After winning the Battles of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, Lee had a period of strategic opportunity. He had several options he could do:
He could send forces to the Mississippi to turn back the Union attempts to capture the river. This would have stopped the Union forces where they were most actively advancing.
He could send forces to Tennessee to reclaim the Confederate territory the United States had captured in 1862. This would have been a political victory by overturning what had been a significant Union success and by showing the Confederates could protect their own land.
He could have attacked the Union enclaves along the coast. These probably would have been relatively easy victories and they also would have removed Union “invaders” from Confederate territory. And they would have freed up the troops being held around those enclaves and weakened the Union blockade.
He could have used the opportunity to build up his army and deepen his defenses. The Confederacy was winning just by continuing to exist. The Union had to attack at some point if it hoped to win the war. So Lee could have gone on the defensive and forced the Union to fight at a offensive disadvantage.
What he historically did do. He launched an invasion into Union territory. He judged that the best hope of winning the war was to defeat the United States in its own territory. He figured doing so would force them to the peace table.
Of course, his plan didn’t work. He lost the Battle of Gettysburg. And by sending his forces into Pennsylvania, he lost the chance to hold the Mississippi or retake Tennessee or the coastal enclaves. And he lost a lot of troops he would need when the Union launched its counteroffensives.
So what should Lee have done? Go North? Pick one of the other options I outlined? Follow some other plan?
He should have sought a central transit hub as a prize and leveraged it to capture DC and force a negotiated settlement. That is what he attempted. He failed because he didn’t get there firstest with the mostest, Meade did. Then Lee miscommunicated to Earle the urgency need to capture the high ground (Culp’s hill?) and it was over except for the desperate gamble of the three pronged attack with Pickett, artillery and cavalry in the Hail Mary around the rear at the angle. Meade correctly guessed that Lee would attack the center with artillery and moved the reserves up to the front line, making the artillery fly helplessly over the front line where Lee incorrectly thought the reserves would be, leaving them unfettered to push back Pickett’s frontal assault. Longstreet’s cavalry retreated in the face of the terrifying and far inferior Custer Michigan cavalry. Any two of these needed to succeed for the plan to work. Only Pickett’s men did as everyone expected and they were slaughtered mercilessly. It was in fact all Lee’s fault, but this was as good a plan as any. Any other Union general other than Meade probably would have left the reserve in reserve to be blown to hell. Only Custer’s special brand of foolhardy idiocy could bluff Longstreet. But if Lee had not tried Gettysburg, Vicksburg would have still fallen the same day and the slaveholders would have faced Grant grinding them to pieces in pretty much the same fashion he did.
“Take that hill if practicable” is really fucking poor communication. Stonewall Jackson would have understood Lee’s intent and dire consequences exactly and would have done it immediately and at whatever the cost. But Jackson was quite dead by that time. Earle thought it was an optional order by the very wording of it and declined because his men were tired and it would have been very costly. The high ground is very costly to take because you can use the potential energy and view to inflict enormous damage while the enemy has no view and must move an entire division and equipment up a hill. Enormous amounts of energy are required even when not under fire. That is precisely why the high ground needs to be taken before it is reinforced.
“If practicable” was the sort of gentlemanly understatement that was central to Lee’s character. If this were a drama or epic (which it is to us) this is Lee’s scorpion and frog utterance. To hell with “for want of a nail” the kingdom was lost. For lack of clarity, the Confederate cause was lost. And it was as miserable a cause as any other in human history. The genteel sob faked his manners and honor by adding “if practicable” because he was fighting for fake honor and fake manners. The proper order was “take that hill or die trying.” That led to Plan B, which was, frankly, a pretty good idea (Pickett’s charge reinforced by artillery and cavalry). And because “if practicable” failed to make an impression, it was the last best hope for the fucking crackers.
July 4, 1863 saw the end of the confederacy. Vicksburg fell that day and the Mississippi transit would in short order economically destroy the confederacy. Had July 4, 1863 seen a confederate victory at Gettysburg and an occupation of DC, the North may very well have sued for peace, or maybe not. But by the time Lee was retreating back to Northern Virginia, there was no further chance for such a victory. Grant and additional forces were on their way to reduce the army of Northern Virginia and Sherman would burn the rest.
So what should Lee have done? He should have said: “take that fucking hill motherfuckers or I’ll blow your brains out myself.”
Let’s say, for the sake of argument, that Lee had won a decisive victory at Gettysburg. Then what?
He’s not going to stay and occupy Pennsylvania. The Union had the resources to occupy enemy territory but Lee didn’t.
He could think about moving further north and maybe trying to raid Washington or Baltimore or Philadelphia. But the risk was high. He didn’t have a supply line back to Virginia and he would have used up most of the supplies he had brought with him. And the Union was expecting an attack on its cities and had forts and garrisons waiting. The most likely result of an attempt to attack a northern city would have been a huge Confederate defeat.
So win or lose, Lee had pretty much the same plan for his campaign. Go into Pennsylvania, fight a battle, and then go back to Virginia. He was hoping that if he won, the United States might be demoralized.
But even if he had won at Gettysburg, I don’t think the United States would have given up. Lincoln certainly wouldn’t have. And I think the Confederate raid into the north did as much to firm up anti-Confederate sentiment as it did to demoralize Union will. The defeat at Gettysburg would be matched by the victory at Vicksburg. And Lincoln could have pointed out that while Union armies were taking and holding southern territory, Lee’s retreat proved the Confederates couldn’t do the same. On the whole, the United States could still plausibly claim it was winning the war.
Wars are fought for economic reasons, and by economic means.
All the South had was cotton.
The North had the factories, and it had Pittsburgh. Which, at the time, produced more iron and steel than France, Italy, & Belgium combined. In one city! And steel was also made elsewhere.
The South was short on precious metals.
The North had just hit the Comstock Lode, possibly the largest Silver strike in Human history.
The North controlled the lion’s share of all merchant shipping fleets.
The South had few, and neither a worthwhile Navy, nor the means to defeat the Union blockade. Little in the way of European-made weapons & supplies could enter the South.
The North’s population grew sizably–due to ongoing immigration from Europe.
The South–had no such scale of growth.
No European nation had recognized the South, diplomatically.
Support for Lincoln and the war would have collapsed if Gettysburg had been taken and used to stage a siege of DC. Lee’s plan was good, probably the best available.
As mentioned, the North had all the industry. Let’s not forget the north had 10 times or more the amount of railroads to move all that industry and troops quickly. In a war of attrition, the confederacy loses. A decisive blow was a risk that needed to be taken, Lee took it and came up short. He had to get the public in the Union to abandon Lincoln. Taking DC probably would have done that.
This reinforces my ‘everyone who sings the Star Spangled Banner should thank God Jackson wasn’t at Gettysburg’ belief. Had he not died after Chancellorsville and been with Lee I think the CSA might have won Gettysburg by day two and that would likely be that.
On the other hand, I don’t think Washington was Lee’s target. Even in siege DC would have been a tough nut to crack. With more than 60 forts and nearly 100 battery sites I don’t think Lee could have done it. It would be sexy, sure, but not all that effective and it would have taken time.
Far more likely would be to march on Philly or Baltimore in an effort to destroy or deny the transportation and supply hubs those two cities represent. Along the way he could sack Harrisburg, Reading and Lancaster in an effort to undermine the political resolve of the north. Confederate armies prepared for a siege camped in Philly or along the Chesapeake would certainly make a strong statement that the south was going to win the war.
Surrender and spare the nation two more years of misery before doing it in 1865. Yeah, yeah, I know.
There’s nothing poor in Lee’s communication in issuing an order to take that hill “if practicable”. Lee was an army general issuing orders to his corps commanders, who had a great deal more latitude in being expected to understand the intent of the Army commander’s orders and adapt them to the realities of the situation on the ground and issuing orders to their division commanders than Ewell and A. P. Hill were used to, both of them were new to corps command, both having formerly been divisional commanders in Jackson’s corps. “Take that hill if practicable” is the kind of order Lee gave to Jackson all of the time, and the kind of order that Jackson would, taking the actualities of his situation and the intent of Lee’s order into hand would pass on to Ewell or A. P. Hill as an order to take that hill at all cost. Jackson was however, as you said quite dead and Lee, having split his two large corps into three smaller ones had two new corps commanders unused to that level of command.
I see Jonathan Chance has beaten me to it, but a siege of DC is all Lee could have managed, trying to actually take it would have proved all but impossible and the siege would be purely for political effect, DC could easily outlast Lee’s army in a siege.
I agree Lee could have besieged Washington but not taken it. And the effort would have led to a defeat. It was the contingency Meade was planning for. If Lee had reached Washington, the city’s garrisons and forts would have kept him out. And once he stopped moving, Meade would have brought in the rest of the Union army in the threatre to encircle Lee and keep him from leaving. Meade wasn’t a brilliant general but he was competent - give him a situation where he had Lee surrounded by superior numbers and Lee was going to lose.
In my opinion, Lee’s best option would have been to go to Mississippi. There were Union troops in Virginia and Tennessee and along the coast but they were all relatively static. The troops in Mississippi were advancing so they were the greatest threat. In addition they were the deepest in the south; Union troops in other theatres might be defeated but they could easily withdraw. The Union troops in Mississippi could be cut off. And as a bonus (although nobody in 1863 would have appreciated this) a Union defeat in Mississippi would have hurt the careers of Grant and Sherman and that would have helped the Confederates in the future.
So let’s say Lee goes to Mississippi, wins a major battle there, and the Union troops along the river are forced to withdraw back up north. I think Lee should have then worked on clearing the coast: send troops to retake places like Galveston, Jacksonville, and the Albemarle Sound. These operations would have freed up the troops that were holding the perimeters and they would have been political victories in the south for liberating Confederate territory.
You seem to be assuming that the union armies would have stayed static.
Pull the Army of Northern Virginia out of the mid-Atlantic theater and send it to Mississippi? Meade would take Richmond and all of Virginia in two months. The CSA government would have time to get away - back to Mobile or Birmingham or somesuch, but as a political act if would have finished the CSA no matter what.
No, so long at the Army of the Potomac existed, the south had to keep a major force in place to block any move toward Richmond.
Lee, and the Confederacy’s, best chance of “winning” the war would have been to create an environment in the North where the Union no longer wanted to continue fighting. A northern environment that would have led to the election of a President George B. McClellan in 1964 would most likely have led to the end of the fighting.
If things had been different, things would have been different. Or would they? I believe the end result would have been the same.
Concentrating forces around the Mississippi would have meant less forces elsewhere. Northern advances would have been made elsewhere.
The CSA didn’t have the ships and resources to weaken the Union blockades. The CSS Viginia might have temporarily weakened/removed the blockades but the USS Monitor-style vessels ended that hope.
The CSA had limited arms and supplies and most of it’s reserves were already involved in the conflict. The North would continue to send more and more troops and weapons into the South.
This was Lee’s best chance to reduce the North’s willingness to fight. If Pickett’s Charge had not taken place, the CSA would have had more soldiers to fight losing battles elsewhere. Either the Union would decide to no longer fight a civil war, or the Union would have won a war of attrition.
It’s 82 miles from Gettysburg to Washington D.C. And that’s road miles using 20th century automobiles, not the horses,wagons and foot soldiers that Lee had. He couldn’t have laid siege to Washington as he would have had to wheel around, expose his flank and then attempt to march on the city.
A victory at Gettysburg might have been a PR boost in the Confederacy but in practical military terms it would have meant little. Lee’s logistical lines were too spread out, the battle took place too late in the year (Lee’s army didn’t have adequate winter clothing for a fall and winter siege of D.C. had they remained in the North) and Lee’s remaining too far north risked his units being cut off from a possible retreat back into Virginia.
The war was essentially over in 1862 when the Union split the Confederacy and captured the cities along the Mississippi River. Since they already had a strong sea blockade going and with the South unable to resupply itself or export the majority of their agricultural goods, it was only a matter of time before the Union caused the population there enough hardship to make negotiating peace a harsh reality.
Gettysburg was the final gasp for the Confederate military offense. After that, everything was downhill until Appomattox Courthouse.
The Union armies weren’t going to stay static in the long term but the period I’m talking about was a window of opportunity. After the defeats of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the Union army was changing commanders and rebuilding in the East. Lee could have pulled a substantial number of his troops out without worrying about a major Union offensive for two or three months. Especially when Union intelligence always assumed there were more Confederate troops in Virginia than there ever really were.
I think one of Lee’s problems was that he was too good at battles. Because of this, he sought to bring the Union army to battle in hopes that by winning enough battles he would win the war.
But it was a bad strategy. The Union often gained more from the battle than the Confederates did even if the Confederates won. The Union had a much deeper base and could afford to fight more battles than the Confederates could.
Lee would have been better off emulating Washington’s strategy in the Revolution. His goal should have been to keep his Army and his country in existence as long as possible by avoiding losses as much as possible. Lee shouldn’t have been counting how many battles he won - he should have been counting how many months he could keep the war going. The United States, like the British, would have eventually gotten tired of fighting a war that wasn’t ending.
The Union couldn’t allow the South to remain seceded as it would have weakened the entire nation. The European powers were obviously looking for opportunities to colonize areas around the world and if the Union hadn’t demonstrated a willingness to end its internal dissension, they could have easily gained a toehold back in what was the United States.
After all, Napoleon III had sent troops into Mexico and only withdrew them after the US indicated its displeasure with that state of being in the wake of the Civil War. Had the Union grown tired of the war and discontinued fighting, there would have been little to stop the French from attempt to lay claim on areas out West or in the SOuth which were lightly populated and thus poorly defended.
Lee doesn’t need to take Washington to win the war. He needs to get recognition from foreign states and possible recognition from idiots like McClellan He needs to cut it off and make them tremble. The Union’s political support for the war with the people not in uniform was shaky. That is his best hope.
But Lee has some inherent problems. He thinks like a Virginian, not an American. Lincoln and his side thought like Unionists.
Jackson may not have been able to actually take Culp’s hill, but he would have understood not only Lee’s intention, but the dire situation, both strategically and tactically. The confederacy would lose a war of attrition. They needed quick strategic victory. Gettysburg might have got them that. Pickett understood the gravity of the situation and knew that the charge was risky and dangerous. Perhaps he didn’t know about Longstreet’s cavalry, but since they didn’t come through, what difference? For Pickett’s charge to actually work they needed at least two of the three prongs of the attack to work. Destroy the center in force and divide the enemy. The few soldiers getting to the angle wasn’t enough, the infantry division needed to get there basically intact, and so did the cavalry division. Neither did.
Complex attacks in enemy territory are notoriously difficult. You don’t have the same confidence you do on familiar ground and the enemy does. This is present throughout the animal kingdom in territorial disputes.
The point of Gettysburg was to destroy enemy morale enough to let the war opponents get the upper hand in Congress.
The ideas about shifting armies between Virginia and Mississippi was pure fantasy for the slaveholders. They didn’t have the trains to do it, and even if they did it would have taken weeks. Far better than any army movements in history, but in 1863 the only army in the world that could effectively move it’s entire army by trains was the Union army. If the Union did not collapse politically, the Union was going to win from the get go due to vastly superior industry.
The only winning move the confederates could have made was for Beauregard to have not fired on Sumter and started the war. The same ability the Japanese had to avoid war with the US by not attacking Pearl Harbor and other targets. The Japanese had their top military planner, Yamamoto, telling them exactly that. But the same racists culture of bigotry, honor and manners made them blind to not going to war with an enemy with many, many times times their capability.
No, that wasn’t even remotely practical. No European power could hope to field armies, in America, on the size or scale required, nor supply them for anywhere near long enough. And not one of them was realistically even equal to the South in terms of technology base - the South lacked industry but it had a lot of ingenuity and adaptiveness.
Mexico had critical flaws in its government and wasn’t even really a unified country at the time - it was a collection of regions which all had their own power structure, and simply wasn’t up to fending off even fairly small forces provided they were well-led.
Onto the main topic.
It might have been quite possible to send forces to Vicksburg. Joe Johnston desperately needed them as he was outnumbered and his forces were divided, with half his army besieged by Grant. It would have been difficult, but possible to send enough men there to maybe make a difference.
There was no point to attacking along the coast. There’s simply no gain to it for the Confederacy as they can’t hold it.
Minor quibble, but I think Potosi would have to count for more. It supplied much of the world’s silver for 400 years.
Attacking enclaves along the coast is a fool’s errand, because the North can always return by sea to retake them at its leisure. It’s like George Washington’s desire to retake New York during the Revolution – against an enemy with complete control of the seas, New York is too exposed to seaborne invasion to be held, period. Lee could not leave sufficient force to hold each coastal enclave without hopelessly subdividing his strength, and the North could still mass to defeat in detail each enclave. Any propaganda value gained from overthrowing Northern control would evaporate as it became cleat the North could return and retake the places any time it felt like doing so.
I concur that strategically Lee’s plan was the best of several unpalatable alternatives available to him, but tactically he mishandled it. He should have adopted Longstreet’s modification of the plan, and gotten between Meade and DC, then dug in and forced a desperate Meade to assault prepared positions at great loss, THEN gone over to the tactical offensive.
I’ll also wryly note that marching on the Confederate commissary might have been the best plan of all. Evicting Lucius Northrop at gunpoint might have done the Confederacy a world of good.