I always hear people talking about some mythical button that the president of the United States supposedly has his finger on. As in, “we can’t have a senile old man with his finger on the button.”
I can guess what this is in reference to: launching nuclear bombs, or some other catastrophic event of warfare.
But is the president really capable of doing this by himself?
A man crazed by dementia and old age could really launch a nuclear strike, simply by pushing a button (or dialing a number or giving an order) without anyone else’s consent or oversight?
I don’t know if this is a debate but since it’s political, it will probably become one.
It’s a figure of speech. In order to launch a nuke you need authorisation from the President (or whoever is in power), the launch commander has to confirm it, and two people have to each turn a key simultaneously. And the keys are not within reach of one another, so one person can’t do it.
There are people here who know much more about the sequence than I do, but that’s the gist of it.
The button is, of course, mythical. It’s mostly a cartoonish way of saying that the US President has the power to authorise a launch of weapons that can really go Old Testament on the enemy.
It’s almost as cartoonish as having a marine in full dress uniform with a hefty briefcase constantly trotting after El Presidente with all the magic spells and codes that would enable the launch of the serious stuff.
In reality, an inconspicuous secret service agent with something the size of a palm pilot in his pocket would be all that’s needed, but it seems that the need to maintain a dramatic appearance trumps a more common sense approach to this.
As a Brit and curious does anyone know what our routine is for a nuclear strike?
Our nuclear forces were brought into being just in case during the Cold War the soviets tried to do a bit of divide and conquer ie.alienate N.A.T.O. from the U.K. and then pick us off.
The French have their own independant Nuclear strike force because noone likes them and are unlikely to start the third world war on their behalf to protect their interests.
I’m also curious as to their routine to implement a nuclear strike and using Russia as an example what damage it would do?
In the film The Dead Zone, John Smith has a vision of Stillson as president, all hot to launch a nuclear strike. In that scene, the Nuclear Football can only be activated by two palm-print scans, his and a reluctant general’s. He tells the general, “Put your hand on that pad or I’ll cut it off and do it myself.”
According to Wikipedia: France and weapons of mass destruction - Wikipedia
The French have 350 nuclear warheads. That would be enough to destroy every major city in Russia. And then have enough left over to do the same to the US.
I can’t see how the two-man rule would apply to the President since he is constitutionally the commander in chief. If the SECDEF would refuse to authorize launch, the POTUS could simply order the launch himself since he’s the boss, right?
I do not see how this information can be correct. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (like all the Joint Chiefs) has no operational duties, responsibilities, or powers under Goldwater-Nichols Act. The chain for all military operations goes from the President to the SecDef to the CCDR’s. Are nuclear attacks somehow different from other military operations?
No it’s not. The French Force de frappe is well known, consisting of the M-4 and M-45 and M-5 and M-51 SLBMs (roughly comparable to the Polaris and Trident families, respectively) and the ASMP air-launched supercruise missile. (The land-based components of the Force on frappe triad were decommissioned in the early 'Nineties due to obsolescence and maintenance cost.) For the French, building a “nuclear deterrent” was more about showing independence from NATO and opposition to a re-unified and potentially nuclear-armed Germany than any real strategic need; while its arsenal is large, it is dwarfed by US and Russian (formerly Soviet) arsenals, and in any exchange specificially directed at France it would come off far worse in terms of parity.
As far as the question of the o.p., the National Command Authority (normally the President, but in his absence, incapacitation, or death, the next highest available person in the line of succession) can give the order to initiate a strategic nuclear operations plan; this is typically done from the White House Situation Room, an Advanced Airborne Command Post (AACP, formerly called NECAP) which is an aircraft (currently a Boeing E-4), or if mobile from the so-called “Nuclear Football”, a special portable communications node. The President must relay a set of codes confirming his identity, and the Vice-President, a member of the United States Cabinet, or a member of Congress must confirm the order; that is, they must confirm that (in their opinion) the NCA is sound in mind and otherwise has sufficient capacity of judgment to initiate this order. Once the authorization has been confirmed, the NCA then selects specific Contingency Plans or specific sites for targeting, and the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM, formerly the Strategic Air Command) takes care of the business of figuring what actual assets will be used and how the strike will be coordinated. (Contrary to popular belief and movies starring Matthew Broderick, NORAD has nothing to do with actually launching missiles or deploying other assets and merely provides information on potential threats.)
Actual launch operations vary; for Minuteman III and (now decommissioned) Peacekeeper land-based ICBMs the “two man rule” described above is true as applied to the launch complex crew. In addition, release codes for the Permissible Action Links, received from the launch authority (USSTRATCOM) have to be entered in as the first step in arming the weapon, which prevents the launch complex crew from getting a wild hair to being Armageddon before the officially sanctioned time, although the simple mechanical PALs on the original Minuteman fleet were set by SAC to the same combination–00000000–to prevent any problems with transmitting the codes. (The warheads aren’t fully armed until terminal flight to prevent accidental detonation.) Submarine weapons also have, or had, at least a two man rule (some sources say three or more); however, actual release codes are stored on the sub in case of limited or interrupted communications. Air launched and ground-based tactical weapons are released to local control at specified alert levels, but since these weapons are almost all in the Inactive Reserve of the Enduring Stockpile (some are still transitioning from Hedge Stockpile to Inactive) it is a strictly academic issue at this point.
So, no, the President can’t just push a button as so amusingly depicted in the Genesis “Land of Confusion” video. He could arbitrarily authorize a launch, but he’d have to get some Congressionally-sanctioned person to confirm him of being in sound mind and judgment. Once the order goes out, USSTRATCOM has to execute the plan; if the plan makes no sense, they’re probably going to dial up someone at the Pentagon and ask if the Prez is out of his ever-livin’ mind, and then they’re going to call NORAD and ask why there aren’t any red streaks on the thread board, and et cetera; by the time it all gets sorted out, the President will no doubt have moved onto simultaneously solving the problems of homelessness and hunger, and everything will have gone back to more-or-less normal.
Anecdotal story; at some point late in the Nixon administration, Nixon was supposedly demonstrating some seriously (i.e. clinically) paranoid tendencies, suspecting that the Soviets were secretly undermining him in retaliation for opening relations with the PRC, et cetera, and Henry Kissinger advised the JCS not to accept any orders from the President without first crossing his desk. Of course, since this story is recounted by Kiss, one might question the strict factuality of it; nonetheless, one may assume that should the President start seriously failing in his mental facilities unofficial actions will be taken to see that he does not do serious and irreversible harm. The ones you have to worry about are those that seem both sane and sober.
I have absolutely no useful commentary on this topic. I do, however, feel compelled to point out that the vB-shortened version of beowulff’s link reads:
I already wrote this several times, but that’s not correct. The relative size of the arsenals is completely irrelevant from the detterence point of view if France can inflict such damages that attacking it (with nuclear weapons or not) can’t be worth it. You don’t need parity for that. Just to be able to raze a couple dozens major cities. And the french nuclear doctrine the “deterrence of the weak against the strong” was precisely based on this concept. ICBM were supposed to be launched immediatly against major cities, and only against them (not against strategic or military sites like for instance the ennemy’s own nuclear missile bases)
Besides, as for the show of independance, it’s not just a show. Not having your own detterence means that you must rely on other countries, and there’s no guarantee that you will be able to. For instance, in case of a defeat of NATO against the Warsaw Pact in a classical war, what were the guarantee that the USA would threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union (and so doing risk itself a massive nuclear attack) rather than abandon western Europe to its fate? Or the USA could have turned isolationist at some point, etc…
This assumes that the doctrine of Assured Destruction is endorsed by all sides, which was definitely not the case with the Soviet Union; their view (like that of RAND and Hudson Institute nuclear strategy theorist Herman Kahn) was that a nuclear exchange could be survivable, hence why the the Soviet Union aspired to nuclear parity with and eventually exceeded the arsenal of the NATO (that is, US and UK). The deterrence value of a nuclear arsenal is limited at best, and with three or more independent players the strategy of Assured Destruction becomes unstable, or at least not possible of an explicit equilibrium.
Well, there is the massive military presence of the United States in Germany (even during the height of the Vietnam Conflict), including intermediate range nuclear armed ballistic and cruise missiles. There is no realistic scenario during the 'Sixties development of the Force de frappe that the United States would pull out of Europe in any scenario short of a nuclear exchange, and if such an event were imminent most of Western Europe would have come off every bit as bad as the United States and the Soviet Union; indeed, in the event of a full scale nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union, the only rational move by the latter would be to destroy other threatening arsenals (i.e. the UK, France, and the Peoples Republic of China) lest they lose the capability to do so post-exchange, leaving those nations capable of threatening what remained of Soviet population, industry, and military capability. In this case, having an arsenal actually makes so-armed nations a specific target regardless of their ostensible political neutrality in a hypothetical conflict.
That aside, France’s withdrawal from the agreement to participate in NATO military operations, and hence its desire to maintain a completely independent response, has its origins in the Treaty of Brussels issue that led to NATO. France’s major opposition to NATO wasn’t that the US would up and abandon Europe, but rather that the United States enjoyed to strong of a role–often a nearly unilateral one–in the leadership of NATO, and that a special defense relationship existed between the US and several nations (specifically the UK, but also Turkey and Italy) in which the other members of NATO had no say. At the same time, France was attempting to maintain the crumbling remnants of the French Colonial Empire, and NATO (i.e. the United States and the UK) refused to assist in efforts to shore up those claims. The result was the French withdrawal from NATO military involvement, the formation of the strongly executive Fifth Republic with a decidedly Gaullist influence, and the decision of post-colonial France to maintain its then waning status as a world power that it enjoyed in the pre-WWII arena by developing nuclear weapons. This was always the prime motivation in developing nuclear capability, and it remains today even though President Sarkozy can’t seem to articulate who France is defending against or how.
