat backwards logic in the desire to get a bridgehead over the Rhine even though clearing Antwerp was going to be necessary to sustain a thrust deep into Germany is summed up here pretty well:
This same First Canadian Army that was being denied the ability to conduct unrestriced use of its forces to accomplish this mission because of the logistical situation where the supplies were going to Market Garden.
What does “fill the Mall” mean?
The Mall is the road that leads down from Buckingham Palace to the Admiralty Arch/Trafalgar Square. It is traditionally where the crowds gather to celebrate great events and cheer the King/Queen. Churchill’s point is that Montgomery wants to receive his Field Marshal’s baton from the King at Buckingham Palace so that afterwards he can stand on the balcony by the King while the crowds cheer him to the rafters.
Thanks! 
No problem. Of course Churchill was not averse to standing on the balcony himself! Mind you, it didn’t do him much good - he lost the General Election less than two months later.
Having talked about Montgomery’s ability it is interesting to think about his popularity. Eisenhower was elected President, could Monty have run for office? Probably not, since Wellington after the Napoleonic War there is no tradition in the UK of military (or naval) leaders moving into high politics. Standing as an MP, speaking in the House of Lords, yes, leading a party and becoming Prime Minister, no.
he was good, but not great. Brooke was the best British, nay Allied, general.
Unfortunately there is no evidence to support this view with regard to his ability to command armies in battle - the topic of this thread. Brooke did ok as a corps commander in 1940 during the Battle of France but that is at a relatively low level running a fighting retreat in a disastrous campaign. Brooke was an absolutely brilliant CIGS, able to manage Churchill as no other service chief could, but that is a very different skill to what we are talking about with Montgomery, Bradley, Patton, Slim, etc.
ps If no one else has said it, welcome to the Dope, formzorba.
I have fought these battles over and over with experts in military history and Montgomery will always remain a difficult figure to assess.
It is partly as he was deeply flawed as a person and that gets mixed up with his undoubtedly high ability as a commander - especially an Army Group commander which was probably his optimum level.
It is also due to the fact that he was a difficult subordinate to those who he regarded as of inferior ability - and that list is equally undoubtedly long. Whatever their merits as men, the likes of Alexander and Eisenhower were second rate commanders. Monty would serve loyally under men he regarded as equally professional as himself - for instance Brooke and perhaps unexpectedly Bradley. He offered to serve under Bradley, rather than than allow Eisenhower to dispense with a land forces commander which he rightly saw as something that would lengthen the War by six months, if politics required (as it did) that post to be an American and there is no reason to belief he would not served loyally as one of Bradley’s Army Group Commanders.
Bradley and Monty only fell out due to the Bulge - which dented American pride so much that their commanders, historians and people (those that are interested anyway) have carried that hurt with them to this day. Hence this thread.
It is a fact that Americans tend not to think much of him - for the same old tired reasons that are trotted out here.
Any objective examination of the facts should allow a very good argument to be made (personally I believe it to be an overwhelming argument) that he was one of the outstanding commanders of WW2.
Anybody who things he made a mess of North Africa simply does not understand their history. Sicily was chiefly cocked up by Patton (a distinctly second rate whose proper level was probably Corps commander) rushing off in the wrong direction. Italy was a mess generally but Monty cannot take much blame for the deadlock there - largely causes by an exaggerated idea of what was possible (Giant Two anyone? A suicide mission thankfully stopped at the last moment. Anzio? A laughably poor operation).
Overlord has to been Monty’s masterpiece however. As land forces commander he demonstrated how to command an Army Group and was patient in creating the circumstances for the ultimate breakout from the American sector. If folk bother to go into the planning, expansion and development of the battle as a whole it is simply a masterpiece. Most Americans to this day like to pretend there was an American front and a British-Canadian front without acknowledging that it was Montgomery that directed the whole.
The one boil on his reputation which cannot be argued against is Market-Garden - it was a misconceived operation. The Bulge occupies American minds much more than the other Allies but it shouldn’t - Monty had no interest in the battle because he knew that strategically it led nowhere and should not have been the place for a major counter-attack. The fact that so many lives were needlessly sacrificed after the Germans were (as was inevitable) stopped in their tracks was more down to repairing injured American pride than proper strategy.
In Europe Monty and Bradley stand out head and shoulders above the rest of the Western Allied field commanders. The American Navy commanders in the Pacific (in fact generally) were also head and shoulders above any British or Allies Admirals - this should not be a nationalistic argument.
Unfortunately, when it comes to Monty, it generally becomes one.
notquitekarpov, that was an interesting summary. My (American) wife is a huge fan of Patton and tends to look down upon Montgomery as markedly inferior and wasteful - I think the 1970 movie made a huge impression on her. I had no strong opinions either way for Monty or any other British commander for that matter, but we always enjoy having our historical knowledge improved. Do you have any links or sources that I could read to reappraise both commanders?
I also want to do the same with General Douglas Haig someday too. He’s generally condemned as awful, but from what I’ve read he deserves a lot more slack.
Sicily was chiefly cocked up by Alexander’s lack of leadership as Army Group commander. Montgomery approved of Patton “rushing off in the wrong direction” as his drive up the western coast had stalled out. Montgomery can’t take blame for the deadlock in Italy because he wasn’t there for it; having quite happily left Italy on Dec 23, 1943 where
His primary criticism during his brief stint in the Italian campaign came from Mark Clark who was looking for someone to blame his troubles at Salerno on. Clark was inept, incompetent, insubordinate, an Anglophobe, and his need for self-aggrandizement and ego make Montgomery and Patton look like egoless saints in comparison. He’s also the only general in US history to have a Congressional inquiry called for his actions by a petition from his own men:
Well for Monty I would recommend Nigel Hamilton’s three volume biography (overall title ‘Monty’ with individual volumes separately subtitled).
One has recognize it is the authorized biography, having access to all his private papers, and can be rather uncritical at times but on the relationships between Monty and his British rivals, subordinates and superiors it is excellent. It is also excellent on his relations with the Americans and other allies. It also has some of the best maps I have seen in any military history. I would not recommend it to pass on to your wife - but if she is relying on the film “Patton” for her views on George Patton then she is probably not sensitive to the quality or credibility of her historical sources! “Patton” has about as much to do with the actual Sicily Campaign as “Braveheart” does with medieval Anglo-Scottish history.
You will need to read wider for a bit of balance. Don’t bother with ‘Decision in Normandy: The Real Story of Montgomery and the Allied Campaign’ Carlo d’Este - it’s a one sided hatchet job on all non-American land forces commanders and has been widely exposed for its bias nowadays. The fact he is also the author of ‘Patton: A Genius for War’ gives the game away somewhat!
Also many of the studies just concentrate on one battle or campaign - but I would suggest in no particular order:
These are the three volumes mentioned above. The first two were revised (acknowledging his repressed bisexuality or homosexuality which were hidden in the original biography) and republished as a single volume and is useful if you can get it (called “The Full Monty”) but unfortunately volume III (which includes Market-Garden, the Bulge etc) never got the same treatment .
On Patton I would start with the “Patton Papers” and his own “War as I Knew It”. He was essentially a cavalry commander - brilliant as exploiting weaknesses and mistakes, a superb eye for ground and a highly developed sixth-sense as to what the enemies operational reaction to his moves was most likely.
Unfortunately he had little interest let alone ability in logistics (“Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics.”), refused to form long term plans (his diary entry of 26.2.45, “It may be of interest to future generals to realize that one makes plans to fit circumstances and does not try to create circumstances to fit plans”), tended to care little about the lives of his men or to be able to assess what it was possible to ask of them (the hospital slapping incidents) and let his overwhelming ambition and ego get in the way of his generalship (the Palermo incident in Sicily, and his “horse race” comment about his rivalry with Courtnay Hodges’ Army - diary again 5.3.45).
Compared with Patton, Montgomery was a wilting violet!
Thanks! When I mentioned my wife, she is a historian too, and has read Parallel Lives, the Papers and War as I Knew It. But she hasn’t read anything about Monty, so I guess she only got suckered into the Patton side of things. She’s also read Genius for War, which according to you has misled her somewhat.
I’ll take a look, thanks!
Many thanks to notquitekarpov. Really good stuff.
A couple of other books for those interested in Montgomery (and the other Second World War commanders) I would recommend The War Lords, edited by Sir Michael Carver, which has a chapter on Monty by Ronald Lewin and Armageddon: The Battle for Germany 1944-45 by Max Hastings. While not a top notch academic historian his insights into the personalities of the great and the powerful are excellent and he has a journalist’s knack for a pithy phrase.
The movie “Patton” does a horrible job of accurately portraying the man. If you pay close attention, the actual hero of the movie is Omar Bradley while Patton is portrayed as the flawed hero, ill-tempered, unforgiving, bloodthirsty and sack-happy. This is rather unsurprising when one considers that the movie was based on Omar Bradley’s “A Soldier’s Story” and he was the military advisor to the production of the film and Bradley intensely disliked and never really understood Patton. In actual fact Bradley relieved more divisional commanders than any other American general, while Patton only relieved one, after giving him two warnings.
Rubbish; D’Este is anything but a hatchet man on all non-American land forces commanders. I’d suggest reading Bitter Victory: The Battle for Sicily, Fatal Decision: Anzio and the Battle for Rome, and actually reading Patton: A Genius for War to disabuse you of this absurd notion.
Believe me, it hasn’t, if anything it disabused her of any notion that the movie Patton was an accurate portrayal of the man.
What makes you think I haven’t read “Patton: Genius for War”?
I stand by my assertion as to the merits of the author. He is not a historian in the proper meaning of the word. Obviously YMMV but people disagreeing with you are not necessarily idiots.
His (Monty’s) was a popularity issue, IMHO.
Right now, I’m focusing on US Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher. Hated by many of his junior officers, he took control of Task force 17 before Coral Sea ahead of more junior ones. And then came the endless litany of supposed blunders and miscues, from Coral Sea, to Midway, To Savo, East Solomons. He was basically retired by November 1942. But it doesn’t remove the fact that, given the war material he had at any time in 1942, he was the most successful fighting admiral of the war. Six enemy carriers sunk.
