Was the Fall of France in 1940 inevitable?

[Dissonance]

@MMI

IIRC one of the criticisms of the French deployment in 1939-40 was that the French deployed there armies as though the Maginot line weren’t there, or at least with far less concentration in the north as they should have in order to fight the battle on the Belgian plain.

I’ve heard this as well, Trevor Dupuy wrote something about it in Understanding War:

Perhaps the most significant reason why the Germans won was the fact that the French high command, after a tremendous and expensive national effort to build a nearly impregnable line of fortifications – the Maginot Line – along the frontier with Germany, actually deployed its forces as though the Maginot Line were not there. A German thrust across the frontier, such as had occurred in 1870 and 1914, could be stopped by a relatively small number of men in the fortifications. Thanks to the Maginot Line the French high command could have greatly reduced the number of reserves behind the fortifications, which was a substantial proportion of their military manpower. These troops could have been used elsewhere, or in an enlarged strategic reserve.

The French defeat in May 1940 has been blamed – by people who don’t know any better – on the fact that the French military put too much faith in the defensive strength of the Maginot Line.  In fact, it is just the opposite. The French were defeated mainly because they did not put enough faith in the strength of that line.

…
[T]hey deployed their forces equally along the frontier, leaving four armies behind the fortifications, when one –at most – would have been required. In other words, French deployment ignored the existence of the Maginot Line.

There’s an order of battle of the French Army and the BEF on May 10th, 1940 located here. Only Army Group 1, with 4 armies having 11 corps as well as the BEF was deployed facing Belgium to counter the presumed German main thrust. Army Groups 2 and 3 with 4 armies of 14 corps were deployed behind the Maginot Line or covering the Ardennes. Although the forces assigned to Army Group 1 were of higher quality, very large numbers of French forces sat out the breakthrough behind the Maginot Line.

@ralph124c

To add to what has been said: the French battle tanks were actually SUPERIOR to the german PanzerKampfwagen MKIII and IV! The French “Char-B” tank had a better gunsight, a larger cannon, and MUCH thicker armor. In fact, General Guderian described (in his memoirs) how german shells BOUNCED off the Char-B’s stout armor. The problem was: very poor communications on the French side-many units were out of contact with HQs for days…not a good thing in modern war.

As has been said, most French tanks lacked radios, which greatly hampered their effectiveness on the battlefield. While most German tanks were inferior to French and British models in terms of armor and firepower, the Pz-III and Pz-IV, which constituted a minority of German tank forces, had a substantial advantage over the Char B and all other French tanks in that they had multi-man turrets. French models had a one man turret, which meant that the commander had to do triple service as the gunner and loader in addition to his responsibility as the tank commander, frequently having to rely on signal flags to send or receive orders due to the general lack of radios, a highly inefficient arrangement. The Pz-I, Pz-II, Pz-35(t) and Pz-38(t) all shared the flaw of a one man turret, but were generally equipped with a radio. More importantly though, German tanks were concentrated in Panzer Divisions in turn forming Panzer Corps, while most of the French and British armor was parceled out amongst the infantry.