as always - unconfirmed - but interesting nevethless:
https://twitter.com/WarMonitor3/status/1574435655840845824?cxt=HHwWgMDSweS4wtkrAAAA
the whole mobilization thingy has the potential to become a bigger headache than the war in Ukr. for mr. putin
(rubs hand in glee)
What was that quote by Littlefinger in Game of Thrones - “If war were arithmetic, then the mathematicians would rule the world”.
It’s a bit more complicated than conscripting thousands of untrained soldiers or dragging 50 year old tank chassis out of mothballs and sending them in to Zerg rush Ukraine. They still need to be organized into functional combat units and deployed effectively.
Just the act of gathering, repairing, and moving 100s of 50+ ton vehicles takes a huge amount of specialized manpower and resources.
During WW2, it was common for western nations to spend 40% of GDP on military. Places like Japan were spending closer to 60-80% of GDP on military. That is total war. Before this war Russia was spending about 4% of GDP on military.
Even with the war, I doubt that figure it much higher. I read Russia is spending $300 million USD a day on this war, but even that figure is about 109 billion a year, which is about 6-7% of GDP.
And on the more mundane side, what about trucks? Tanks need a lot of support, and weren’t there reports that Russia lost most of their support vehicles within the first month of the war?
Looking forward to seeing Russian casualties hit six figures by year’s end…
Casualties happen in war, I get this. And I’m no fan of Putin and this war. But hoping for casualties on either side seems disgusting to me. Especially if they’re conscripts.
Modnote: This comment is off-topic. Please satay on-topic.
Here’s an interesting article that tackles the OP’s question
Okay @What_Exit, we’ll thai to stay on topic. (sorry, can’t resist, go drink more coffee!)
But was wanting to comment on @Chronos point - whether personal weapons, heavy weapons, tanks and possibly most important of all, supplies for such as well as infantry basics, it’s the truck that has to be considered.
It does no good to be able to rehabilitate gear and equipment (and conscripts!) if you can’t supply them in the field. And we’ve had lots and lots and lots of articles about how poorly Russia has done at that between gear failures, lack of active and recent logistics experience, as well as dry rot in many of said vehicles.
I suspect that keeping 300k new soldiers equipped and fed in the field is far beyond their current logistics ability. I still lean towards putting said troops in emplaced positions in the ‘New Russia’ breakaway areas and Crimea, where it will at least simplify the problems, as well as serve as an excuse for Putin to escalate if/when they are under attack. Or to be placed on other borders to free up hopefully more currently trained active duty individuals.
But I in no way see them as an effective aggressor force in the current circumstances.
ISTR the trucks having rubbish tires and poor maintenance.
That and Bayraktar drones targeting trucks for weeks while they sat idly in the 40 km long traffic jam north of Kyiv. As I recall Russia later responded by pressing civilian trucks into service.
That guy’s full of shit. He misread the article terribly.
What it says isn’t that a BTG has “meat shields” who are used to flush out enemy positions by being fired upon, it says:
To compensate for the shortage of maneuver forces, and to preserve combat power, BTGs employ a force of local paramilitary units as proxy forces to secure terrain and guard the BTG from direct and indirect attack. These units are comprised of local militia, Russian veteran volunteers and mercenaries who defend the line of contact and key infrastructure.
The guard force is also the source of the BTG’s freedom of maneuver – its presence frees up the BTG’s maneuver soldiers from security missions, protects them from attack and allows the BTG commander both free movement to his point of attack and time to prepare the battlefield for the attack
Which isn’t the same thing; basically it’s saying that lower quality conscript, militia and paramilitary units are the ones on the front lines, and this allows the BTG to mass and be mobile. This makes sense, because if the BTG’s soldiers are busy manning observation posts and defensive positions, they’re not available to maneuver or attack.
This is an extremely interesting passage from toward the bottom of the paper, and it makes me wonder if maybe some small part of Russian difficulties are deriving from flawed doctrine and organization.
In summary, a BTG is not a maneuver formation in the traditional sense; it will not close with its enemy to destroy them through firepower and maneuver. Instead, it is an asset provider to relatively static paramilitary units who, in turn, act as a guard force for the BTG and deny adversary personnel access to the geographic areas the BTG is assigned to control.
Korea was far from the last time for the US Army (which composes a small majority of uniformed military personnel in the US.
The First Gulf War saw over 20k Soldiers called up from the IRR. More recently, the US Army was drawing from the IRR (Inactive Ready Reserve) for quite a while during the period where Iraq and Afghanistan overlapped significantly. There was also a legal requirement for IRR Soldiers to attend a one day muster if the IRR scheduled/ordered it. Musters started actually happening during OIF/OEF.
I knew someone who served in Afghanistan with a 40 or so year old Second Lieutenant who hadn’t put on a uniform in almost 2 decades. The LT had been commissioned, had some kind of serious family issue that got him released from his Active Duty Service Obligation, and was assigned to the IRR to meet the rest of his obligation. Since officers don’t have an enlistment contract with a hard end date and the LT had not resigned his commission when his reserve obligation expired, he was still in the IRR.
There were also incentive programs during the peak of the GWOT period to try and get IRR Soldiers into on of the active, drilling, reserve component units. One was just a bonus for affiliating with a reserve unit. The other option, if you turned down the monetary bonus, was reducing service obligation by 50% if you joined a RC unit. I served with on NCO just off active duty that had seen a lot of his fellow infantrymen called up from the IRR shortly after getting off active duty. His, I think second, combat deployment was in the Korengal Valley and his “bottle was full.” He came to us in the Army Reserve to both fulfill his obligation and reduce the odds that he would go back to war even faster than if he had stayed on active duty. He took the service obligation reduction. Some of the troops pushed into one weekend a month did it because the IRR was seen as a higher chance of deploying or a higher chance of deploying sooner. Some of them undoubtedly deployed too.
Thanks for the update. I’ve got to do a better job of remembering just how ancient and creaky my personal recollections have become. LOTS of battle-water has gone under the bridge since I left the service.
The T-64 was likely just the tank in possession of some of the frontline units, that’s all. There’s no real reason to scrap a T-64 in favour of spending money building a new tank, especially when the T-64 can be provided upgrades to give it some of the newer bells and whistles. In trained hands, it’s a perfectly fine MBT.
I can understand why NATO is unwilling to have NATO tanks fighting. It’s also a very different thing from a Russian tank, requiring conversion training and provision of completely different ammunition and parts.
I’m not a soldier and never have been. In my understanding from meeting a few and reading stuff on the Internet, though, about 2/3rds of military personnel - in the USA - are not in combat positions and will never be in a combat position. Most military is concerned with logistics.
While countries can have technology like Iron Dome and anti-missile capabilities, most defense comes down to bags of sand, piled on top of each other, and concrete.
You don’t need training to peel potatoes and you don’t need training to put dirt in a sack.
I’m pretty skeptical that the Russian army would send out completely untrained soldiers with weapons when they’re on the defense and mostly just need good fortifications. Give the guys who have the guns a nice safe location to shoot from, and that’s good enough. It’s well worth doing.
In general, I’m fairly skeptical even of the stories that people are being forcibly conscripted who aren’t reservists, and the like. A few isolated cases can be blown up into big news - and that’s even assuming that those things really happened.
If I were them, I’d be sending people to work at weapons factories, to build fortifications, and a small minority - who seemed more willing to shoot at other human beings - to go back through training so they can be shipped out to the front lines in a few months.
I’d be skeptical of any reporting that says they’re doing anything else, minus pretty good evidence. A photo of a rusty gun or a video of a guy reading from a script, under duress, etc. is not that.
To whatever actual representation of the situation the pictures I’ve seen is accurate, all I’ve been able to think of is the conversation at Helm’s Deep (in the movie) between Gimli, Legolas, and Aragorn.
Aragorn: “These are no soldiers.” Gimli : “Most have seen too many winters!” Legolas: "Or too few. Look at them.
What was his job? I was under the impression that there was very little need to recall the vast majority of officers unless there’s some obscure or undermanned specialty that they worked in.
IIRC Infantry. For enlisted at least, rumor had infantry and military police falling into the undermanned specialties category that were likely to be recalled. Both were in high demand for counterinsurgencies. Note that the driver for MPs was mostly their tactical role as rear area security not the law enforcement tasks that the name makes most people think of.
Note: I would NOT want to be the low level officers controlling these men in the field. The majority don’t want to be there, and are underequipped to fight as the balance stands right now. I suspect there are going to be a lot of deaths attributed to “Ukrainian Partisans” in the officer core where none of the new recruits saw anything.
Helpful when both sides use fundamentally the same weapons and ammunition.
Which will further add to the issue of the new levy being poorly lead and organized. Sure, you can give orders that will be obeyed while everyone else is watching and said officers have the rest of the army at the back, but the moment they are separated by the issues of war, patrols, or even dismissing to housing…
It’s going to be ugly.