[QUOTE=Celyn]
I don’t think you really meant “English” there. Unless you’re really sure that no other part of the U.K. was involved, sent troops, got bombed, all that fun stuff. Yes, it’s a slight tangent, but just a bit of ignorance-fighting.
[/QUOTE]
It’s a fair cop. 
Sub Judice, I wasn’t trying to excuse the complete lack of action, just offering my interpretation for a lack of military action. Things are further complicated by the Cold War of the 60s and 70s, IMNSHO. If you look at the way that both the US and USSR spent money to “help” countries that they felt were at risk of falling into the other’s sphere of influence, I can see where certain minds would consider Franco a nuisance, but one they could live with, and so would be reluctant to upset the applecart.
Neither this reasoning, nor the reasoning I gave against direct military intervention, actually answer your original question. They only illuminate some of the thinking for how people of the time looked at it, as I undersand the events.
I think the crux of your question is at what point is a “bad peace” more moral to accept than to foment a revolution or civil war. Before I go further I have to throw out a bit of cover - my understanding of Twentieth Century Spanish history is sketchy. I will admit right from the beginning, I know I’m going to be missing much of the picture. Having said that, though, I don’t think that there was any realistic expectation, while Franco was in power, that he would ever willingly hand over the reins to anyone else. That he did just that seems to me to have been a singularly shocking event for the observers of the time. And Carlos was not expected to have been the King he has shown himself to be.
If I had a series of intelligence briefs indicating that Franco was a tin-pot dictator with every intention of holding on to power, no matter whom he might crush under the wheels, and a recognition of how justified his opponents would be to view any promise of aid or support with a jaundiced eye. I’d be very, very leery of doing anything that would allow for the situation to get even worse. I want to say that letting Franco remain in power for so long without at least economic sanction was an evil act. Og knows that there are numerous things done in pursuit of the whole Domino Theory that I will categorize as just that.
On the other hand, taking a moral stand that one believes to be futile that one has reason to believe would result in an even worse mess, harming far more people than are being currently harmed… I can’t quite say that that is actually a moral act. I don’t ask for an assurance of success. But I suspect that the experts of the day may have had all sorts of studies showing why upsetting the Franco apple cart would have been 90% likely to make things worse.
I honestly don’t know whether, at the time, that the decision to leave Franco in power was justified or justifiable.
Without trying to sound like Pangloss, I’d like to ask of the people reading this thread who are better informed than I in Spanish history: My understanding is that a lot of Spain’s current liberty is the legacy of Carlos’ actions, philosophy, and work. The more normal progression after a charismatic dictator rules (however autocratically, and inhumanely) a nation is to have tin copies follow his footsteps. Twentieth Century Spain managed to avoid that pattern. How likely would that have been to have happened without Franco turning over authority to Carlos?
Gah, that still sounds too much like Pangloss.
What I’m trying to ask is who were the men standing in a position to be likely to pick up the pieces after Franco died or fell? Do those who know Spanish history think they would, or could, have gone on towards the more liberal Spain we know today? Or would they have tried to be Franco 2?
And this kind of second guessing, looking at the results 40 and 50 years after the decision makers in question, is even worse. Even if my suspicions that without Franco’s transfer of power Modern Spain would still a repressive state are correct, the chain of events that lead to that seem so low-probability, it still looks like the result of a lucky roulette spin. i.e. not exactly the sort of probability one wants to see involved with a gamble with a people’s freedom. (Before Nava comes to yell on me, I am well aware that to talk about Spain as consisting of a single people is another one of those convenient fictions that hides more truth than it illuminates. I’m just being a little poetic.)