The heck with the whole region cooperating - what happens in Syria if ISIS is gone? What becomes of Iraq? Aren’t those conditions likely to create a future ISIS-type problem down the line?
I’m speculating out my arse but…
Who gives a damn if we can get the regional powers to manage this problem themselves and leave the west out of it.
How come when ISIL disperses into the population, it is taken as an indication that they are still a potent threat; but when the Iraqi army disperses, it is an indication that they are broken and defeated?
The Iraqi army isn’t a threat to anyone. Clearly.
Because if they can’t manage it themselves, there’s a fairly good chance that sooner or later it turns into a problem for the West. That’s been the general pattern for a while now.
Well, that’s when we let the Syrian’s take care of it, since they have no issues bombing the crap out of civilian areas (and civilians, full stop), and since there won’t be any sort of massive outcry from either the media or the (western) public over it. Hell, we seem to be fine with Assad et al doing whatever, including the use of poison gas, based on the lack of such outcries and the number of posters on this board and elsewhere who think having Assad in power gives the region stability or something.
For sure. But there is a nascent coalition now. If it manages by some miracle to even appear effective, other players like Egypt and Iran might join. IF that happens, perhaps something good can come of it after all?
I realize that’s a giant IF. But I feel like that’s what this administration is hoping will happen and it’s come closer than any recent administration accomplised to date. So they feel they gotta try.
Worse case scenario, the US resorts to a protracted drone warfare. Something they’ve become reasonably good at and generally comfortable conducting with minimal risk/involvement of US troops.
Was that ever possible? Was the sense of nationhood in either place ever as strong as tribalism, or enough to make significant numbers of young men risk their lives for it? I’m not seeing it.
The strength of ISIL, and the ease with which its members can slip back into the community, suggests that at least a large percentage, maybe the majority, support them, at least more than they support other power centers such as their local dictators or foreign/infidel invaders. It’s going to be difficult but necessary to limit attacks to targets representing actual threats to the outside or to peace in general, but at some point in the future it may be necessary to reach some sort of accommodation.
It’s disgusting, sure, that we might now have to support Assad, like we supported Saddam throughout the no-fly-zone period, in the causes of humanitarianism and peace. But that’s what it looks like now.
No. It was never possible. The last administration assumed nation building like this was possible but it’s one of the mistakes that I mentioned that the US has made in the past.
To their credit, they are now building a coalition of established nations, instead of relying on a rag-tag Iraqi or Afghan army with tribal alliances that trump any possible national interests.
The “coalition” is a fiction, and I am amazed that posters on this board actually take it in any way seriously. It is a formality, a permission by the countries in the list for the US to use their names in the propaganda, and a token one- or two-plane contribution to the attacks. The countries in the “coalition” have neither the will NOR the ability to actually do anything substantial.
I understand the general point you’re making, but the sanctions on Iraq and no-fly zones as “support” for Saddam is just plain bizarre.
Considering that the purpose of such a coalition is to present an image of regional cooperation, the “real” contributions of each country listed are far less important then the fact that they are willing to be counted as members of the coalition.
And considering the vastly disparate capabilities of the US and Middle Eastern militaries (besides Israel), this is probably the only sort of regional coalition that ever could exist.
Of course the coalition exists for political reason. That’s why such coalitions are formed! And they’re entirely necessary in cases like this, whether this particular entanglement is wise or not.
QuickSilver, in the post that I responded to, contrasted this “coalition” with “rag-tag Iraqi or Afghan army”.
When the purpose/reason of the coalition is strictly political, how “rag-tag” (I presume the reference is to the capability) the coalition partner is is completely irrelevant.
Surprised this needed to be pointed out, but there you go. 
Iraqis have proven themselves to be ineffective at best (and coward at worst). The coalition countries do not wear the same stigma, at least for the moment. As such, they may garner more respect among their regional peers.
The Iraqi and Afghan armies were “rag-tag” both politically as well as materially – they were not united and they had virtually no international legitimacy.
On the other hand, our wise and wonderful coalition partners in this circumstance are, generally, both united and possessing of international legitimacy.
Again, since the “coalition” countries are not in any way significantly contributing anything but their name to the joint effort, how exactly is their effectiveness or cowardliness relevant?
While the US is doing most of the heavy lifting, the coalition countries participation is more than just symbolic:
A couple of token planes are “just symbolic”. Even the “rag tag” Iraqi army could manage that just as well.
No, because such symbols, to be effective, require international legitimacy, political unity, and the like.