Exactly. That’s how Grant ultimately defeated Lee in the U.S. Civil War, in a war of attrition. Grant lost more far more troops than Lee in the Overland Campaign in the spring of 1864 (55,000 Union casualties vs. 33,000 Confederate casualties in just 40 days). However, Grant could replenish his losses; Lee could not.
Also worth noting that Grant had to fight offensively. It’s another myth, IMHO, that Lee was necessarily the better general. Particularly as Lee’s own forays into hostile territory ended so magnificently (for the Union and our country, that is—it was disastrous for the traitors).
He was certainly better than some of the early Union Generals he fought. Irvin McDowell for one. Lee’s biggest mistake was thinking his loyalty to his state was more important than his nation.
When in command of an army, Lee never fought against a similar force commanded by Irvin McDowell. McDowell had command of a corps in the Second Bull Run campaign and battle, where Lee was in command of the Army of Northern Virgina, but McDowell was subordinate to Pope in that role. A division that had been under McDowell’s command was detached from him and sent to the Peninsula in time for the Seven Days battles, but McDowell was not present - he remained in command of the Department of the Rappahannock, charged with defending the southern approach to the capital.
Oh, I agree, I though Grant and a couple others were better. But the Union did suffer through some pretty incompetent generals to start. The South was lucky as Lee was better than average, but of course the CSA had plenty of bad generals also.
It’s a bit biased. It glosses over some data in Yamato’s favor:
As stated, the tests against the Shinano turret faceplate were at 90°, and penetrated. Left unmentioned was that the tests also showed that at 45°, as mounted on the ship, the faceplate could not be penetrated by the 16” at any range.
American radar controlled gunfire was impressive, landing hits on Yamashiro at over 10 miles range. OTOH, 5 battleships fired at her yet failed to sink her, immobilize her or silence her main battery. She sank after 4+ torpedo hits. In earlier night battles American gunfire showed high initial accuracy but this declined.
The IJN developed diving shells for their heavy guns. These enabled shells landing well short of the target to hit and detonate. The longest-range damage done by a battleship on a moving target was one such hit, at ~31,000 yards, by Yamato. The Iowa class had no protection against this type of hit.
Realistically, none of this mattered. What did matter was anti-aircraft capability, and here the USN had it all over the IJN.
The best detailed analysis on that fight I have seen was done here. He did the actual math and shows his footnotes.
As for point 1, if the Iowa is fighting at long range to take advantage of its radar, its shells are going to be falling at close to 45 degrees anyway. It won’t be exact of course but small angles only give small additional amounts of protection.
I will copy the footnote from the site as to why Japan’s diving shells were not worth the sacrifices they required.
"7. The tradeoffs the Japanese made for these shells don’t seem to have been worth it. The only textbook example of an optimal Type-91 hit was an 8" shell that struck the magazine of the U.S. light cruiser Boise during the Battle of Cape Esperance. In this case, rapid flooding prevented a catastrophic detonation of the magazine. Thus, the shell hit, while causing massive damage to Boise, did not achieve the sort of critical damage the Japanese had sacrificed so much for in terms of raw penetrative power in the design of their Type 91 ammunition. Further, it should be noted that the very long fuze delay times in these sorts of shells (necessary for allowing adequate delay if the shell was transiting underwater to the target) had undesirable effects when the shell struck light plating at flat trajectories (such as superstructures). In these cases, Type-91 shells frequently detonated well after the shell had carried through the target ship and was in mid-air on the other side. In a long-range gunnery duel, plunging fire from a Type-91 shell might conceivably pass through the armor deck and then through the bottom of the target ship before detonation – again, not a trivial hit, but hardly the optimal amount of damage to be expected from a very large caliber shell penetrating to the vitals of the target."
Yes for Germany , but Japan had gotten itself into quite the quagmire in China that had already dragged on for four and a half years before they attacked the Western Allies. They weren’t losing the war with China, but they couldn’t win, either.
The crazy militants pushing the war in Japan were also contemplating attacking the USSR in addition to attacking the UK and the US. As it was, Japan and the USSR were neutrals until the final days when the Soviets decided to get a land grab.
Coming back to this question, which points to an early discussion concerning the areas where the IJN had an advantage over the USN (and RN).
As I said earlier, the Japanese were able to integrate operations from multiple fleet carriers and get coordinated strike packages off much faster than it took the Americans to get off uncoordinated strikes.
The US was struggling to even get attacks by individual flattops in a timely manner, let alone with another carrier. Struggling is being kind. At Midway, it took far too long.
Carriers would launch the fighters first because they took off in the shortest distance, then the dive bombers and then they would have to bring up the torpedo bombers from the hangers because they needed the full flight deck to get enough speed for the heavy load. Japanese would often have one carrier supply the torpedo bombers while the dive bombers would come from another.
Enterprise and Hornet took close to an hour for the process. In the meantime, the fighters were burning precious fuel circling overhead.
Launching the torpedo bombers from Enterprise was taking too long so Enterprise let squadrons fly off by themselves, which was one of the causes of the chaos. Yorktown had needed to recover the scout planes first, so their launch was later.
Hornet was able to get off their entire strike package together but the controversy comes from where they went, the “flight to nowhere.”
Mitscher went on later in the war to became a superb leader but I think that most historians agree that the screwup belonged to him. He certainly falsified the After Action report, but because Nimitz didn’t want a public fiasco, the doubts weren’t aired at the time.
A US scouting plane had sighted the Japanese carriers, but only reported two. There was a question if the Japanese would have their carriers in one or two groups and while the planes from Enterprise went after where the Japanese should have been based on their speed and heading, it’s thought that Ring and Mitschel decided to go there they thought a second group would be. They flew off west instead of south west, except part way through, the leader of the torpedo bombers disregarded orders and took off with his squadron.
Hornet’s tordepdo bombers famously found the Japanese fleet before the dive bombers from the Enterprise and Yorktown successfully crippled three of the IJN carriers. Hornet’s torpedo bomber squadron got completely wiped out while the rest of Hornet’s planes continued of their sightseeing tour and found nothing.
In the After Action report, Mitschel claimed that his planes went on a south-west route, but years later, someone researched it, and found that most of the pilots said they were on a west heading.
Mitscher was one of the greats in aviation, and it doesn’t seem likely that he wouldn’t have approved the heading himself.
While the US won at Midway, they could have done much better. It goes to show how much better prepared for war Japan was.