By which I mean did his military record show that he was competent in tactics, strategy, ect?
Well, his military record shows that he won the U.S. independence from Britain. I’m not sure what more is required.
He generally learned from his mistakes, which were many. And that set him apart from those officers who never learned.
That’s actually a bit of a controversial question. As a leader in a broad sense he was quite effective - he held his army together under very trying circumstances and that perseverance was critical to eventual success. And when forced into more of an irregular role he functioned well enough. However…
Washington fancied himself a European-style field commander and his record in actual set-piece engagements isn’t great. As a colonial officer he didn’t cover himself with glory during the French and Indian War ( in fact he directly precipitated it ) and in the Revolutionary War, if you look closely, you’ll see he technically lost just about every major regular field engagement ( note, that is not the same as every campaign ). He sorta seemed to function best in defeat in a way - he was good at extracting himself from tough spots. He wanted to fight and win in a conventional manner but unfortunately wasn’t that great at it ( at least not with the army he had to work with - give him Frederik the Great’s Prussians and he might have done better ). Thankfully necessity ultimately forced him in other directions.
Good point. He was handed the task of winning the war for independence of a thinly populated confederation of independent states sprawled along over a thousand miles of coastline, against the major maritime power in the world, which had the potential to field quite large armies if it wished. To do this he was handed an all-volunteer force, signed up for short terms by and large, with variable but generally inadequate funding. His experience was limited to staff officer during the French and Indian War and one expeditionary force. And yet he won. To me that suggests a reasonable grasp of strategy and tactics and a willingness to learn from his mistakes and use the knowledge to avoid future problems. Not all the developments that ensured American independence can be attributed to Washington’s generalship, but without it (and Greene and Putnam and a few others) independence would not have been won. “Necessary but not sufficient” is probably the way to summarize that in a short phrase.
I should note that this question was inspired by my recent reading of **The Making of the Prefident 1789: The Unauthorized Campaign Biography ** by Marvin Kitman, who paints something of an unflattering view of Gen. Washington (for example, that Fort Necessity was built in a particularly boneheaded spot). I decided to ask the question here to see what others thought/knew about his military abilities, since it was my first in-depth book about George.
I’ve read a lot about Washington over the years, and would be glad to suggest some other books, if you like.
He was certainly a good general; by the end of the Revolution I would even say he had learned to be a very good general. But he was never in the very top rank with, say, Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Napoleon and Rommel.
Washington certainly learned from his mistakes, on Long Island and elsewhere. He fought hard when he could, withdrew when he had to and always saved his army to fight another day. By skilled siegecraft he forced the British to withdraw from Boston. He won when no one thought he could, and showed both good judgment and audacity at Trenton and Princeton, winning notable victories there. Finally, he very effectively coordinated his efforts with the French at Yorktown in 1781 and won a smashing victory over Cornwallis that all but ended the war.
George Washington held his army together for eight years almost by sheer force of will, despite recurring supply problems and short enlistments. He also showed great courage on the battlefield. He rode between the opposing lines at Princeton in 1777, waving his sword and encouraging his troops. An aide covered his eyes with his hat because he was sure that Washington would be shot. Miraculously, despite volleys from each side, he wasn’t, and the Americans swept the field. Remarkable.
Finally, he deeply respected civilian control of the military, even when the Continental Congress kept giving him more and more power. That’s a quality that not all great generals share (coughMacArthurcough).
Washington was, as one biographer wrote, “the indispensable man” of American independence. We were damned lucky to have had him.
The pithy little line I’ve always heard was that Washington was a terrific retreater, but not great at much else. I think this is the 7 second, pop-history, History-channel answer. The above posters are undoubtedly much more correct.
The best general of the 20th Century was General Giap. He beat the French and the US when he should not have. He did the same thing Washington did after Long Island. Washington lost almost every major battle and still won the war against the superpower of the time. The only 18th century generals with a claim to being in the same league are Fredrick and Napoleon. And only Fredrick can join Washington in having achieved his life’s work by military means throughout his own life, Napoleon failed in that. Washington fought and won a Republic in such a way that we have kept it against great odds, and set precedents and took political actions after his battles that have helped keep the Republic. And Washington knew politics even better than war. And he did all of this without setting up a personality cult or claiming some kind of odd genius. If I had to pick one of the three to lead my cause in dire straits, it would be Washington, despite the extreme high qualifications of Napoleon and Fredrick.
Washington has always struck me as sort of an Augustus Ceaser, no great shakes in the field, but a leader who knew how to get ultimate victory.
Well, I’ve been there and can attest to this. The defense to this is that Washington was only in his twenties at the time.
In his own day he was referred to as the American Fabius, after Fabius Cunctator (Fabius the Delayer), hero of the war against Hannibal.
I’ve been reading about his campaigns quite a bit lately. One source claimed that he really craved a standard, European-style open field battle, and was constantly denied it until Yorktown. I’m not sure that’s born out by the record.
Certainly he did right with the placing of cannon on Dorchester Heights in Boston. But he arguably seriously screwed up dividing his forces between Brooklyn and Manhattan, and in not fortifying all the passes on Long Island. He came close to losing to the British there, but his retreat was beautifully done. His later retreat from New York and into New Jersey was also very well done. He had to endure a series of humiliating retreats and inactions, but I think they were the correct decisions. His decision to attack at Trenton on Christmas in 1776 was a considered and (especially as the result shows) a good move, but his decision to push on afterwards, make an unpredictable retreat and a new attack afterwards showed excellent military skills. Washington wanted to push on, but took the advice of his officers and didn’t overdrive his troops. Overall, that sems very good generalship, yto me.
Add to this the ability to keep his men together and in the field in the face of poor conditions and iffy pay, his ability to inspire loyalty in his officers, and his Cincinnatti-like ability to turn down the temptations of seizing control, and you have an excellent general. He did make mistakes, and certainly had his faults, but they didn’t rule him or cause him fatal problems.
He built the Army. That itself was a task equal to McCellan. His capture of Boston handed the Brits a major defeat at low cost. He selected good subordinates (more than Lincoln could generally do). Knox became very effective. Greene whipped the Brits in the South fairly consistently. He did keep Gates on too long.
Most importantly, he never gave up. While cursed with a European mindset at the start of the war, he soon wised up. He adopted a strategy based on maintaining the Continentals as a force-in-being, refusing decisive battle when there was too much risk.
As long as the Army was in the field the war was not over. Washington kept the Army together.
Well, it’s a good thing he didn’t have a cult of personality, or else we’d all be gushing about him on this thread.
Kidding, bit of early (for me) morning snark. Seriously, thanks for the info, folks.
I wouldn’t say Washington was a particularly great strategist or tactician; in these matters, he was somewhat pedestrian. But he had a number of distinct qualities that one seeks in history’s great commanders.
Washington stayed focused on “the prize at the end” despite terrible temptations and distractions. It’s critical to develop a clear war aim and stay focused on that. For example, Washington could have done more damage with more extensive use of guerrilla or terror tactics, but that wouldn’t have led to the kind of country he hoped to achieve. Also, the army’s financial and logistical troubles would have overwhelmed many commanders, but Washington gave them just enough attention to keep going, and stayed focused on the overwhelming urgency of staying in the field and looking for victory. Similarly, he could have allowed his well-known thirst for recognition to carry him onto a throne, but he stayed focused on his initial aim of making the fledgling country into something he knew the world needed, and not just a shrine to his own ego.
Washington had his own foibles as a commander, but he was often able to set these weaknesses aside almost consciously and do the proper thing. He burned with the urge to counterattack New York after his defeat at Long Island, but even if he won, the city would have been too vulnerable to the British Navy to be held, and (after listening to his subordinates) Washington concurred, and with considerable reluctance, did not make the attack. In this self-restraint, he did what Lee could not bring himself to do at Gettysburg.
Late in the war, when he learned he would have a French fleet for one last campaigning season (the French made it clear they were at the limits of their financial commitment, and rightly so, as the cost was a factor in the eventual collapse of the French government) Washington was again tempted to move against New York, but the French admiral wouldn’t go that far from the Caribbean islands he was charged with protecting. So Washington again set aside his fondest desire, changed his focus to fit reality (another great and all-too-rare personality trait) and went for Cornwallis at Yorktown – a huge gamble, as everyone before radio agreed with Napoleon’s dictum that the convergence of separate columns in the face of the enemy is the most dangerous moment in war.
In this decision, Washington showed another strength – the ability to hold oneself back for long, trying periods of great patience and then suddenly convert to all-out effort at the decisive moment. Many commanders had one or the other quality (think of Hood’s reckless aggression, the various WWI generals throwing everything into the meatgrinder in all-out attacks, and so on, or the above-mentioned Roman, Fabius, showing enormous willpower while waiting out Hannibal) but it’s rare to find someone who can switch gears on short notice and correctly judge when that moment has arrived.
Washington shared with Lee an emphasis on developing a great system of intelligence (although both were aided by sympathizers in their opponent’s population centers), both in terms of spies and cavalry patrols. What’s more, he generally listened to that intelligence and acted on it.
Add those to his famous dignity – a quality much admired in those days and in somewhat short supply in the hardscrabble colonies – and his ability to inspire both the men under him and the civilian leadership – and you have a general who even though he would be ranked only “fair” at tactical and strategic operations, possesses numerous highly valuable and rare traits that are even less often found in the same person.
I ran across this while searching for a Sun Tzu quote for this post. Just for fun, here’s one author’s summarization of Sun Tzu’s Art of War into six simple principles. (Clearly there’s room for argument about these principles; I’m just using this list because it dovetails with some of the points I’ve tried to assert above.)
I’ve colored what I perceive to be Washington’s consistent strengths as outlined above green, and areas in which he was occasionally brilliant in blue.
McNeilly’s six principles are:
- Win All Without Fighting: Achieving the Objective Without Destroying It
- Avoid Strength, Attack Weakness: Striking Where the Enemy is Most Vulnerable
- Deception and Foreknowledge: Winning the Information War
- Speed and Preparation: Moving Swiftly to Overcome Resistance
- Shaping the Enemy: Preparing the Battlefield
- Character-Based Leadership: Leading by Example
I gave him “Preparing the Battlefield” mostly for his work at Dorchester Heights (mentioned above by other posters) and his careful arrangements for the Yorktown campaign (and subsequent siegecraft). I gave him “Moving Swiftly” for reversing the army’s fortunes at Trenton (Trenton is also a fine example of “Striking Where the Enemy is Most Vulnerable,” too), and again, for the convergence at Yorktown.
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You’re lucky Georgi Zhukov isn’t alive to read the Straight Dope 
I think there are two answers depending on how you look at it.
Was he a good General-in-Chief? In the rear with the gear doing what most general officers do today such as planning, organizing, strategizing, etc.? By far he did an outstanding job.
Was he a good commanding general such as what colonels and brigadeers would do now? In this I think most would agree no and possibly tending to incompetence.
To hijack the thread, my father once told me that many military historians consider Lord Murray a military genius hamstrung by Bonny Prince Charlie (similar to Joe Johnston and Jefferson Davis methinks) however I’ve never seen anything justifying this statement. Is this question worth of its own thread?
Nathaniel Greene won that war. Washington just mopped up.
This is kind of the crux of things. Washington was not a brilliant field commander - he wasn’t even always a good one ( sometimes he was ). He was a great leader and there is a difference. So for example…
If we’re talking lead a nation as commander-in-chief of a state in turmoil, absolutely. If we’re talking a field marshal for an otherwise stable and healthy state, absolutely not. There are a fair number of 18th century generals I’d rather have leading my army into battle, never mind Napoleon and Frederik the Great ( who I think is perhaps a bit overrated, based on some recent reading of mine ). This would not, however, include any of his opponents ;).
Murray was much more realistic, certainly. Prince Charlie was not much of a military mind ( assuming one could suggest he was one at all ), but he seemed to have usually yielded to Murray’s advice. He didn’t listen to him when Murray advised he not attempt an invasion of England, which was probably Charles’ biggest mistake - but it was a semi-reasonable one considering the precariousness of the situation. Unless he were to just try to gain Scottish independence ( his safest bet, but politically impossible to his mentality ) he needed to take the war to England eventually and England was at its lowest ebb after getting badly mauled by Maurice de Saxe at Fontenoy ( this had prompted the Scottish expedition in the first place ). Other than that I don’t think you can blame the failure of the '45 on Charles. Charles wasn’t terribly competent, but it was always a very unlikely pipe dream ( something its half-hearted French sponsors were well aware of ).
Murray’s only real failure as a commander was the night time probe towards Nairn, in the evening before the fateful engagement at Culloden Moor. It was a good notion ( or at least probably the best of lousy options ), poorly executed and left his force exhausted as well as starving the following day. But otherwise Murray consistently performed very well with what little he had.