doorhinge. What should Monty have done to ensure success? Tactical changes?
(bold added)
Better reconnaissance. The Allies were surprised by the amount of resistance they encountered and were unable to overcome it. Every hour that the Nazis delayed Allied reinforcements from reaching the airborne troops holding the bridges, allowed more Nazi armor to be brought to bear. Just because an opponent retreats from one area doesn’t mean they are running away. They could be regrouping and reforming to begin another assault.
The Allies had also picked up a bad habit of thinking that they were going to be home by Christmas of ‘44’. A nice thought, but no one had bothered to ask the Nazis what they thought of the idea.
A view from the “other” team -
*Market Garden
By Hans van Winkelhoff
Why did Market Garden fail? Several reasons:
•The allied underestimated the Germans. After the defeat in Normandy and the race to Germany, it could be expected that the Germans lost their morale. But in no time they organised a very effective defense and they just started fighting again. Hastily formed Kamfgruppen proved to be excellent units that were able to hold ground against numerically superior allied battle units. Weakened German units fought with a surprising courage and stubborness. This was totally unexpected. Some of these German units were from 15e armee that had escaped from west Belgium and reached the corridor from the west. They were on their way to Germany, the Heimat, and had to cross the corridor. The allied only had attention for the line Eindhoven-Arnhem and took not enough notice of this 15e armee under General von Zangen. Between 5 and 22 september 82000 German soldiers, 530 guns and 4600 vehicles crossed the river Schelde and started fighting. It was a real mistake the allied made. They willfully had ignored 15e armee and they payed the price for this.
•The weather was real bad now and then, but this was an argument used as a bit of a weak excuse by the allied themselves after the failure of Market Garden. Okay, there were rainy days, but there were also sunny days.
•The allied did not listen to the messages of the Dutch resistance that had given a warning: German tank troops of Hohenstaufen division had arrived near Arnhem. Montgomery did not want to hear this and ignored these signals.
•The British were too slow in their advance. They did not take initiative at crucial moments. They took a break in Valkenswaard and the complete XXX corps came to a halt when reaching Eindhoven because of a few 88 mm. canons. They lost the initiative. Precious time was lost, but the Germans knew how to use this time effectively.
•The landing areas for the American and British paradivisions were wrong chosen. As a result, it took too much time for these paratroopers to reach their objectives. The men of 1st Airborne had to walk 10 km. to reach the bridge over the Rhine!
•The use of one some single road starting from the Belgian Border and ending in Arnhem proved to be too risky. On paper Market Garden was a briljant plan and worth trying, but in practice it was just too ambitious. Market Garden failed not in and around Arnhem. What could these brave paratroopers do against heavily armed SS men with their half tracks, Sturmgeschütze, Panthers and their new King Tigers? Almost nothing. Market Garden was lost in the area Belgian/Dutch border-Nijmegen. Everything went wrong there. 1 paradivision in Arnhem paid the price.
*
Thank you doorhinge. From what you presented it looks to me like the allies were over confident. Couple that with poor reconnaissance (they totally missed 15e armee???), poorly chosen drop zones, too slow in their advance…
A bit different than Rommel who felt that maintaining momentum was critical.
Interestingly, Operation Market Garden is not mentioned by name on Montgomery’s Wiki page.
To offer a factual answer…
One presumes that the average set of bowels includes more than one shit so, presumably, at any given moment General Bernard Montgomery was worth several times more than a shit. Of course, just because there’s a large quantity of something available, if it is hard to extract it may no longer be worth counting. But in my experience, there is not a large cost to extracting shit. Usually, it comes out without any outside interference.
And one need not just count the shits that he had on hand at any given moment. Over his complete life, I’m sure that the General created a plentiful quantity of shit. I doubt it was significantly greater or lesser than the average amount of shit that one could hope for from a man of his build - so the General might not have been a particularly good find as shit-hunting goes - but if you just need one, he’d have done you up right good.
After a spirited defense at Normandy and Caen, the Nazis began to withdraw to stronger defensive positions. The German army knew how to retreat in a military manner. They weren’t simply running away. Market-Garden was risky but every military advance is. The road to Arnhem was narrow and heavy equipment was limited to using that road. There would be no off-road excursions and the enemy would know exactly where you were and where you were going. Speed was of the essence. The assault had to be completed before the enemy could respond in sufficient force.
Generals and Field Marshalls need to be confident people. They’re considered over-confident when their plans fail to meet objectives. Military leaders such as Rommel, Patton, and Nathan Bedford Forrest understood that it was important to “get there firstest with the mostest” if you expected to win. They also understand that you will get your ass handed to you if you outrun your supplies and can’t find more.
According to the Rommel Wiki - Rommel said, “Drive, drive, then you do not need fuel”. Which was understood to mean 'Get there quickly, take the enemy by surprise, then use the fuel available from the enemy’s supply. The problem with that attitude is the distinct possibility that your army will not reach the much needed fuel depot. If a General/Field Marshall took a chance and met his objective, then he’s a genius and a man who can get things done. If he failed to meet his objective, he was over-confident (or worse).
Montgomery didn’t know, or under-estimated, the size of the force that Market-Garden would be facing but he was aware that the force would be increasing as time went on. There also seemed to be some initial confusion on how determined the Nazi defense would be. The airborne troops held longer than expected. Bridging equipment was available. Tanks and artillery was on the way. Communications could have been better but Market-Garden soldiers had a chance of meeting their goals. Unless they met with multiple delays. Which they did.
The Brits and Canadians regrouped, resupplied, and carried on. Just like they always have.
I have absolutely no idea what your point is. All you are doing is stringing together a slew of non sequiturs that do absolutely nothing to address the actual issue that you are responding to: Market-Garden delayed the clearing of the Scheldt Estuary for weeks. Again, from the horse’s own mouth:
The point of the Ultra decrypts was that Montgomery knew exactly what he was up against with Market Garden.
…what a fascinating thread.
I don’t know much about General Montgomery at all. But this thread is just an amazing insight not into Montgomery himself, but into the nature of history, and how our opinions are shaped by where we grew up and what we were taught.
I see the usual inability of US based posters to admit any General could be better than one of their own good old boys.
It is comical to see it being claimed Monty ‘only won’ because he outnumbered his enemies without it being mentioned the US always outnumbered the Germans and by a greater ratio than Montgomery!
Look at the force ratios for COBRA and then get back to me to explain why it took so long to make the breech.
The whole anti-Montgomery hysteria in the USA stems from the incident where he was given command of US troops when Bradley lost control during the Bulge. It is seen as a great humiliation that the US needed any help.
The German commander of the 5th Panzer Army, Hasso von Manteuffel said of Montgomery’s leadership:
*The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough*Please. All you’re spouting is the usual “No matter what happened, the Americans are wrong” nonsense.
We’ve been talking about Montgomery because that’s who the thread’s about. If you want to discuss the mistakes made by Eisenhower or Bradley or Devers or Clark or Patton or Simpson or Patch, all you need to do is start a new thread.
On the contrary I never said anyone was ‘wrong’ However I note the merest hint of a defence of Montgomery makes you ‘anti-American’.
Why should I?
I simply pointed out one on the main planks of the Monty haters (he always outnumbered the Germans) applied in spades to Patton and Bradley.
Did you not know this?
Hugo First, well this is an American board. So don’t be surprised. Montgomery had a mutual dislike with certain Americans (Bradley) who were very influential in the post war era and whose narrative has informed the US view.
Hey! I wasn’t even born then!
So because he was disliked by some American Generals this is good enough reason for most Americans to doubt his competence and traduce his reputation?
A Nellands quote that says a lot:
*‘Bradley’s First Army took a month to cover the last five miles to St. Lô this is attributed (correctly) to the bocage and the enemy but when the British Second Army took as long to cover the six miles into Caen that is attributed to Monty’s “timidity,” “caution,” and “slowness”?’ *
Montgomery’s fault is that he had the audacity to believe he was better than any other General. To the US mindset this is completely unnaceptable. All her Allies must assume a prostate position at the feet of her greatness.
The whole transatlantic Montgomery hating industry is based on nothing more than injured national pride.
By any standards Monrgomery was a succesful commander and any attempt to say otherwise is doomed to failure.
D’este writes:
*The First Army staff, already resentful of the change of command, **is alleged **to have been less than pleased to be under British command. Such resentments, and many seem to be of postwar creation, were not evident to James Gavin, the 82d Airborne commander, when he dined with Hodges and his staff several days later. “The staff spoke of Montgomery with amusement and respect. They obviously liked him and respected his professionalism.” For his part, Gavin was impressed with Montgomery as a soldier. “I took a liking to him that has not diminished with the years.” *
As for Montgomery denigrating the US soldier read what he actualy said:
*I would like to say a word about these two points
I first saw the American soldier in battle in Sicily and formed then a very high oplnion of him. I knew him again in Italy. And I have seen a. very great deal of him in this campaign. I want to take this opportunity to pay a public trlbute to him. He is a brave fighting man, steady under fire and with the tenacity in battle that stamps the first class soldier. All these qualities have been shown in a marked degree during the present battle.
He[the US Soldier] is responsible really—he is basicaly responsible for Rundstedt not doing what he wanted to do and when the inner history is told you will find that because he held out in three places the Germans could not take advantage of their initial success.
The first was in the Elsenborn salient south of Monschau, which had to bear full the blow of almost a whole Panzer army and the Panzer army recoiled. They could not do it. With this great. blow, hitting the center of the American Army, Rundstedt did overrun a conslderable number of American formations and around St, Vith and south of it there were a great many American troops cut off and unable to get away. When I was brought into the party that was the situation. The American troops isolated and cut off were fighting and holding on to centers of road communication making it extremely difficult for the Germans to move and flow through the gap they had made.
I have spent my military career with the British soldier and I have come to love him with a great love. I have now formed a very great affection and admiration for the American soldier. I salute the brave fighting men of America I never want to fight alongside better soldlers.
Just now I am seelng a great deal of the American soldier. I have tried to feel that I am almost an American soldier myself so that I might take no unsuitable action or offend them in any way. *
No it is not. Rommel made Montgomery look bad because Rommel had to make decisions Montgomery never had to. What was predictable about Montgomery was that he was predictable. What was predictable about Rommel was that he was unpredictable. Eisenhower backed Montgomery because it was the politically “right” thing to do. It bolstered moral in England. It made the Allies appear that they had a united front. Montgomery was into meat grinders. He held the line and inched along, which is what was needed to be done. This does not mean Montgomery was not a good commander, he was, just nothing special.
Note: I have no personal reason to “traduce” Montgomery. My father fought in the Pacific to kill Japanese.
Yes decisions like:
*‘how far and how fast can I run’ *
and:
‘shall I steal every single piece of Italian transport to save my German troops or only 90% of them.’
Rommel was soundly beaten twice by Montgomery.
In Libya and in France. By any ranking that makes Rommel a loser.
Indeed. The Monty haters have it both ways.
‘Look at that fellow Monty. Never took a risk in his life.’
Or
‘Look at that fellow Monty. Taking such a risk at Arnhem’.
Heads you win…
Now you are being insulting. Montgomery was placed in command in Normandy because he was by far the most qualified General. .
It was the standard Allied tactic. Bite and hold. To claim Bradley did it any other way is just plain wrong.
Your view is skewed because it is based on ignorance of the facts and exposure to the score settling memoirs of US Generals.
Oh Really? Lets speculate what Montgomery and Rommel would have done if the roles were reversed regarding arms, troops and supplies. C’mon, c’mon, there’s a bit of an inferiority thing going on here. Gee, I almost feel guilty mentioning what Marquis de Lafayette did to Cornwallis in the Virginia Campaign. Look familiar? No doubt, we’ll both get over it.
No doubt. After all you got over having your capital city invaded and your Presidiet’s house getting scorched black.
As usual for a Monty basher once they are called out on the blatant invention of facts they slip into default ‘find another way to insult the British mode’. It is clear that the real problems with Montgomery are completely based on the fact he was not an American success. Sadly there will always be those who will strive boost their own (inflated) standing by belittling their partners.
I’m English and have read a fair bit about WWII. Monty was certainly a blowhard, he was still around in my day offering his opinion on everything under the sun and, if it wasn’t on military matters, usually wrong-headedly. In my opinion though he was a pretty good General/FM, although certainly not of the caliber of England’s greatest (Marlborough, Clive, Wellington, Slim et al).
I’d put him on a par with Patton actually.