No, I can’t really. But I have seen a few research facilities in practice (of widely different fields), and I have read many papers. I think I can read between the lines in the papers to what the process was like.
I don’t know whether they call it science or applying science, but my guess is they call it science unless they are actually building a prototype, and sometimes not even then. I think that scientists do proof of principles (science), and engineers do applied science.
Perhaps you can offer an alternate description of the practice of science? Has this not been your experience?
For example, I would surmise that most times that you see data on a span for some particular dependent variable this is really fiddling around with stuff. The actual values chosen are usually round numbers, i.e. educated guesses.
They don’t only use those trays with thirty samples in them for repetition. They are also used for trial and error.
But yes, I’m speaking from (limited) experience. I’d certainly be interested if anyone has had a different experience.
What leads me to believe that most of them are producing consumables is the way the funding works. Every research proposal I’ve seen has tried to demonstrate that the research is a road to an application with societal/economic impact, whether or not the scientists themselves were interested in application.
Ah! I understand… the sad truth is that in order to get funding (and science is often fairly expensive), you’ve got to find someone willing to pay for your research, which is almost always either the company you work for or else the government. With the company, it’s always about the bottom line, of course, so you have to make some noises about potential applications, and further, you’re sort of expected to follow through with it if you DO find potential applications.
With the government, you’re also generally expected to make some noises about potential applications, but that’s scarecely universal (witness particle accelerators). Further, I think it’s probably safe to say that some large number of grants may mention, for instance, quantum computers or something, because the buzzwords are important, and the research will be so far removed from a practical quantum computer that I’ve always found it quite laughable. Certainly, I’ve never written a paper on anything that has any direct application, although I still mention possible applications as the need occurs.
To me, most of the practice of science is answering one of two questions:
1: Can X be done?
2: X happened… how?
Some of it is proof of principle (i.e. is it possible to build a quantum computer) and a lot more of it (in my experience) is in trying to understand the concepts which some engineer may eventually apply.
In any event, my experience is admittely as a theorist and not an experimentalist, so I’m not the best source for how experimentalists do their thing. But it’s always struck me that the good experimentalists have very solid grasps of what they’re expecting to see when they do an experiment. At times, no one knows what the result ought to be, but even then it’s been my experience that the experimenter is doing something more than playing around with his equipment and actually has some idea of what he hopes is going to happen. It’s quite common, I think, that an explanation is already there, whether that explanation turns out to be right or not, and whether it even makes the right prediction.
There seems to be general confusion as to what a hypothesis and a theory are.
A hypothesis is a statement that can be tested. Ideally, it should be either true or false. Note that a hypothesis is not a question. “What kind of soft drink does eris prefer” is not a hypothesis. “eris prefers Coke to Pepsi” is. “God prefers Coke to Pepsi” is not a good hypothesis because we have no way of determining whether this statement is true or false. It is untestable.
Nor are hypotheses formed “using explicit or implicit assumptions and axioms.” They are simply statements that can be proven or disproven. Rather than making them up at random, one usually formulates a hypothesis in aid of investigating the validity of a theory (see below). However, that has to do with what a hypothesis can be used for rather than what it is.
A theory, strictly speaking, is an explanation of why a set of hypotheses have been found to be true or false. A scientific theory should be falsifiable. It should not merely explain the data you already have but should also make a prediction that can be tested. In other words, a scientific theory will generate a hypothesis.
To give a ridiculous example, suppose you open a door of a darkened room. Next to the door, there is a switch. You say to yourself, “Pushing this switch will light up the room.” This is a hypothesis that can be tested. You turn on the switch and a light goes on. You step to the next room where there is also a switch next to the door. You form the same hypothesis, test it, and once again, the light comes on.
Based on this data, you form a theory. “These switches next to doors control the light bulb in a room. Therefore, if I push the switch again, the light will go off.” This theory has generated a prediction (a new hypothesis) that you can test.
In real life, of course, theories are far more complicated and an experiment designed to prove or disprove a hypothesis may generate new data beyond proving the hypothesis true or false. e.g., pushing the switch in the second room turned on a stereo instead of a light.
Moving on,
**
The universe is reasonable What data we have suggests that the universe is reasonable. Similar causes do appear to produce similar results, e.g. experiments are repeatable. This may not be true “everywhere” but, until there is evidence to the contrary, our working hypothesis is that the universe is reasonable.
The universe is logical Once again, what data we have suggests that this is the case. This hypothesis is subject to disproof, like any other. Indeed, you could argue that, in a sense, this has been disproven. Quantum mechanics happily incorporates “partial truth values” for all kinds of statements. Science had no trouble working with this concept and, in fact, rapidly developed it to the point where it could be practically applied.
**Our senses provide a reasonably accurate source of information about an objective universe. ** Let’s take this in two parts. Our working hypothesis is that the universe is objective because that’s what the data seems to indicate. Now there is some data to the contrary. Parapsychologists often claim, for example, that psychic phenomena cannot be observed by sceptics. In other words, whether the phenomena exists depends on the observer. This, however, contradicts many orders of magnitude more of data we have indicating that the universe is objective. These claims are not enough, therefore, strong enough to cause us to abandon our hypothesis.
The other part of the statement, that “our senses provide a reasonably accurate source of information” is not necessary as a basis for science. This is a metaphysical statement. What do you mean by “reasonably accurate?” At most, we can say that our senses provide a consistent source of information. This is, once again, a working hypothesis because it comports with the data we have.
A difference that makes no difference is no difference. To the extent there is no way to tell whether our senses are “a reasonably accurate source of information,” whether they are or not is immaterial from a scientific perspective.
Truthseeker, there’s no confusion on this end what a hypothesis is; although your example is clear and well-thought-out, it’s unnecessary.
Let’s assume the opposite for a second: let’s assume that the universe is irrational. In this irrational universe, the fact that in the past we’ve been able to see a patterned relationship between cause and effect has no bearing on whether this pattern will hold in the future.
When you say that our current data suggests that the universe is reasonable, you’re assuming what you’re trying to prove. You’re saying that, since in the past we’ve seen similar causes produce similar effects, we can expect to see similar causes produce similar effects in the future. While that’s certainly how a reasonable universe would work, an unreasonable universe wouldn’t necessarily work that way.
I think this is subject to the same errors of your first argument: namely, when you organize your data in such a way as to suggest that the universe is logical (and “partial truth values” are simply an elaboration of a system of formal logic), you’re almost certainly using logical principles to organize and analyze your data. Especially when testing falsifiable statements, it’s impossible to avoid using “If P is true, not P is false” logic.
**Our senses provide a reasonably accurate source of information about an objective universe. ** Let’s take this in two parts. Our working hypothesis is that the universe is objective because that’s what the data seems to indicate. Now there is some data to the contrary. Parapsychologists often claim, for example, that psychic phenomena cannot be observed by sceptics. In other words, whether the phenomena exists depends on the observer. This, however, contradicts many orders of magnitude more of data we have indicating that the universe is objective. These claims are not enough, therefore, strong enough to cause us to abandon our hypothesis.
[quote]
This is a misstatement of the claim. Parapsychologists don’t generally claim that psychic phenomena cannot be observed by skeptics: they don’t say, for example, that Uri Gellar’s spoonbending is invisible to skeptics. Rather, they say that skeptics inhibit the phenomenon itself.
At any rate, this is also a distraction. Let’s focus on this sentence: “Our working hypothesis is that the universe is objective because that’s what the data seems to indicate.” How on earth would this sentence be comprehensible in a subjective universe? When you say that the data indicate something about the universe, you’re assuming that there’s some truth that can be indicated. Once more, you’re assuming exactly what you’re supposed to be proving.
And yet all scientific experiments rely on sensory input to gather results. You look at a microscope slide. You look at a computer monitor. You listen to the spotted owl cries.
If the world is an illusion, then scientific inquiry is pointless. Especially when combined with the idea that the universe is subjective: if the universe is subjective and illusory, then it becomes what you make of it, and you could equally discover the “truth” about your universe by chanting nonsense syllables and staring at your navel.
I should state again that I make all these assumptions myself: I assume every day that the world is reasonable and logical and that my senses provide a reasonably accurate way to observe an objective universe. However, I do recognize that I’m making these assumptions, and I understand that not everyone makes the same ones I do. I figure that’s an important thing to recognize.
I am going to ask again, Truth Seeker: reject logic, reject your senses, and allow suspicioun that the universe won’t continue behaving the way it has. Then go do science.
While I don’t disagree with Daniel (obviously), I do want to put my own comments in here, too.
Yes; this must be so, for if it weren’t we couldn’t be doing science in the first place. “Every time I do ‘A’, some random event happens.” Ask youself what it would mean to “do ‘A’” in such a world. Apparently you feel it can be done, and those poor souls would still be able to do science.
Science, in the context of “The universe is reasonable”, seeks to describe and find cause and effect relationships. Without a reasonable universe there can be no such thing. Why you find that there could still be science without this is a mystery to me.
What data we have suggests this is the case? Forgive me while I chuckle… tell me, dear Truth Seeker, how are we to interpret data without logic in the first place? You would like to argue that QM has disproven this hypothesis. I would appreciate your definition of “disproof” which doesn’t assume that logic can be applied to the universe. Take all the time you need, I’ll wait. I suggest, however, that you do everything you can to retain the copyright on such a commentary as you really will want to publish it in some techincal journals of science and philosophy.
i’ve got to say, Daniel has said this very well for me and himself. But, what the heck? How do you propose to disprove the hypothesis “We can rely on our senses”? What are you going to show me? How will you present this data to me that I may, without my senses, grasp it? I am thoroughly intrigued.
I find that statement to be self-contradictory. We do science; we do science by observing the world. If our senses are do not provide a sound basis for examination of the world, there can be no science.
Note I do not say that our senses are 100% accurate. They only need to be accurate enough to relay specific information when necessary. The reasonable universe axiom allows us to repeat experiments to help compensate for potential sense errors, but to find these errors we would still need to perceive them. At some level, we rely on the accuracy of our senses to perform science. There can be no other way.
And, er, the “chuckle” remark did come off as rather rude. Sorry, but it wasn’t meant to be. I genuinely laughed at something I perceived to be funny, not a laugh of disdain, not laughing at you, etc. Well, I’ll shut up now. Forgive my rudeness.
I think that there is a particular assumption that TruthSeeker needs to make to do meaningful science. I’m not sure if it follows from DanielWithrow’s axioms, or needs to be added independently.
First I will summarize my understanding of TruthSeeker’s argument. Then I will articulate what I think is TS’s additional assumption. TruthSeeker contends the following. Science is merely a set of prediction-generating techniques (i.e. theories) that generate falsifiable predictions. These theories are to be evaluated not by whether they make accurate claims about the nature of the universe (for science has nothing to do with such metaphysial notions as “the nature of the universe”), but rather by whether their predictions are falsified or varified by the data when tested.
The assumption I see used can be expressed as “memory is reliable”, or, more generally, “things can reliably be recorded”. The very notion of testing a hypothesis rests upon a belief that we can reliably carry out the following sequence.
A) Use a theory to generate a prediction.
B) Use an experiment to generate data.
C) Compare the date generated in part (B) to the prediction
generated in part (A).
I also have some problems with TruthSeeker’s use of the term “metaphysical”. On the one hand, s/he seems to dismiss as metaphysical claims that entirely concern purely physical matters, such as the relative physical arrangement of the sun and the earth. On the other hand, it seems to me the some metaphysical notions are going to be necessary to make sense of TruthSeeker’s account of science. For example, we will need to accept and understand the existence of such abstract entities as theories, predictions, data, the future, and the past. In addition, we will need to make appeals to some theory of meaning for counter-factual conditionals.
hmm. I don’t have time to proof-read this. I’ll just have to hope that it’s coherant. I’ll try to return later to mop up my mistakes. Sorry.
>>You’ve made the fallacy of hypostatization,
>>treating an entity (science) as if it were a person
>>(“…what science is trying to do.”). If you were
>>trying to convey I was misunderstanding what
>>scientists try to do (science is an abstract
>>concept and has no will of its own), then you are
>>mistaken.
>
>Science has no will of its own? Pull the other one!
>You learn something new every day. Who says
>pedantry is useless?
>
>If anyone else had trouble following my figure of
>speech, please let me know.
I do. The fallacy of hypostatization is a logical fallacy of ambiguity. I suggest you explain what you mean without the use of such fallacies. This particular one may seem relatively harmless, but it’s left unclear what one means by “science” doing something or trying something, such as in the statement (responding to my claim about science picking out theories that most closely resemble reality), “This fundamentally misunderstands what proper science is trying to do.” What is “science” here?
>>Most professional scientists do believe they are
>>discovering the truth about nature. For instance,
>>they believe that there really are such things as
>>atoms, DNA, and so forth. >>They don’t use
>>such theories just because it’s convenient to
>>describe a pattern. They >>accept them because
>>they believe them to be true.
>
>First of all, what some scientists believe about science
>and ultimate reality is irrelevant. Some people believe
>their religions represent ultimate “scientific” truth but
>that doesn’t make them correct. Second, if pressed, I bet
>most scientists would carefully hedge as to what their
>theories actually say about ultimate reality.
Careful perhaps, but I don’t think they would hesitate much on the truthfulness of their theories, particularly well-confirmed ones. Few biologists, for example, would say that evolution has never actually happened and is instead just a device to organize data.
>The problem is that you are using “truth” in a scientifically
>meaningless sense. DNA is a theory. Many, if not all, believe
>that DNA really exists, as I’m sure everyone reading this board does.
>Ultimately, however, that belief is irrelevant. It simply isn’t
>necessary because whether DNA really “exists” has no impact
>on its utility as a theory. DNA is a working hypothesis, subject
>to being disproven.
I think I’m using “truth” in a very meaningful sense when it comes to science. After all, why accept a scientific theory that is known to be false? Scientists, to my knowledge, have never done such a thing. Are you saying that having theories approximate reality is unimportant to science? Then what are the purposes of a theory if not to accurately represent reality? Is not truth eminently relevant in science? If it is not, what sort of project is science if truth is not the, or at least an ultimate object? Yes, sometimes scientific theories are not correct. But scientists try to accept only those scientific theories that we have rational basis for thinking them to be true or at least being approximately true. And as I explained, the values for accepting such theories must have some philosophical basis for thinking that nature’s preferences are similar to ours when choosing among empirically indistinguishable theories.
>>An unknown force created the universe and
>>everything in it (fossils, memories, corpses,
>>gray hairs, everything) five minutes ago. You
>>can’t point to any piece of data to disprove the
>>theory. Anything you point to, whether it be a
>>wrinkle, tombstone, or anything else, was created
>>five minutes ago with all its deceptive appearances.
>>This can easily fit every piece of empirical data
>>you can think of. It is completely empirically
>>identical with the universe being billions of years
>>old. Is the five-minute hypothesis rational? No. It’s
>>absurd. But we can’t reject it merely by pointing
>>to the data. Hence the requirement of nonempirical
>>principles.
>
>It’s not absurd and my old buddy science doesn’t
>“reject” it, she simply has no opinion.
Why wouldn’t “science” accept the theory that scientists do, that of the universe being much older? Scientists do typically accept and reject theories. In this case, scientists vehemently reject this theory in favor of one that gives a much older age for the universe. If you are not talking about “scientists” when you speak of “science” under the hypostatization fallacy (as would seem to be the case), what are you speaking of? Who decides what opinion “science” has?
>‘Sci’ (that’s what we used to call her back in the hood)
>would say, “Is there some way to distinguish between
>these two theories? Do they make different predictions?”
>If not, – and by definition in this case they do not –
>which theory is “correct” is not a scientific question. From
>the scientific perspective, the position that the universe is
>as old as it appears to be is adopted as a working hypothesis
>because it is simpler.
Why is it adopted at all? I think it’s because of the latter being more truthful. But why should being “simple” count as a factor of its being “adopted” if it has no relevance to the truth? Why is it not a scientific thing to do to reject the five-minute hypothesis as false? Scientists automatically reject this hypothesis when they choose the theory of the universe being much older. It certainly seems to be a very strange thing to have truth not be a relevant factor when the decision is made in choosing scientific theories. I think you need to provide at least some justification for your claims, and an explanation of what the term “science” means when you employ the hypostatization fallacy. It clearly does not seem to mean “scientists,” as many have used it in such contexts (e.g. “science accepts atomic theory”).
Sorry, I forgot to specify to whom I was speaking to in the above post (it’s usually unnecessary where I have usually posted). I was speaking to Truth Seeker.
Of course, if God changed what we perceive as ongoing rules of the natural world then our view of the constant state of reality would be forced to change. However, this does not occur in such large doses that we need to add an unknown variable to , say, the freezing point of water. Below 32 degrees farenheit, given sea level air pressure, water will freeze. You can try this experiment many, many times and not watch water spontaneously freeze at 45 degrees nor not freeze at 12 degrees. If one of these options happen: you’ve proven the theory wrong for that particular instance. And maybe God DID have a hand in it. But millions of people still are making ice in their freezer as you think about this quandry.
You know, maybe there is something to Tyrell’s memory axiom since no one seems to be able to remember the key point I’ve been trying to make in this thread.
Once more, science is not about “TRUTH.” Whether a theory is “True” or “Accurate” or represents “Reality” is a meaningless concept in science. Science can say, “The theory explains the data.” **That. Is. All. ** You cannot ask “But doesn’t that mean the theory is TRUE?” This means nothing, nada, zilch, zip. If you have additional data, you can ask, does this theory explain the new data or will we need to modify the theory?" But science has nothing to say about some platonic notion of archetypal “truth.”
Now most scientists probably do believe that science describes objective reality. But it is not necessary that this be true in order for science to function. Many people who are ethical believe in a supreme being. However, an ethical system need not rely on belief in a supreme being.
Lots of people in this thread seem to want to assert that some scientists’ beliefs about what science says about the nature of the universe are necessary to science. The question, however, is whether scientific theories could still be generated and tested even without those beliefs.
The answer is yes. There is some finite possibility that we are living inside of a sort of celestial “Truman Show” run by beings from another dimension. Even if all scientists firmly believed this, the process of science could continue without a hitch.
**
Excellent, I always enjoy Sweden.
As I observed earlier, the closest thing to an axiom that science has is that mathematics is “true.” Logic is, of course, a branch of mathematics, specifically set theory. The real reason, however, that science makes such extensive use of mathematics is that mathematics makes excellent predictions. If I have data points A, B and C, I can manipulate them through this set of rules (mathematics) and accurately predict a new data point, D. If mathematics did not have this property, we wouldn’t use it. In sum, science has an extremely strong hypothesis that mathematics works.
It is, of course, possible to imagine other formal logics that don’t accept things like the principle of non-contradiction. However, these don’t turn out to be very useful as they don’t “work” given the data we have.
The point once again, is that science uses logic because it works, Accepting the hypothesis that logic works does not require the acceptance of logic as a matter of religious faith.
If it were to turn out that in some cases logic didn’t work, nothing in principle would prevent the process of science from attempting model this new set of data. However, any scientist would look extremely long and extremely hard to formulate a theory that did not require jettisoning logic. For obvious reaons, the utility of logic and mathematics are extremely strong hypotheses.
**
It’s obvious that you do, but you’re not “anyone else,” are you? This is not a fallacy, as it would be if I were referring to “society” wanting this or that. Society has no collective will. Science, by contrast, is not a collection of individuals, it is a process. So when I say, “science is attempting to do X” I mean that the process of science is designed to produce X. When we discuss what axioms are necessary for science, we are discussing what axioms are necessary in order for the process of science to produce and test theories.
I’m sure you understand that what some scientists believe about the ramifications of science and scientific theories, while interesting, says nothing about what, if any, axioms are actually necessary to produce those theories.
You keep saying that. I’m not sure why. Is it in response to me?
Please, beg the question for me. Since we’ve been reduced to repeating ourselves, I’ll ask again: how can we confirm or deny a hypothesis without an underlying method for evaluating hypothesis in the first place?
If it turned out that logic was different, I’d agree. But no logic?
Truthseeker, I have this hypothesis that everything in the universe is random and unconnected. What looks like cause and effect is really just coincidence. And despite all the coincidences that have occurred so far, the next time you boil water, it might not boil until it reaches 400 degrees Centigrade.
How would you go about disproving such a hypothesis? Boiling water won’t do so: the fact that it boils at 100 degrees Centigrade is just another coincidence with no bearing on what’ll happen the next time you boil water.
Similarly, next time you add 1+1 together, you’ll get 19. Sure, every time before, you’ve gotten 2, but that’s just another coincidence.
This is, I think, how an irrational universe would work. This is a universe in which cause and effect don’t exist. And it would look just like our universe, but science would be useless as a predictive tool in such a universe: tomorrow our cars might start turning into eels, the sun might give off noise instead of light, gravity might reverse. And science would have predicted none of it, because science requires a rational universe. An irrational universe renders science useless.
I don’t, of course, believe that our universe is irrational. But I don’t see how its rationality can be proven. It’s something that science requires in order to be a useful predictive tool.
I have no time to take part in this debate but thought you might appreciate this possibly relevant article from the The Times on the subject of hormone replacement for post-menopausal women. As you may know, a recent study has found a small but real added risk of, for example, breast cancer to be associated with this highly-recommended therapy; and it’s not clear what the new opinion on the subject is going to be. There is much interesting discussion of how replacement therapy was funded and marketed in the first place. At the end of the article, Dr. Utian, who’s long advocated the therapy says this:
*" “There are an awful lot of interests at stake here beyond women’s health,” he said. “There are investigators with research grants, N.I.H. grants and grants from the pharmaceutical industry. There are academics with careers to build.” Added to that, he said, are medical specialists ? gynecologists are comfortable with hormones, internists with statins to lower cholesterol and protect against heart disease, bone experts with drugs like bisphosphonates to protect against osteoporosis.
“It’s not just a matter of what the data says,” Dr. Utian added. “Truth is opinion.”*
I thought that all sides of this debate might appreciate that ;).
I think I can grant almost everything that is in your last post. But a problem still remains. It is not just that mathematics and logic are extremely well supported hypotheses, they also constrain science. This is true of all ‘extremely well supported’ hypotheses, in every field.
You are of the opinion that science can function without these hypotheses, and you may be correct in a limited way (I think it could function with small changes to the set of hypotheses, but not large changes).
Science is constrained by its hypotheses. But the hypotheses are also constrained. True, they are constrained by the data. But they are constrained by more than that. They are constrained by our feeble minds, and really they are constrained by these ‘well supported’ hypotheses. Mathematics and logic aren’t just supported by their predictive ability, they shape the direction if inquiry. People sometimes do research just because they can fit it to a statistical curve.
You may be able to describe a core of science independent of the typical well supported hypotheses, but I disagree that this core is all that science needs to function. When you write that it “is not necessary that this be true in order for science to function” it reminds me of the most common error in science: that the whole is the sum of its parts. I maintain that if you strip away enough of the hypotheses, like mathematics, logic, chemistry, immunology, etc. science will not function. The problem is that the scientists would no longer know how to do science.
So do you say that science is really just fitting hypotheses to the data, or do you allow that the character, if not the heart of science, is the hypotheses that we have most tightly embraced?
And very importantly, what ultimately decides which hypotheses we embrace is not just the data. It is very constrained by our minds. It is constrained by headaches, deadlines, grants, and prejudices.
This keys directly into my idea about the “ultimate foundation” for science… assumptions. At the root of any scientific principle or theory lies an assumption (or axiom)… even a really basic one like “The Universe is logical” or “This behavior is predictable.”
Because of these assumptions, adoption of a scientific principle as a “truth” requires some measure of faith, or belief. As was pointed out to me in another thread, this faith is not the same as a religious faith. Religious belief usually requires one to accept a truth without questioning it. Scientific faith, on the other hand, is quite the opposite. It is the nature of the true scientist to constantly question what they believe to be true, and if they find it lacking, to (hopefully) reject their assumptions in favor of a superior one.
However, it is still belief that lies at the foundation of science… belief that the universe is reasonable, logical, predicatable. It is faith in the assumption of predictability that keeps science going.
“Everything is provisional, pending better data.” I think that’s how it goes.
… that maybe adds to the discussion, or is completely irrelevant and ignored.
I have the same fundamental question as the OP’er. My personal issue with the occasional smug scientist who looks down his or her nose at the religious believer has to do with The Beginning.
Both science and religion seem required to start with one of two premises: in the beginning, there was nothing*; and something was created from nothing (Heaven, the Universe, Earth, animals and man for the religious believer; the matter that formed the universe post-Big Bang for the scientist.)
AND/OR … some things transcend time and have always existed (God for the religious believer; the matter that formed the universe and the medium wherein the universe is suspended or exists for the scientist).
Both strike me as equally fantastic and incomprehensible. As has been pointed out, science works in the confines of an already existing ball field. What created the field and the rules?
And though I understand the idea of, “Science is the best way we have to predict future occurances given certain data, until it isn’t. And then we’ll incorporate those new results, and it is again.” that seems to me somewhat akin to “God is real, and this is the way He wants things done, because the Bible that God had men write tells us so.”
What exactly “nothing” is is something of a mind-blower in itself. Pondering this stuff always makes me think of Pinto from Animal House having his deep conversation with Donald Sutherland’s professor, and then asking earnestly, “Could I buy some pot from you?”
Sorry, but it wasn’t meant to be. I genuinely laughed at something I perceived to be funny, not a laugh of disdain, not laughing at you, etc. Well, I’ll shut up now. Forgive my rudeness.