His letter to Eisenhower demanding command of the ground forces in Europe that almost cost him his job.
He also chafed when Eisenhower was put in overall command. sniff, sniff* Smells like Haig…
At last we agree on something. I can’t make nead nor tail of your poijnt either.
I rather expected you to post this letter. Until such time I will treat your claim as an unsourced allegation.
Smell more of the desperation of someone completely without evidence to back his ealier claims.
You want me to post the actual letter? The one Montgomery requested Ike tear up when he realized that it might cost him his job? The one he had to send an apology letter over?
Right. Sure. There was no such letter from Montgomery to Ike on 12/29/44. I made it up. :rolleyes:
I said post it. Once we see it we can form our own conclusions. Is this a problem for you?
The German view from “The Other Side of the Hill” -
“*All the German generals to whom I talked were of the opinion that the Allied Supreme Command had missed a great opportunity of ending the war in the autumn of 1944. They agreed with Montgomery’s view that this could best have been achieved by concentrating all possible resources in a thrust in the north, towards Berlin.”
von Rundstedt: “the best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Strategically and politically, Berlin was the target. Germany’s strength is in the north. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war.”
von Manteuffel: “I am in full agreement with Montgomery. I believe General Eisenhower’s insistence on spreading the Allied forces out for a broader advance was wrong. The acceptance of Montgomery’s plans would have shortened the war considerably. Above all, tens of thousands of lives - on both sides - would have been saved.”*
Now that does not mean I am saying it was the correct view but the claim Montgomery was copletely wrong is arguable. Outright condemnation that the plan as unworkable is not credible.
I am merely stunned that you seem either unaware of this letter’s existence or are trying to play some kind of ‘gotcha’ game that I cannot fathom.
TTBOMK the letter may no longer exist, only excerpts. However it is referenced is several WW2 texts, mostly formed out of interviews from:
In any case, here is a description of events: (google books link).
Take note of his mention of ‘failure’, as the Bulge had already been blunted. He was making a mockery of either the American troops or American Generals. Either way he was being an ass.
There are many other references.
You would be surprised at the number of ‘facts’ people quote which are no such thing. Only by seeing the actual letter can you make an informed opinion as to its contents.
I am sorry to say your frantic Google did not produce the goods. Where is the letter that shows Monty **‘demanding command of the ground forces in Europe **’
Reference your claim or withdraw it.
I just did.
Thats what you said about the original letter. Now it seems you claim it no longer exists…
Please post these ‘many other references’
No you did not. What you did was post a vague comment on a letter that no longer exists(?) that you have never seen and that you can not quote directly.
Let me make it clear for you. You need to quote the exact words where we can see Monty 'demanding command of the ground forces in Europe ’
I am afraid it is up to those making aclaim to reference it.
You are basically asking me to fully quote a document that may no longer physically exist, but is referenced by several sources who were present, including Montgomery’s chief of staff, acknowledge the existence of. :rolleyes:
No. You made a specific claim that Monty** demanded **command. That is simply not true. I say that with complete confidence. I am 100% sure you can not give me the quote because it was never made. I can not be any clearer.
You must realise that anything you read in a US General memoirs is just as self-serving as that written by any other nations Generals. Make sure you know his agenda before accepting his conclusions.
These Generals are grossly overrating the state of the Allied forces in the Autumn of 1944. Supply issues, manpower issues the need for defense along the rest of the front, and still operating German garrisons would have doomed such a strike. That is even before we consider that Germans were pretty good at adapting defenses.
Montgomery’s attack might have worked, certainly. So might have Patton’s or BRadley’s single attack plans. Or they might have been crushed.
Ah, so poor Montgomery was merely misnuderstood and that is why his Chief of Staff went running to him to advise him to apologize to Ike rather than staying with Ike and explaining that it was just a misunderstanding. Sure.
Who are you referring to? de Guingand?
Well as you have yet to post any evidence of Monty demanding command of the ground forces in Europe we will have to withold judgement on that subject.
Because no US General ever told anything but the honest truth?
(post shortened)
What you call non sequiturs, I call 1944 WWII Allied troop movements in Europe. The Scheldt would have been liberated regardless of whether Market-Garden succeeded, failed, or had never been conceived.
Montgomery had ordered the 1st Canadian Army to accelerate it’s advance to the Scheldt in August. The month before Market-Garden began. The entrenched Nazis along the coast had been strongly objecting to Allied efforts to evicted them.
The fact that “the division reached the Ghent Canal on 8 September, hitting the first of the Scheldt Fortress defences” DOES NOT mean that successful offensive operations were conducted against them. If a successful offensive had been achieved, successive operations would not have been necessary.
The 15th Army had quite a bit of input on whether their escape would be effective or not. It would have been unwise for the Canadians to bypass the entrenched Nazis located to the south of the Scheldt in order to engage the entrenched Nazis to the north of the Scheldt.
The Scheldt eventually became a MAJOR battlefield on Oct 2nd but Canadians and Germans had already been shooting at each other over possession of the area before that date.
Here’s the letter he’s referring to, from Monty’s memoirs…it starts on the bottom of page 286:
http://www.mocavo.com/The-Memoirs-of-Field-Marshal-the-Viscount-Montgomery-of-Alamein/216599/287#286
Notes in brackets are mine.
So, I think there’s a little bit of a misunderstanding here. He didn’t want command over all ground forces in Europe. That was Eisenhower’s job, and Monty knew that, and knew there was no way he was going to get it. He wanted command over Bradley’s army. Both he and Bradley had coequal commands, and had to coordinate operations, which didn’t always go well. (it also didn’t help that he and Bradley didn’t get along, and he and Bradley had been constantly fighting over their respective roles.)
I don’t know whether Monty’s request was a good one or a bad one from a military standpoint, but it caused a political firestorm with the Americans, because word of it got back to Washington, and the Americans didn’t want an American army serving under a British command.
So, Montgomery, realizing too late the political firestorm over his letter, sent the following telegram to Ike, trying to walk back his remarks:
My criticisms of Monty earlier in the thread, not withstanding, I actually agree with Malden Capell. Monty made some mistakes, like Caen and Market-Garden. He had some successes, like El Alamein, Tunisia, and Italy, where, for all the problems with the campaign, he did well.
Monty’s strengths were that he was a good organizer, that he could simplify overcomplicated plans and uncover what objectives were really necessary and what weren’t, and that he had an almost inate understanding of concentration of force, so that when given the resources, he could find weaknesses in the enemy line and break it. His weaknesses were that he didn’t do well against superior force, he was not particularly operationally flexible, and he was an arrogant, sarcastic son of a bitch who didn’t get along well with his subordinates, his colleagues or his superiors.
That being said, while I don’t think he was the best British general in WWII (I’d give that honor to General Slim), he wasn’t bad.
I knew that. However there are many (the majority?) who are willing to believe any charge levelled against Montgomery.
You hit the nail right on the head. Montgomery could have been the best Allied General by a factor of 10 but no way was he going to be allowed a major position in charge of American Forces. The whole storm was political and nothing to do with ability.
Montgomery was so convinced that a single ground Commander was needed (to be no 2 to Ike) that he made it quite clear he would serve under any such commander if he were appointed. To be sure he thought he was the best man for the job but he was big enough to accept someone else in the job.
A lot of people do not know that Montgomery was the Ground Commander in Normandy up to late August.