I think it’s easy to underestimate Washington’s considerable skill at losing battles. He was so good at losing battles that he was able to use that skill to win the war. Though, mind you, it would have been even better if he had been that good at winning battles.
Having thought about this for a while, I will put my perspective. It’s very easy to focus on Washington’s failings, but doing so misses the essential points. There are no perfect generals, because there are no perfect people. Many commanders have made mistakes, and arguably the best commanders have made the biggest ones. You don’t become a great general by not having flaws; you become a great commander by always learning, always adapting your skills to the military and political situation, and by avoiding defeat. Winning, as such, is a byproduct of the process.
Yes, Washington wasn’t the best battle commander in history. That’s also completely irrelevant. He won the war, and he won it because of superior strategy. Over history, strategy has become more and more important, but even in ancient times merely winning battles rarely accomplished anything. Washington’s basic accomplishments include putting together an army, keeping it together in some pretty rough circumstances, outmaneuvering many generals with more powerful forces and complete control over the sea, and eventually combining with allies to utterly defeat the enemy. That is no a small list of accomplishments, and it’s hard to see what more he could have done to be considered “great”.
We can imagine a general who had all of the above and was also a super-tactical -genius who can win with five drunk privates and a old hound. We could perhaps imagine a general with no communication problems, crack troops, and plenty of supplies. For that matter, we could also hand Washington a regiment of modern-day marines with a couple tanks while we’re at it. Washington took everything he had available - including his numerous skills and talents, and turned all of them to winning, which he did against what was perhaps the most powerful nation in the world at the time, at least in its ability to project force globally.
Further, I’d go so far as to say that losing battle was actually an advantage. He repeatedly retreated from fights, but this actually dragged out the war in his favor, probably far more than a few hard-fought victories. Washington did not have unlimited manpower or resources, which meant that simply denying and delaying the enemy was often more useful than simply beating him. A British casualty could be replaced more readily than an American, and England alone had many more people than America at this time. On the other hand, Britain was fighting a war at the end of a very long supply chain. Repeatedly, British victories in the field resulted in few casualties but high expenses. Further, these victories gave the British almost no strategic benefit. Why fight hard battles when victory (for you) is unlikely to be worthwhile and defeat is low-cost? Under those circumstances, you’re far better-off waging a campaign of maneuver and harassment, which is basically what Washington did.
Nathaniel Philbrick (Mayflower, In the Heart of the Sea) has a new book out on Washington and Benedict Arnold. Here’s an interview on the Mount Vernon website; he talks about Washington’s military leadership beginning at 19:44: https://vimeo.com/158493434
This misses the point.
The supreme leader of a movement MUST be good at politics – which, properly understood, is another word for managing people. If he is not good at managing people, he is not a great general, no matter what his skill at tactics or strategy. If he cannot manage and inspire people, his solders will fight for him only reluctantly, and thus not put forth their best effort.
Patton is a good example. His skills in other areas allowed him to win battles IN SPITE OF his woefully poor management skills. But Washington, Eisenhower, and Robert E. Lee – political generals all – were better generals than Patton.
Bob ++
I think your chronology is in error. The American Revolutionary war and the Napoleon wars do not overlap.
Your point that Great Britain had other entanglements during the Reveloutionary war is still valid.
Zerr-coli
Bumped.
Here’s a good 2005 interview with David McCullough about Washington’s learning curve as a general: '1776' Takes Readers to the Battlefront : NPR
I think it was Barbara Tuchman’s March of Folly that mentions the problem with the American Revolution was that it was very unpopular in Britain. They had to hire mercenaries (Hessians) because Brits did not want to fight, they were still working off an expensive war with France from a decade and a half before (hence the unpopular billeting troops in civilian houses, and new taxes). So everything Washington could do to prolong the war worked in his favor. Plus, the French saw the opportunity to stick it to the English who had taken their colonies in the previous war, and by strategic blockade (and timid English commanders) managed to cause the English defeat.
Yes. I recommend Iron Tears by Stanley Weintraub for a very interesting look at the Revolution through British eyes - a good exploration of the political, military, diplomatic, social and economic impact of what increasingly became, as md-2000 said, a very unpopular war.