This is a gross oversimplification. Loyalist American Rangers who fought for the British were quite skilled in frontier warfare.
In addition, large numbers of Amerindians also fought for the British against the American Rebels. The British employment of Amerindian allies ended up being another example of “good short term battle strategy, poor long term political strategy.” Amerindian raids alienated American Loyalists and caused a swell of volunteers for Rebel militias.
No, it’s not.
It’s not as if there was a shortage of forests in Europe, either. “Egads! Trees! We’ve never seen such devilry before!”. Gimme a break.
Fact of the matter is, both sides of the conflict preferred to fight in open terrain. Without modern communications, it was simply impossible to control a force of more than a few dozen people in forested terrain. Your troops had to be able to see your flags.
Because…?
More on Washington’s espionage network: Spying and Espionage · George Washington's Mount Vernon
An interesting Mount Vernon short film on Washington’s 1776-77 New Jersey campaign, including the battles of Trenton and Princeton: http://www.mountvernon.org/site/animated-washington/winter-patriots/. The film quotes Frederick the Great as saying that the campaign was “the most brilliant of any recorded in the annals of military achievements.”
Tell that to Macbeth.
I have read only one bio; there is only one difference with your account above, and that is of emphasis rather than fact:
Washington’s conduct of the Yorktown campaign was skillful, but I was disappointed to learn that the idea for the campaign originated with the French, who were at pains to convince Washington to accept it.
Americans naturally have a different perspective on the War of Independance to the British, but you should remember that in part, it was being fought as a sideline from the main task of defeating Napoleon’s ambition to rule the whole of Europe - in effect he wanted a United States of Europe (with him as head, naturally).
Britain and its allies were pretty stretched - the loss of The Americas was not considered to be a huge loss, especially when compared to the goings on across the channel.
True. Washington initally would rather have smashed the British stronghold in NYC.
That would be the War of 1812. The American War of Independence took place before the French Revolution. It’s true, however, that the American rebellion was in many ways a sideline to its very own war, since the British did indeed have to contend with the French, Dutch, and Spanish, and maintain their hold not only on mainland America but also their Caribbean holdings.
Umm, bob, you do know that the Revolution ended in 1783 (Treaty of Paris) and Napoleon didn’t come to power until 1799 (as 1st Consul; Emperor in 1804).
Methinks you are thinking about the War of 1812, where the US tried to use Britain’s distraction with the French to get concessions (and maybe grab chunks of Canada in the process) from the British. Didn’t go according to plan, and talk about poor generalship…
But back to Washington, just to add to the consensus, he was a good but not great field general, but he kept his army intact and in the field as a constant threat to the British and managed (with massive French aid) to win the decisive action (Yorktown) that finally got the Brits to decide not to throw good money after bad and negotiate peace.
And that was more than good enough.
ETA: ninja’ed by Ludovic–who filled in a few things I should have mentioned
If we can go back to pillorying Washington for a second ;)…
The disconnect between the first two comments and the third always comes to mind when I think about Washington. Because he didn’t always learn from his mistakes and those two disasters are the prime cases in point. As noted by Elendil’s Heir’s buddy he lost both battles in essentially identical fashion and in a really, really pedestrian manner. In both cases he bit at a small frontal feint while the majority of the enemy army ( in both cases commanded by Howe ) waltzed around and rolled up his unguarded flank. Protecting your flank ( or at least keeping an eye on it ) is generalship 101 and Washington failed egregiously, falling to the same trick to the same commander twice in a row. He retreated very nicely - something he was sincerely very good at. But a more aggressive commander than Howe ( who was partially constrained by his own false hope that a settlement could be reached ) would have probably ended him in those encounters. Actually if you were going strictly in terms of Howe and Washington’s battlefield record against one another you’d have to call Howe the better general :D.
It’s why while he was a great leader, I’m just never going to be able to see him as a great general. He was a decent one who had some good qualities and was smart enough to learn to act against his own worse impulses and adapt to necessity. But as a tactician he just wasn’t the bee’s knees.
You’re confusing the War of Independence with what we Americans call the War of 1812. Napoleon was 14 years old at the end of the former.
ETA sorry to pile on.
In his “Revolutions” podcast Mike Duncan (who did the outstanding “History of Ancient Rome” podcast) says one of Washington’s failings as a general was he made things too complicated. Several different units attacking different places at different times is great on paper. But when you are marching at night in fog during winter things things go wrong. But his skill in building an army that could fight well at Germantown convinced Europeans that America could win.
Is it fair to say Washington was more of a political general like Eisenhower than a strategic/tactical general?
I wouldn’t say so. Washington often exercised battlefield command and came under enemy fire (most notably at Princeton); Eisenhower did not. Washington was a political general, I suppose, in the sense that he was personally chosen by his fellow members of the Continental Congress, had to be mindful of occasional scheming to replace him and, as with any top general in a democracy, was subject to civil authority.
Really?
He liked dogs.
Can’t really holds him responsible for causing the war ( which would have happened eventually anyway ) and he was under belligerent, though more defensive orders. But he was the individual that ended up lighting the spark and arguably ( the actual action is muddled ) he overstepped himself by initiating offensive actions.
Partly, but he could do certain tactical things really, really well - retreats, and surprise attacks.
He wasn’t a *great *battlefield general, but he was not an empty uniform.