Rommel was not an especially great commander. He was good to be sure and had some other things to recommend him (he tried to kill Hitler among other things) but there were better battlefield generals the Germans had. Some of the best ever.
Manstein and Model could school Rommel on strategy and maneuver tactics (respectively).
Montgomery was well aware of the failings of Allied tanks, he had tried initially to crush the German lines in North Africa by sheer weight of armour, he only did it once.
British tanks of the period were terrible.
Rommel had a huge advantage in the two years or so of the North African campaign, because they had access to good reliable and accurate intelligence, the British worked it out, and eventually nailed the person, he was the US attaché in Cairo -Colonel Bonner Frank Fellers .I think the word ‘dickhead’ was invented for a man such as this.
Eventually this source was tracked down, but not before immense damage had been done, in order to minimise the seriousness of the leaks - there was another British Major who compromised himself with a female dancer - Rommel was portrayed as something of a genius commander - which led to his being held in higher regard by Hitler than maybe he warranted.
Look at Rommels desert campaign, and just how often he was able to skirt around defences with such ease, it wasn’t all skill.
Point is, that even with less material strength, the kind of advantage that good intelligence confers can counter such a disadvantage.
Montgomery was completely right about his logistics, he was right about the capacity of the enemy to fight or run, he was right about the weakness of the US approach to a general advance instead of focused attacks, he understood how to use air power in particular, he didn’t lose any major engagements, and when it all hit the fan, he was able to see the bigger picture and work out how to respond.
Luck? Hmm, war is frequently about it, the real skill is knowing how to make use of your advantage, and turn the enemy strengths against them - using up their fuel instead of taking them on is far more useful - or have you forgotten about the Battle of the Bulge?
And that is why Montgomery is an inferior commander to Rommel. Rommel attacked where defenses were weak, learned though intelligence, but Montgomery had Ultra, which allowed him to have as clear a picture of the German lines as Rommel had. With superior numbers. Even with inferior tanks, you use flanking maneuvers in that situation, as was done later in France. As Rommel did with inferior numbers in North Africa. Montgomery was a competent general with superior intelligence, superior supply and superior numbers and he ground Rommel down. His competence was in knowing that Rommel was way out of his league and being very cautious. Montgomery’s predecessors lacked even that basic competence. The only advantage to Montgomery taking so long to beat Rommel was that it meant that Rommel had one year less to fortify the beaches in France Rommel thought would be used. Rommel correctly surmised it would be Normandy, not Calais.
When Rommel was attacking, Montgomery did not have the benefit of Ultra, it was Ultra decodes that allowed the British to work out exactly what sensitive information Rommel was getting, and once that hole was plugged, Rommel never won a single battle afterwards - not one at all. That is very telling indeed, the Germans knew how many and where every single British unit was for two full years until Ultra exposed the full extent of the intelligence loss.
Rommel was never out of Montgomery’s league, there were certainly other much more able German commanders.
What sort of criticism is it anyway, that he only won because of this and that? the reality is that you assess your advantages and play to your strengths, this is war, not some childish game of even handed fighting. You don’t give your enemy the slightest chance, this is not the objective at all.
You assertion that Montgomery was poor seems to be based upon the fact that he won pretty much every significant engagement, its like saying a running back is rubbish, he does nothing but cross the touchline and score points - but does not have much style about him.
So what about the fact the D-Day was largely Monty’s show? Or that he predicted breakout in 90 days? Or that Operation Supercharge he predicted down to the hour? or that he looked beyond D-Day and how to get right into Germany by deciding where to take first, he was responsible for ensuring Antwerp was taken first to ensure the subsequent supply line to the Rhine would be effective.
No matter how good the Germans generals were every single one of them lost, no matter how effective their tactics, they never understood strategy, and they never ever learned how to operate their economy as effectively as even Britain, let alone the US. They never ever understood the importance of production based warfare.
Monty knew how to get the most from what he had, he didn’t waste men and material and by not wasting his resources, he ensured that he never overran his supply lines, something that German generals did time after time after time, ultimately costing them the entire war - they never learned once, you don’t win wars by burning up what you have, because by doing so you end up needing ever more replacements along stretched supply lines.
Its German flair and verve along with strategic naivety that lost the war for them - cautious is perhaps not great tv, its not glorious but grinding it out and grinding down your opponent turned out to be much more effective than some Charge of the Light Brigade by weakly armoured tanks into 88mm AT guns.
Boring success against glorious defeat, you make the choice.
I don’t see that there is any evidence that Montgomery was as bad as the movie Patton and popular American opinion make him out to be. Any competent general could have filled in. But the fact is that the Brits were not long on competent generals. Market Garden was a failure. Dieppe was a failure and was awfully planned, but that was Mountbatten’s fault. Market Garden was well worth a try, but not by troops as cautious as Montgomery’s were used to being. I’m not impressed that he was better than competent. The whole “Monty” is a hero thing I suppose was necessary for the Brits, but when someone mentions to me that “Monty” was important and changed the world, frankly I think of the Pythons, who really were brilliant. Montgomery was adequate to the task assigned, but as I mentioned, his tying up Rommel for another year rather than having him flee to France a year earlier was his “clever bit”.
While I am entirely in agreement with you that Monty takes a lot of undeserved criticism, securing Antwerp was not his finest hour and isn’t something I’d point to praise him for. Antwerp was taken on September 4th, but without control of the Scheldt Estuary it was useless as a supply source. Rather than concentrate on clearing the estuary and pursuing the retreating 15th Army, Monty diverted attention to Market Garden. As a result, the first supplies didn’t start moving through Antwerp until November 28th after a brutal fight to clear the estuary:
That’s pretty telling, especially in light of the fact that until the capture of Antwerp, the Allies were still getting most of their supplies via the “temporary” Mulberry harbor at Arromanches on the Normandy coast.
Doesn’t say much for someone supposedly lauded as a terrific logistician.
The Great War had taken a heavy toll of those company and field grade officers who should have been generals twenty years later, and often the best.
That and the Brits sent their best to sea.
I always got the impression that a lot of the vitriol toward Montgomery stemmed from two things- he seems to have been somewhat of an asshole, and because he was cautious and methodical when other generals had more of a risk-taking attitude.
The paired operations of Market and Garden didn’t turn out as expected. Operation Market being the dropping of Airborne troops to hold bridges and roads behind Nazi lines and Operation Garden being the land assault to reach and relieve the bridges defenders. It wasn’t the first failed operation and it wouldn’t be the last. Market-Garden failed because of the Nazi defense was stronger and more determined than expected. Plus, the road from Neerpelt to Arnhem was narrow and the only hard packed ground available that could handle heavy military vehicles. Cover it very quickly or die trying.
Was that Montgomery’s fault? No. Was it Montgomery’s responsibility? Yes, just as it was Eisenhower’s responsibility.
In the middle of 1944, the Allies had begun to advance faster than their supplies could be replenished. Airborne operations had been planned and cancelled because ground forces had already captured intended targets. The logical choice was to concentrate the Allied resources and forces on one front and to increase the amount of supplies being unloaded and transported to the front line troops. Supplying Bradley’s 12th US Army Group didn’t deal with the supply issue. Supplying Montgommery’s 21ste British Army Group did.
No it didn’t, see post #26 five posts up. Market-Garden drew attention away from dealing with the supply problem. Had Market-Garden been a spectacular success, Monty could have broken into the Ruhr which was the industrial heartland of Germany and hopefully cause a precipitous collapse of the Germans ending the war before Christmas. At least that was the idea. By doing this 21st Army Group diverted any attention or resources to clearing out the Scheldt Estuary, and until it had been cleared and then de-mined Antwerp was of absolutely no value for unloading supplies at all. As a result of concentrating on Market-Garden, while Antwerp was taken on September 4th, the estuary was not finally cleared until November 9th, and the lengthy process of de-mining the estuary once cleared took until November 28th. Not a single pound of supplies flowed through the port of Antwerp until the first convoy arrived on November 28th. Marseille was up and running as a major port for supplies before then and contact established between 6th and 12th Army Groups on September 15th.
It would indeed be interesting to see how a General Cunningham would have done in an alternate timeline.
Market-Garden didn’t help the supply issue because Market-Garden failed.
If it had been successful, the Nazis would have been forced to retreat from the estuary before they were encircled or to surrender. Maybe. The Allies had greatly underestimated the strength of the Nazi defenses.
During the decision-making stage, the Allies were forced to chose between supplying Bradley or Montgomery. The choice to supply Montgomery and free up the relatively undamaged Antwerp port would have solved both the supply issue and positioned the Allies to invade the Ruhr valley. Supplying Bradley would have put Allied boots on German soil but the port cities would still have to be liberated.
I believe the decision to supply Montgomery was the best decision, at that point in time. Unfortunately, Market-Garden failed and the Scheldt Estuary still had to be secured.
Market-Garden didn’t help the supply issue because it completely halted the advance to clear the Scheldt before it had even begun and allowed the 15th Army to escape and dig in. The success or failure of Market-Garden did nothing to change this basic fact.
This is flatly untrue; take a look at a map of where the Scheldt Estuary is and where the planned advance of Market-Garden was heading. The objective of Market-Garden was to break across the Rhine and into the Ruhr, turning East-Southeast from Arnhem. This is the exact opposite direction one would go in to encircle the estuary. The plan of Market-Garden had nothing at all to do with alleviating the Allied supply situation; it was a gamble to deliver a knockout blow to Germany when it was optimistically believed that it could be done using the supplies available on a narrow front strategy. The only possible way Market-Garden would have done anything to alleviate the Allied supply situation would have been if it caused a complete collapse of Germany. Even if the laws of physics were to be revoked and advancing away from the Scheldt was to somehow cause it to be encircled, this would not force the Germans to surrender. They left garrisons encircled behind Allied lines all over Normandy to deny the Allies their use. Calais and Le Havre were still held by the Germans at this point, and despite being surrounded they had no intention of surrendering. When the operation to clear the Scheldt that Market-Garden had delayed finally got underway the Germans put up a long and bitter fight for it.
Complete and utter bullocks. What you seem to be intentionally ignoring is that the choice to supply Monty for his plan of Market-Garden did absolutely nothing at all to improve the Allied supply situation or to free up the port of Antwerp and in fact caused a major delay in freeing up the port of Antwerp. The only way supplying Monty over Bradley would have done anything to free up Antwerp would have been if Eisenhower had directed Montgomery to ditch Market-Garden and put all effort into the Canadians advancing North-Northwest of Antwerp into the estuary from the first weeks of September rather than waiting until October 2nd to begin the operation.
You are free to have your own opinion on what the best decision was, but you are not free to have your own facts. Supplying Montgomery for Market-Garden meant the Scheldt was not going to be cleared and Antwerp was going to remain useless as a supply port. Montgomery’s plan did nothing to improve the Allied supply situation at all. Again, the only way Market-Garden was going to improve the Allied supply situation was if it caused a complete collapse of Germany, but the same could be said of a narrow front thrust into Germany by Bradley.
(post shortened)
The war in Europe didn’t stop while Market-Garden was being carried out. Neither Montgomery or Bradley expected to receive all of the supplies entering Europe. Montgomery wanted the supplies that Bradley would need to invade Germany and Bradley wanted the supplies that Montgomery would need to flank the Western Wall and invade Germany.
Meanwhile, the Allied attempts to take retake French and Belgium ports continued. And so did the Italian campaign, etc…
Siege of Dunkirk 1944 -
*The 1st Canadian Army had been allocated the left of the 21st Army Group’s line of advance and General Bernard Montgomery, the commander of 21st Army Group, had directed them to clear the Channel Ports before continuing into the Netherlands. Most of these ports, however, had been heavily fortified and, despite the generally poor quality of the garrisons, it was necessary to mount full-scale major assaults.
The ports were needed to supply the allied armies and the lack of such facilities had halted or slowed much offensive activity. Montgomery had estimated that the Channel Ports would be sufficient for his needs and this view persisted until mid-September. Under pressure from Dwight Eisenhower, the Allied Supreme Commander, Montgomery modified his instructions to the Canadian commander, Henry Crerar, on 13–14 September thus: “Early use of Antwerp so urgent that I am prepared to give up operations against Calais and Dunkirk” and: “Dunkirk will be left to be dealt with later; for the present it will be merely masked.”
Action against Calais continued (see Operation Undergo), at least partly due to the need to silence the heavy artillery sited nearby. The forces that might have been used to capture Dunkirk were released to assist on the Scheldt and thus open access to the largely undamaged port of Antwerp. Instead, smaller Allied forces held a perimeter around the city.
…The Canadians approached Dunkirk from the south west. On 7–8 September, the 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade captured Bourbourg, about 13 km (8.1 mi) from the city itself.
…After the general German surrender, the garrison surrendered unconditionally to Alois Liška on May 9, 1945.*
The 1st Canadian army, under Montgomery, began the attack on the Scheldt estuary on Sept 12, 1944. Market-Garden began on Sept 17, 1944. The Scheldt became a major battlefield on Oct 2, after Market-Garden had failed.
http://www.desertwar.net/battle-of-the-scheldt.html
The Allied attempts to take retake other French and Belgium ports continued before, during, and after Market-Garden. The success of Market-Garden would have moved the front lines, threatened the Ruhr, and could have increased the chances of Nazi surrendering much needed ports. Or not.
Rommel took calculated risks other general would not. Look at what he did in France with his Gespenster-Division(Ghost Division.) I am left with the impression that he was one who could grasp new concepts quickly. If you don’t want him, I’ll take him. Rommel, hands down. And he deserved a better fate…
Reading “An Army at Dawn” makes it clear Monty was decent, but not great. He wasn’t incompetent, but he won thru having more material and troops and ULTRA intercepts. Mind you, at the start of WWII, there were far too many “old school” generals who were incompetent. In comparison, Monty might have seemed a genius.
However, his egomania and disdain for American forces were certainly liabilities.
Except that they didn’t, at least not the one that mattered, the Belgian port of Antwerp, or rather the Scheldt Estuary that controlled access to it.
What all of this has to do with anything I have no idea. I already told you the Germans left garrisons in ports on the French coast which didn’t surrender simply because they were surrounded.
Horseshit. The operation to clear the Scheldt Estuary did not start until October 2nd; it did not start on September 12th. Your ‘source’ is something that has clearly been poorly translated into English from another language, probably through Google translation or some other automated program. Let’s look at exactly what is says, shall we?
Except of course for the Allied attempts to clear the approaches to Antwerp which didn’t happen and were delayed from happening for three to four weeks because of Market-Garden, and the success of Market-Garden would have done nothing to increase the chance of the Germans surrendering much needed ports short of causing an unconditional surrender of Germany.
(post shortened)
Just because Canadians are known to be polite doesn’t mean they weren’t busy kicking Nazi ass along the coast of France and Belgium in 1944. Besides pushing across France on a wide front, the Allies were also clearing the coastal fortresses. The 1st Canadian Army was under the command of Montgomery. Montgomery had ordered the ports retaken after the Normandy breakout (ie before Market-Garden had been planned). Antwerp was on the list of ports. So was Dunkirk.
*The Allied forces, including the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, and the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade of the First Canadian Army, landed on the beaches of Normandy, France on D-Day, June 6, 1944. As the armies progressed further inland, the First Canadian Army engaged in bitter fighting at Caen and Falaise. But with hundreds of thousands of troops fighting across the front, the Allies needed large amounts of supplies, and the First Canadian Army was assigned the task of clearing the coastal areas and opening the channel ports for vital supplies.
Fighting on the left flank of the Allied forces, the First Canadian Army pushed rapidly eastward through France towards Belgium. September began with the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division being welcomed to Dieppe. The 2nd Canadian Corps left a number of units to guard the heavily defended ports and pushed into Belgium, reaching Ostend, Bruges and Ghent by the middle of the month. By October 1, the port cities of Boulogne, Cap Gris Nez, Calais, and Dunkirk were all under Allied control. The 2nd Canadian Corps had also captured the launching sites of German rockets and put an end to their attacks on southern England.*
http://www.canadaatwar.ca/page47.html
Assume for a moment that Market-Garden had been a resounding success. Are you saying nothing would have changed. Give the supplies to Bradley? Give the supplies to Montgomery? What difference does it make? Get out the magic nickel - Heads for Bradley, tails for Monty.
Should the other ports have been leapfrogged in order to take Antwerp and the Scheldt estuary sooner? Would the leapfrogging have left too many Nazi combatants and big guns behind Allied lines?
Decisions had to be made. Moving NE to Arnhem then SE into Germany solved more problems than moving West into Germany did. I believe Market-Garden was the right choice for that point in time. Too bad it failed.