Were there any areas where the Imperial Japanese Navy exceeded the US Navy during WWII?

Factual Questions
61

You’re sort of missing the point. Lexington wouldn’t have aborted its mission and been heading home from a target base still 400 miles away just because it had been spotted by seaplanes if they weren’t afraid of what the IJN could potentially do from that kind of range. And it absolutely was an acceptable risk/reward for the Japanese. If just one of those torpedoes had hit the Lexington, her and the US Pacific fleet were going to be having a very bad day. That would have been fully 50% of the US carrier fleet in the Pacific out of action - Saratoga was already as mentioned out of action from a submarine torpedo and wouldn’t be available until after Midway, and Hornet, having only been commissioned a month before Pearl Harbor, didn’t depart for the Pacific until March. Which would have left only Enterprise and Yorktown available.

The same way that sinking the Chicago was well worth the cost of 12 medium bombers, particularly at a time when the USN was desperately short on heavy cruisers after the losses incurred from the naval engagements around Guadalcanal, losing 16 medium bombers for a shot at reducing the number of available carriers in the Pacific to two was well worth the risk.

And again, this threat was not something that the USN took lightly just because they had gotten lucky with the Lexington. It was a factor that they had to take into consideration during every naval operation around Guadalcanal, particularly when it came to risking the carriers. The two available fleet carriers weren’t hanging back 250 and 400 miles respectively behind the Chicago’s task force when Chicago was first hit in January 1943, nearly a full year after the attack on Lexington just for the hell of it. They were doing it to stay out of reach of the G4Ms in Rabaul, and to reduce the risk of running into Japanese submarines. Which, incidentally, as well as sinking the Wasp, had caught Saratoga on August 31, 1942, putting her out of action again.

62

Actually, the Lexington would have been turning away if it had been spotted with a fishing boat with a radio. Brown had lost the element of surprise, so he was abandoning the mission.

So, if he was scared of the G4M, he had an odd way of showing it. I imagined that he also knew he was far away enough that a A6M trying to escort at that range would have little fuel left before it would have to return, leaving the G4M’s to burn, which was pretty much the outcome.

In this instance, the G4M’s didn’t have any torpedoes available, they were “only” using 550lb bombs. A pretty good weapon, but not the excellent Japanese torpedoes. If they had hit the Lexington, it might have been a bad day, but it would have still been a lucky hit that would have sent it back to Pearl or to the bottom.

To illustrate the shortcomings of an unsupported G4M even further, the USN made mistakes in the action off Bougainville that could have cost them, but the G4M was the wrong aircraft to exploit them. Since the main air patrol had run off chasing the remnants of the first attack, there were only two F4Fs left to defend against the last eight G4Ms attacking the Lexington. One of those F4F’s guns jammed, so there was actually only one fighter left to fend them off. He shot down 3 outright and damaged two others before he ran out of ammuntion. That aircraft unsupported was great at taking out targets completely unprepared to resist air attacks, but when it faced even lightly defended targets it wasn’t much to write home about.

63

Not only is it simple, but it’s also completely wrong. As I suspected, this myth was generated from thin air.

First, there wasn’t just one planning committee, as it were. As I said, there was a complex arrangement of competing and overlapping organizations with their own planning departments.

And it actually was the planning people who wanted to push the war more, while some of the leadership was more aware of the problems.

Finally, it wasn’t resources that the Japanese felt would be the limiting factor. Recall that the Japanese started the war with the aim of taking the oil and other resources in Southeast Asia.

Rather, it was the manufacturing capacity and the ability of the United States to outproduce aircraft carriers, battleships, other warships, airplanes, and materiel as well as their limited shipping that was the reason that Japan knew they couldn’t win a protracted war with a country that had ten times the war-making capacity.

Back to the Byzantine-like system and organization that was the Japan military and government, Eri Hotta covers the entire year-long process towards war in her excellent book, Japan 1041: Countdown to infamy. All the other countries, both Axis and Allied had fairly straightforward ways of making decisions concerning war. Not the Japanese.

You’re arguing the wrong point. I’ve already acknowledged that they didn’t have armor and self sealing tanks. I pointed that out in my post.

“Well, they could have . . . “ could actually be said about almost anything, so it’s not a strong argument.

One of the biggest strengths of the Japanese was grouping the carriers together, right? We went over that.

By your logic, that’s not a big deal because the US could have done the same. All it would take would be more carriers and a completely different doctrine, but the US could have done it.

The IJN actually added armor and self sealing tanks later to the G4M, so theoretically they could have added it sooner, but they didn’t so this is why we don’t argue about theoreticals but rather want each side had at the particular time.

The second thing is that you missed “capital” in your post. Sinking capital ships by land bombers was something the US never did, let alone in 1941 or 42.

The US tried, see Midway where the B-17s blew the hell out of a lot of waves while the Japanese carriers steered away from the falling bombs. They tried strapping on torpedoes to four B-26 bombers but with no experience or air cover, it went as well as could be expected.

The US Army Air Corp sank zero enemy battleships or cruisers during the war. The IJN land bombers sank three.

While we are talking about the losses of torpedo bombers, we can’t ignore what happened to the USN and Marine torpedo bombers at Midway. This was even six months into the war and people were still trying to send in these low and slow bombers without fighter cover. The US torpedo bombers got devastatored, but the US had decided it was worth it.

Exactly. This was the reason Fletcher withdrew the carriers early before the unloading of the transports were completed.

64

But the only advantage the G4M had was range, and it was a bad compromise, which they later learned and rectified. The range advantage without a fighter to cover it was useless, and only cost you more aircrew unless you were attacking a target that lacked air cover.

Yep, so any range your bombers had beyond fighter cover was basically sending those crews on what very well could be a likely one-way mission. This was a lesson the Allies learned, as well. Land or sea didn’t matter too much in that calculus.

65

I never claimed that the G4M was a perfect bomber. Full stop.

Everyone who is participating in this discussion is very well aware of its weaknesses. Full stop.

The advantage that the imperial Japanese Navy had at the beginning of the war was that they had a land-based torpedo bomber that sunk three Allied capital ships and kept US carriers skittish.

It was a flawed bomber. Of course. I said that in my very first post.

Look at what I said:

note what I’m talking about, and what I’m not bragging about in that post (not just what I quoted here).

Go back and read my post. I didn’t mention the range and I acknowledged the no armor / self sealing tanks.

How many capital ships did your B-25 bombers sink?

66

How many capital ships without air cover did any aircraft sink? The Bismarck was crippled by Fairey Swordfishes. They weren’t great, heck, they weren’t even good. But they were able to arrive at an opportune moment against a target unprepared for air defense. The IJN weren’t lucky to have developed the G4M, they were lucky to have those bombers show up at the point where those capital ships weren’t defended by air cover.

67

And if they hadn’t have developed the G4M, how many capital ships would Japanese land-based bombers have sunk with or without air cover?

They got lucky. Perhaps. That’s not my point at all. The fact is that the Japanese had a land-based torpedo bomber that worked in certain circumstances.

Again, how many capital ships did the US sink, with / without air cover? Had the US have a land based bomber, and had they gotten lucky, perhaps they could have sunk a ship.

Millions of sports contests are decided every year even when one side gets lucky. I just checked Super Bowl stats, and they’re not putting an asterisk on which ones were deserved and which ones were one because someone got lucky.

At this point, we’re talking past each other, without anything new, so there really isn’t any need for any further engagement, is there?

68

An air strike against moving targets at sea isn’t like a flight from airfield A to factory B and back. The ships move away from their last reported position.

Are you arguing that for all the compromises of the G4M, its range was no longer than that of a B-25?

69

You don’t get to put words in my mouth, nor do I understand why this is so personal to you. It’s common knowledge Japan is light on natural resources, particularly petroleum. They stockpiled as much as they could - particularly prior to the increasing levels of embargo by the USA - but it was only enough for a short period.

Explain how this is a “myth”, and show your work

70

Well, no capital ships, but during the Battle of the Bismarck Sea (March 1943), B-25 gunships took helped destroy an entire Japanese convoy, helping sink a total of 8 transport ships and 4 destroyers. B25s also sank freighters, cargo vessels, sub chasers. In the end, sinking support craft was likely more important than sinking a couple of obsolete Capital ships- the HMS Repulse was launched in 1916, although the HMS Prince of Wales was more modern- but still mostly useless.

So did the Italians, in fact the SM 79 was before the Betty. The Savoia-Marchetti SM.79 Sparviero sank several British Destroyers, and badly damaged six cruisers, not to mention a battleship and a carrier.

Well, a lot. But the Army’s land based aircraft mostly sank smaller ships- but it sank a LOT of them

71

If you remove the “land based” aspect, most of the IJN’s capital ships were eventually sunk by aircraft. The only capital ships of the IJN sunk by the US that weren’t at least partly destroyed by aircraft that I can find were the Kurishima (sunk by USS Washington), the Kongo (sunk by USS Sealion) and the Shinano (sunk by USS Archerfish).

I’m not counting cruisers, because they really weren’t capital ships for the navies involved in the Pacific war.

Oh, absolutely not. It definitely had about a 25% range advantage in that comparison. It’s just that it couldn’t really use that range to attack a target that had air cover. It was too fragile and lightly defended, and there weren’t any Japanese fighters that could escort it for about the last third of its range.

72

You replied. Nothing new. No need for me to simply repeat myself.

73

I am sure that TokyoBayer meant land based here.

74

Again, you’re making rather bold claims unsupported by what actually happened during the war. US carriers stayed out of range of G4Ms based in Rabaul as much as possible during the entirety of the Guadalcanal campaign. Enterprise was staying150 miles behind Chicago’s task force when Chicago was initially torpedoed.

As for it being “great at taking out targets completely unprepared to resist air attacks, but when it faced even lightly defended targets it wasn’t much to write home about”, From S. E. Morrison, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, June 1941-April 1944: History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume 7 (History of USN Operations in WWII):

The first air counterattack, and the only one of any consequence during the first six days, was delivered by 16 torpedo bombers (half from Roi, half from Maloelap) on the evening of 20 November [1943]. Admiral Montgomery’s carrier group lay about 30 miles west of Tarawa, recovering planes, when these planes were sighted coming in low over the water. All ships opened fire, and fighter planes in the air attacked the bold bombers, nine of which broke through the anti-aircraft fire and split into three equal groups. Three attacked Essex and Bunker Hill, inflicting no damage and were shot down. The other six concentrated on Independence, dropped at least five torpedoes and made one hit. Eight of the planes were shot down. Independence lost 17 killed and 43 wounded and retired to Funafuti for repairs. It was no minor job for the crew of the repair ship Vestal, for the carrier’s after engine room, fireroom and magazine were flooded, many bottom plates were damaged, and she had a wobbly shaft and a ruptured fire main. Yet they got her into shape to depart for Pearl Harbor under her own power on 7 December.

Independence was out of action until 3 July 1944. After being hit by hit by Japanese torpedo bombers (unidentified but considering that the range from Roi to 30 miles west of Tarawa is ~650 miles, it’s a rather safe bet that were talking about G4Ms) in November 1943. By which time the US was now operating carriers in groups unimaginable in February 1942; 11 carriers were operating in support of the Tarawa landing. And were carrying F6F Hellcats. And the size of the fighter group of fleet carriers had doubled from the woefully inadequate size of 18 planes in February 1942 to 36. And the quality of G4M crews had almost 2 years of attrition to erode.

And again, yes, even that far in the war when the US could send 11 fleet and light carriers out on operations, trading 16 G4Ms for putting a light carrier out of the war for more than half a year was a good exchange for the Japanese.

I honestly am not sure what the point of this is, but you’re missing Taiho (submarine torpedo), Fuso and Yamashiro (both lost at Surigao Strait to gunfire and for once, destroyer launched torpedoes). Oh, and all 3 Taiyo-class escort carriers (all submarine torpedoes) if you want to classify them as capital ships.

I’m not sure I’d put much stock in calling the battleship Ise, Hyugo, or Haruna or the carrier Amagi, all damaged at Kure harbor 19 March 1945 and sunk in later raids at Kure proper battleships or carriers anymore. There was no longer any oil for them to ever sail again or planes for them to carry, and they’d all been reduced to first-class reserve ships by the time of the 19 March attack, then to fourth-class reserve ships and finally relegated to floating AA batteries after being towed into place by tugs.

75

Regarding the Zero vs Wildcat: If 2 fighters have combat loss rates that are about even, then the one with more than twice the range is probably the better fighter. Could the Wildcat escort bombers from Guadalcanal to Rabaul? Hell no. Even P-38s couldn’t fly that far.

Same goes for the P-51 vs late-war Bf-109 and Fw-190. They match up pretty closely in a fight, but only one of them can fly from London to Berlin and back. The Mustang was easily the better fighter.

76

Loss numbers are also misleading unless you consider both total fleet sizes and battle odds.

If 20 of yours meet 5 of theirs and each side loses 4, well, your team sucks.

If you have 2000 fighters in inventory & they have 500, and after a couple months’ combat both sides have lost 300, the other guys are in deep shit & you’re sitting pretty.

77

On the one hand, that doesn’t necessarily speak to the quality of the aircraft. On the other hand, quantity has a quality of its own. But then the question is, is the quantity superior because the aircraft is easier to manufacture, or because (as was undoubtedly the case in WWII) one side has an advantage in manufacturing, industry, and raw materials?

78

Not directly. But in the former case of a 20:5 battle, the lopsided percentage outcome might be due to machine or to man or to organization.

I know w your background you know what I’m about to say, as do several other contributors.

But amatuers love to discuss the merits of single machines in isolation.

People in the biz know that first and foremost, warfare is a team sport executed in the field by large bureaucracies. Who’re backed by even larger bureaucracies who design, build, and procure the tools, develop the doctrine, and staff and train the fighting forces who use all those things together in battle.

79

Yes, I agree. The US as a whole was undeniably superior to its adversaries in WWII, both in terms of systems and also in terms of raw capacity. I just note that the OP is (rightly or wrongly) more interested in individual pieces of equipment or areas of performance. Which does not exclude quantity from the mix of factors to be considered, but it can be difficult to distinguish, for the purposes of this thread, whether the quantity advantage is due to simplicity and efficiency of design (something attributable to the piece of equipment) or to the industrial base.

But, again, overall I agree and I wish more attention was given to just how deficient and inefficient large-scale authoritarian systems are in practice. They are as intellectually bankrupt as they are morally. Mussolini did not make the trains run on time, neither Hitler nor his cronies orchestrated Germany’s economic recovery (though they sure did a lot to bring about its ruin thereafter), and Japanese manufacturing didn’t become a marvel of systems engineering and quality assurance until after it was forced to abandon its militarism.

80

No, the other team is now out of the game.