What happens to military analysts who screw up? Are they held to account by anyone?

[astro]

Not really full GQ, and I think this question is better suited for this forum vs others.

Per this new Report by the Us Army “On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign,” what happens in military academic culture if your estimates, projections and assumptions prove to be inadequate or wrongheaded? Is there any kind of price an analyst (at whatever rank) will pay careerwise, or was every analyst on board with these assumptions at the time, so there are effectively no peers to judge them?

Per the report it appears to effectively be giving a major post-analysis beatdown to a lot of the internal strategic assumptions made by the military predicate to the Iraq war. What happens in these circumstances, does it cast a negative light on the analyst’s opportunities for advancement in the ranks, or probable quality of their future analyses? Is there anybody but history to judge them? How do these guys explain themselves to their graduate students in War College?

Can any dopers lift the lid on what happens inside these institutions?

“The transition to a new campaign was not well thought out, planned for, and prepared for before it began,” write Wright and Reese, historians at the Army’s Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. “Additionally, the assumptions about the nature of post-Saddam Iraq on which the transition was planned proved to be largely incorrect.”

The results of those errors, they add, were that U.S. forces and their allies lacked an operational and strategic plan for success in Iraq, as well as the resources to carry out a plan.

Their analysis is to be released tomorrow, [but the 696-page document was posted last night on the Army’s Combined Arms Center’s Web site](Their analysis is to be released tomorrow, but the 696-page document was posted last night on the Army’s Combined Arms Center’s Web site. The New York Times first reported the study’s findings yesterday. ). The New York Times first reported the study’s findings yesterday.

(warning sizeable PDF)

[Lakai]

Are we talking about military analyst that work at the Pentagon? They all serve at the pleasure of the Commander and Chief.

Bush is responsible for disciplining any analysts who he thinks can’t do their jobs.

Now during the Iraq war Bush let Rumsfeld handle the whole thing and it was largely Rumsfeld who didn’t bother to come up with a post war strategy. He also publicly deified testimony from army analysts who said that they would need several hundred thousand troops to occupy Iraq after the invasion.

Here is a transcript from a Frontline’s documentary Bush’s War:

NARRATOR: And then, just three weeks before the invasion of Iraq was to begin, Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki took the Army’s internal fight with Secretary Rumsfeld public.

Sen. CARL LEVIN (D), Michigan: [February 25, 2003] General Shinseki, could you give us some idea as to the magnitude of the Army’s force requirement for an occupation of Iraq, following a successful completion of the war?

Gen. ERIC SHINSEKI, Army Chief of Staff: In specific numbers, I would have to rely on combatant commanders’ exact requirements, but I think-

Sen. CARL LEVIN: How about a range?

Gen. ERIC SHINSEKI: I would say that what’s been mobilized to this point, something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers are probably, you know, a figure that would be required. We’re talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of geography that’s fairly significant, with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems. And so it takes a significant ground force presence.

THOMAS WHITE, Secy. of the Army, 2001-'03: So the next morning, I get a call from Wolfowitz, who is upset that Shinseki would give this number. And I forget exactly what I said, but I said, “Well, he’s an expert. He was asked. He has a fundamental responsibility to answer the questions and offer his professional opinion, which he did. And there was some basis to the opinion because he is a relative expert on the subject.” So a week later-

INTERVIEWER: So what does Wolfowitz say when you say that? I mean, that’s-

THOMAS WHITE: Well, he’s- he’s- they’re mad. They’re upset.

REPORTER: [February 27, 2003] Army chief of staff General Shinseki said it would take several hundred thousand troops on the ground-

DONALD RUMSFELD: There’s so many variables that it is not knowable. It is- however, I will say this. What is, I think, reasonably certain is the idea that it would take several hundred thousand U.S. forces I think is far from the mark.

PAUL WOLFOWITZ, Dpty. Secretary of Defense, 2001-'05: [February 27, 2003] It’s hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and to secure the surrender of Saddam’s security forces and his army. Hard to imagine.

THOMAS WHITE: All of us in the Army felt just the opposite, that there was a long history of that being absolutely true, that the defeat of the Iraqi military would be a relatively straightforward operation of fairly short duration, but that the securing of the peace and the security of a country of 25 million people spread out over an enormous geographic area would be a tremendous challenge that would take a lot of people, a lot of labor, to be done right.

PAUL WOLFOWITZ: In short, we don’t know what the requirement will be, but we can say with reasonable confidence that the notion of hundreds of thousands of American troops is way off the mark.

THOMAS WHITE: So they discredit Shinseki. Then a week later, I get in front of the same committee. I get asked- I see Senator Levin before the hearing starts, and he says, “I’m going to ask you the same question.” I said, “Good.” I said, “You’re going to get the same answer.” And so he asked me the question, and I- exactly the same answer. And you know, and at that point, Shinseki and White are not on the team, right? We don’t get it. We don’t understand this thing, and we are not on the team. And therefore, you know, actions are going to be taken.

It’s comforting to know that the entire U.S. military isn’t made up of idiots.

The OP’s example is more of a failure in civilian leadership in Iraq and not one of military specialist. Most of the officials working under Rumsfeld left because they all knew Iraq was going to be a disaster.

From Frontline Documentary “Bush’s War”
THOMAS RICKS, Author, Fiasco: It’s a real sign of official inattention that almost the entire leadership of the U.S. military changes over. General Franks retires. The ground commanders, McKiernan and the people around him, and Wallace, are gone, replaced by the most junior lieutenant general in the U.S. Army, Ricardo Sanchez, who until that point had been commanding one division of about 17,000 people, suddenly is commanding 150,000 troops.

If military intelligence was to blame for Iraq, then Bush should have had the people responsible sidelined however possible.

[Sevastopol]

@Lakai

… If military intelligence was to blame for Iraq, then Bush should have had the people responsible sidelined however possible.

Even the Republican bots don’t pretend that’s true anymore.

[BrotherCadfael]

They go on CBS, NBC, ABC, CNN, Fox, etc, as news analysts.

Or, if they REALLY screw the pooch, MSNBC.

[FoieGrasIsEvil]

Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz made the biggest mistakes of their careers by defying Shinseki’s advice, whom by all accounts was a knowledgeable and capable leader.

[ralph124c]

What happens to military analysts who screw up? depends a lot upon their rank and heritage:

1. West point graduate screws up: retire to cushy desk job in Carribean Command (active since 1959, nothing to do)
2. ROTC graduate screws up; dismissal
   Rank of screwupee:
3. Brigadier and above: promotion
4. Colonel and below; dismissal

[Oy]

@Lakai

He also publicly **deified ** testimony from army analysts who said that they would need several hundred thousand troops to occupy Iraq after the invasion.

He made the testimony into a god?