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On the issue of Murray a good general understands political reality. What Murray was suggesting was politically impossible.
Now Washington understood political reality perfectly, as illustrated in the Yorktown campaign. He knew that the British were tired of a war which had always been very unpopular and the French were tired of a war where they had been whipped pretty much everywhere outside N America. If he had failed at Yorktown the peace talks (which were already underway) may well have resulted in a different outcome.
He was lucky as well, the success of Yorktown hinged on the failure of the RN to evacuate Corniwallis’s garrison. If history has shown one thing, depending on the RN’s failure is usually a fatal flaw in a plan. Yet the RN lost, the only major engagement it lost between 1692 and Singapore 1942. Manifest destiny indeed.
If not, I pretty much agree. We should just note that Britain did on occasion suffer smaller naval reverses, but their dominance ( particularly after the Seven Years’ War ) was generally acknowledged.
True, from all I’ve read. There’ve been two relatively recent books on the subject, Washington’s Spies: The Story of America’s First Spy Ring by Alexander Rose, and George Washington, Spymaster: How the Americans Outspied the British and Won the Revolutionary War by Thomas B. Allen (the latter for kids).
Logistics & Intelligence, done correctly, before the battle, are more important than grand tactics.
Since Logistics are always a nightmare for any revolutionary, & since Washington did as well as could be expected, given that limit, Logistics were also done well, Valley Forge & the shortage of shoes notwithstanding.
By and large, no, although Congress gave generalships to several titled foreigners without his input before he asked them to stop, because it was becoming hard to find appropriate assignments for them. One of the many things he liked about Lafayette was that the young French aristocrat asked for no particular rank, saying he just wanted to help the American cause.
I’d say both Horatio Gates and Charles Lee fit those criteria. Gates stayed in power for as long as he did because the New England congressmen liked him, even though he was a pretty bad general and took credit for other people’s accomplishments. As for Lee, I don’t even know what to say about Lee.
I’d agree with your criticism of both men, but don’t consider them “useless political generals” analogous to Lincoln’s, as both had prior military experience and showed at least some skill in the field. Neither got a commission from the Continental Congress solely because of political juice or ethnic appeal; the same could not be said of Lincoln’s more notorious political generals.
I’m kind of critical of his skills as a battlefield commander, myself. Long Island was a disaster–and came close to ending the war. If things had just broken slightly more favorably for the British, the whole of the Continental Army would have been destroyed. He made almost the same errors again in the Philadelphia campaign the next year–Brandywine was won in almost an identical fashion as Long Island–Howe “amused” the colonists with a frontal attack while Cornwallis went around the right with the elite forces and completely unhinged the line.
That said, he was without a doubt one of the best strategists that the Republic has ever seen–Grant, Marshall, and Nimitz are the only ones who I think were better. Plus having the magic combination of charisma and force of personality to almost single handedly keep the Continental Army in the field for eight long years…
Fort Necessity is one of the worst sited military positions I’ve ever seen; actually, I can’t think of anything worse that I’ve actually seen in person. I’ll cut him slack on that one, though. He was only 20!
I’d mostly agree with the fellow who said that Bonaparte and Frederick were his peers, but Washington succeeded better than either. The one 18th Century general who probably was his superior wasn’t mentioned by anyone–the Duke of Marlborough; not too surprising, he is amazingly underrated today and not well known at all. His achievements in containing the “hyperpower” of the early 18th Century are amazing; his deft touch in conducting coalition warfare–with a large and amazingly fractious grouping of bickering states–was on par, if not better, than Eisenhower’s.
And here’s David McCullough on the genius of Washington’s leadership (it’s all worth watching, but he starts talking about Washington’s military school of hard knocks at 7:16): http://www.mountvernon.org/mccullough
I don’t think that Giap was any great shakes. I think that the US just stumbled around and lost it, fought the wrong kind of war, and the US public opinion is what ended the war, not Giap. Not losing the war doesn’t make you a great general.
Same thing for Washington. He saw that he was a screwup as a general, so, we can’t call him a great general. But, he was wonderful at not trying his hand at being a general-too much.
Wars are lost/won by politics, at least the Independence and Vietnam wars.
Well, both Giap and Washington beat the superpower of their time to found their own country. They might not have won battlefield set piece victories, and certainly didn’t, but they won a war fighting superior numbers with superior training and discipline with superior weapons despite losing most battles over a period of years. That is called a strategic victory. The point of warfare, and something not often accomplished. There really aren’t any better generals than the ones that win their wars and political aims. Idiots like Napoleon who are tactical geniuses and I suppose strategic geniuses who keep rolling the dice until they lose are ultimately bad generals.
Very nice post. I think you may have summarized more than was asked for. But that was probably worth doing.
I always loved the notion of how the British would march into an open clearing in a forest wearing bright red uniforms and engage in a shooting match with the rag-tag Colonials who couldn’t afford nice uniforms and therefore were hard to distinguish from the forest background. Bill Cosby did a great job of lampooning the British army who would get routinely clobbered in those encounters. It is just so funny to think about, I can’t help but LOLing as I write this. In addition, the movie Patriot (2000) starring Mel Gibson also seemed to do a good job making fun of the Brits for never learning anything about fighting in forests.
I conducted a debate with myself before posting anything attributed to Bill Cosby and/or Mel Gibson, I felt a strong need to explain all the problems I have with those two assholes … no need to continue …