You’re exaggerating the inability of tanks to do any good - both the rapid advances by Russia in the first days of the war and the rapid Ukrainian counterattack at Kharkov would not have been possible without tanks, and for all the claims that the tank is now obsolete it’s telling both that Ukraine still wants all of the tanks that it can from the West, and far more than it has actually been given, and that Russia is both trying to step up its production of tanks and is pulling tanks as old as the T-55 from storage. Cheap, long range ATGMs have been around since the 1960s and 70s.
Cheap drones are another matter entirely. As the fighting has (d)evolved into an artillery war, the abilities of the cheap drone as a sensory platform able to see beyond the front line has had a dramatic effect on the fighting. I was watching (or well, rather listening to) an older Perun video for the first time on long ranged fires and was struck by the eloquence of a quote by US General William DePuy on the role his infantry battalion played in WWII that he summarized, the full quote is here, bolding is the summary:
GEN DEPUY: One of the comments that I’ve made has infuriated the Infantry School. Now, I
don’t blame them for being infuriated, but I honestly concluded at the end of World War II, when I
soberly considered what I had accomplished, that I had moved the forward observers of the
artillery across France and Germany. In other words, my battalion was the means by which Field
Artillery forward observers were moved to the next piece of high ground. Once you had a forward
observer on a piece of ground, he could call up five to ten battalions of artillery and that meant you
had moved combat power to the next observation point - more combat power than the light
infantry could dispose of. Now, you needed the infantry to do that. You needed the infantry to
protect them, but the combat power came from this other source, and I think that trend has
accelerated ever since. I think the infantry has the dirtiest job of them aiL But, if you want to be
rigorously analytical about what you’re really trying to do, it’s trying to move combat power
forward to destroy the enemy, and the combat power that you are moving forward has been, in
the past, mostly artillery, and that is even more true today. The infantry has a lot of ears and a lot
of eyeballs. Now, it can call forward even more artillery fire and different kinds of munitions -
Cannon Launched Guided Projectiles (CLGPs), the Family of Scatterable Mines (FASCAMs),
Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICMsJ, high explosive (HE), smoke, and
illumination, and soon they will also have terminally guided anti-a rmor munitions. The infantry is a
sensor. It’s a sensory organization that works into the fabric of the terrain and the enemy, and can
call in all of this firepower - including artillery and TAC air that can really do the killing .
And this interview was from 1979, the accuracy and ability to deliver precision fires from artillery - particularly against armor - has increased dramatically in the interim. The video is chaptered, the summarized quote from DePuy is in 4:33 “Long Range Fires”, a look at the effect that cheap, easily replaced drones have had on delivering long range fires in Ukraine is in the chapter at 12:41 “Lessons from Ukraine”