I didn’t expect it from him, but I would have from a realistic, competent leader, yes.
An audience chosen for the speech, not a speech chosen for the audience. You have it backwards.
He only addresses people who can be ordered not to boo, in case you hadn’t noticed.
Armor for Hummers and bulletproof vests, maybe, but not white phosphorus rounds, sure.
We didn’t even get plans for one, in case you hadn’t noticed. Just a statement that we’re gonna bring 'em home as soon as we win. That’s the same shit we were fed when this started, that the troops would be there for as long as necessary and not longer. Look up “begging the question” sometime. :rolleyes:
And that has what to do with democracy? Some of us said, long before this started, that he’d restate his objectives to match what had already been accomplished, so he could fool people into thinking some actual good had been accomplished.
When you’re done learning about begging the question, look up Potemkin Villages.
[qutoe]To dismiss this entire part of the reconstruction effort speaks of an unwillingness to acknowledge anything positive that has been accomplished.
[/QUOTE]
Wrongwrongwrong. It’s a willingness to recognize the facts on the ground, not the version promulgated by the propagandists. If we haven’t heard much about real accomplishments from real reporters, just perhaps it’s because they still don’t dare leave their hotels. But if you want to believe, you’re going to believe, no matter what - that’s what Bush is counting on. Most of us aren’t buying it anymore, though, and every time he tries this shit, more of us can be expected to notice the emperor’s lack of clothes.
I was going to say it was one small, yet highly detailed, element of a very successful plan to win a war, but your analysis is obviously preferable.
I remember those milestones. They were the ones which, when we passed them, everything would get better, right? Obviously, there is now a very powerful and viable government that only incidentally has to be protected inside a section of its own capital by more than a hundred thousand foriegn troops and massive concrete walls built by foriegn contractors paid with foriegn money.
As an anti-war taxpayer, I was convinced I would not like this plan. However, some of the criticisms here seem rushed. One of the things I dearly wanted to hear in the speech today was not in the speech – but it damn sure is in the plan:
I respect that you want numbers; it looks like a good researcher or journalist would be able to track down these numbers and measure the relative success or failure of our progress in Iraq – or you can take the administration’s word for it and start reading on page 20. Now, it’s not going to be simple: “Megawatt-hours times barrels times businesses opened, plus the square root of the number of Coalition-initiated attacks divided by the number of insurgent attacks, plus number of active Iraqi brigades over 100 * the percentage of eligible voters who vote” is not going to be a useful metric of success or failure. But those of you who accuse our President of not going into details are being intellectually dishonest if you think you’ll ever be able to prove with a calculator that the Liberation/Invasion/Looting/Destruction of Iraq was worthwhile. It simply isn’t ever going to be that black and white.
…and that’s where the plan actually begins to win me over. The President’s planners, for the first time, admit that success is difficult to gauge:
…and that’s the meat of it. Our military is predicated on centralized control with decentralized execution, and with objective goals like “get more barrels of oil pumping” and “drive up the ratio of the times we engage them to the times they engage us”, our generals and strategists can form the real plan.
My only gripe is the appendix, with its “interagency working groups” and “eight strategic pillars,” which sound like the typical PowerPoint decision-by-committee crap I see every day in my job inside the Beltway. Anyhow, I haven’t heard or seen anything this specific since I was working an intelligence desk during the opening week of the war (and I blame the administration for not having anything that concrete until now). However, I think this plan is a plan.
We should have had it in our back pocket two-and-a-half years ago, but now we have it. I haven’t been this positive about the situation in Iraq since summer of 2003. I challenge the detractors to read the whole 35-page report with an open mind, and consider that perhaps (2 years later!) your criticism of this war has finally been heard.
Well put. And remember how each stage of the political process was promised to be a stake in the heart of the insurgency? John Mace can complain all he wants that we’ll never give Bush credit for anything. Frankly, it’s the facts on the ground that are providing all the damning anti-Bush testimony one could want. And the Plan for Victory, so-called, is incredibly dishonest on how things actually stand in Iraq – on the status of the economy, the infrastructure, the quality of life, the sectarian fault lines, etc. Remember Yugoslavia, how things worked out when the strongman died? Same deal in Iraq.
And Jurph, I second your proposal to read the document. By page 5, you’ll be saying, “Hey, wait, didn’t I read this two pages ago?” When the length of the document has to be artificially inflated by saying the same thing four times, you really begin to wonder.
No, I don’t recall Bush saying that “everything would get better”. I’m not even sure what that would mean and how you’d measure it. If you have some cites to back that up, I’d be interested in seeing them. Bush has been clear for quite some time that the insurgency was going to take time to beat. Most experts on the subject that I’ve heard have used 9-12 years as a timeframe that experience tells us is needed to defeat an insurgency.
Thanks for the cut-and-paste from the PDF document. I still only have the cheapo version of Adobe Acrobat, and I can’t cut-and-paste. 
Well, that’s because you’re not following the classic investment advice of Will Rogers!
…when it comes to measuring the success of the efforts to bring down the road toll here in New Zealand, there is one overiding metric involved: the number of fatalities. To think that the civilian casaulty rate isn’t included in your cited metrics for success for security shows just why there is such a huge difference in opinion between the Bush Administration and many others in regards to the success of the Iraqi mission. The rate of Iraqis dying and being injured at the hands of insurgents has doubled in the last year. 26 a day early in 2004 to 63 a day in August of this year. By any measure, this is a disturbing trend, yet it is not analysed or even mentioned in the metrics for success.
CIte
And as for the metrics that are measured, I can only shake my head. Actionable intelligence simply means intelligence that is actioned upon. It doesn’t matter how right it is: if intelligence is gathered and then used, it adds to the metric of success. So the Intelligence Gatherers, some of which are civilian contractors, are encouraged to get actionable intelligence-because that is how they make their paycheck. And if the people they are talking too have a grudge against someone else, and that someone else is picked up, questioned and he implicates another innocent party, all of that is measured as a tick on the “success metric.” When traffic wardens are given a quota to give out tickets, is there any wonder that more tickets are given out?
The number of car bombs intercepted and defused is a lovely metric to use: as car bombings appear to be rising-the odds of intercepting and defusing car bombs would probably also rise. So, another tick in the “success metric.” If the metric were to read: “The rate of car bombings per week” we could get a more accurate measure of success, couldn’t we?
the number of contacts initiated by Coalition forces, as opposed to the enemy.
I can’t believe that anybody has the gall to include this as a success metric. So if the Coalition forces shoot first, things are improving?
By using these ( IMHO ) slanted metrics, you gain a false impression of what the true state of security in Iraq. These measures, by the way they are written, are bound to, over time, improve. Yet, the civilian death rate may double, the Coalition death rate remains constant, and the contractor death rate may triple while still being classed as a success.
As to the “plan” that was cited up page, its been a while since I’ve read a document so full of false metrics, strawman measures, assumptions and emotional claptrap. It may be a while before I can bring up the strength to comment on it…
Well, if that isn’t a rational refutation, I don’t know what is. :rolleyes:
Can I ask a stupid question?
Where’s the plan for failure? I’d feel a lot more reassured about Iraq if Bush was anticipating a few other contingencies? You know, assuming total and complete victory isn’t in the cards. Oh wait I found it… page 4: “Failure is Not an Option.” I’ll tell you what that saves us a lot of trouble.
Bolding mine. How about all the times that Bush and/or Cheney assured us that the insurgency was on its “last legs?” I believe I’ve seen that fairly recently. If Bush has been clear about anything connected with Iraq, I’ve missed it.
We should keep in mind that this is the unclassified version of The Plan. We are not privy to such details as are outlined in the classified version, nor should we expect to be, since such revelations might reveal strategic weaknesses. For instance, the plan to restore electricity might well entail such factors as restoring generators, powerlines, etc. Such strategic information should not fall into the wrong hands. Ours, for instance.
…the document is loaded with fallacies, false dilemmas, strawmen, assumptions, false metrics and omissions. The first major problem with the document are the Assumptions made in regard to the Political, Security and Economic Tracks. Lets look at the first Political Assumption:
Page 14
One of the basis’s of the Political Strategy is that people prefer to live in freedom rather than tyranny. But what is more important to Iraqis at the moment, freedom or security? Would they rather live in an American-Style Free society or slightly dictatorial secure environment? I will not pretend to speak for the Iraqi people, but the polls suggest that the Iraqi’s place a high premium on security. By making the assumption that there are only two choices, live in freedom or return to tyranny, the US Administration are presenting a false dilemma.
There are eighteen assumptions that the report is based on-unfortunately I don’t have the time to deconstruct the whole document in order to avoid your use of the deadly roll-eyes again. However, I will offer some comments on other parts of the report.
As you seemed to miss it, I will requote my analysis of the security metrics:
…and I need to make an important point. Why don’t the documents authors consider the civilian death rate important? It is answered here, on page 13:
Should we take a vote? What is a more important measure of the success of a security operation, the mortality rate from the insurgency, or the amount of “actionable intelligence?” Which statistic provides a clearer picture of the state of the play? How is it more “strategic” to know how many bombs have been disarmed to how many bombs have gone off? I contend that the measures selected by the authors of the report are pure propaganda: these measures are not objective, and only provide both the public and the war planners with a false impression of the “success” in Iraq. The decision not to include casualty rates or bombing rates because “terrorists and insurgents want the world to use as a measure of progress or failure” just does not make sense. This is a “Plan for Victory”, not a policy statement: how can you plan if the measures you put in place show you are succeeding even if you are failing?
Lets look at how the “Plan” classifies the enemy. According to the plan, there are four types:
The term “rejectionist” is an interesting one, first coined, apparently by Bremer back in 2004, its taken on a new life in many recent pentagon press briefings. But are the motivations of the “enemy” so clear cut? There are three major groups represented: and according to the plan they are motivated by people who have not embraced democracy, people who want the Baathist Party back in power, and people who espouse the views of Osama Bin Laden. Is that it? There is noone motivated by the occupation by Coalition Troops? The analysis strikes me as shallow and unrealistic: can the Iraqi forces really handle Shi’a religious extremists? How will Iraqi’s handle the crime rate?
Now lets look at the “conditional” nature of the strategy.
Page 11
…the plan has a convienient series of “outs” for the administration: if the plan fails, its because the American people no longer supported the plan, or because the international community failed to expand its support. In other words, even if the plan is fundumenatally flawed and fails spectacularly, its not our fault, its YOURS.
I could type more, but it’s three in the morning over here and I was supposed to get an early night. I stand by my claim that the report is propaganda: I’ll go as far as to say that it is a load of horseshit. It made me angry to read it: it bought me back to Colin Powell’s presentation to the United Nations a couple of years ago-I was so angry listening to him that I nearly put my hand through a wall. His presentation was a crock of shit, and the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq is a crock of shit. I think the New York Times said it best:
And that’s the problem here. It is a set of objectives, not a plan for reaching them, much less a plan that can be assessed against reality, with or without a public time scale. That’s what we’ve been looking for, and it ain’t there, and it ain’t intellectually dishonest to point that out, either.
I don’t know about your Beltway experience, but in my industry we have a saying: Hope is not a strategy.
With all do respect, that is a stupid question. When you send troops into battle, you don’t tell them: Try your best, but don’t worry if you fail-- we’ll just pack and leave.
Your citation explains that the U.S. military is tracking the Iraqi civilian deaths. You don’t think they plan to stop, do you? The President was making a statement of rhetoric, and proposing that if we only count bodies, we will only ever see bad news. By refusing to use the body count as the main measure of success or failure, the President is choosing not to play by the insurgents’ rules.
I’ll assume you’re not in the intelligence field – if I’m wrong, please correct me. I’ve never had anyone define “actionable intelligence” for me, but I know a government civilian whose job it was to choose which bits of intelligence were “actionable”. She told me that she routinely put on her Kevlar and went along on the raids to demonstrate (to the troops) that she had confidence in the intelligence that they were betting their lives on. To imply that they don’t have enough to do, and that they are making up reasons to send the troops out on raids, seems pretty cynical. I’m not saying you’re wrong. Even my friend admitted that sometimes they’d show up and find out she was wrong – at which point the CPA compensated the homeowner for any damage (usually a kicked-in door).
Not necessarily. We already have the figures for “number of bombings per week.” By merging that information with the number of car bombs that have been stopped, we get a view of the percentage we are able to stop as well as a measure of the total car-bomb production capacity of the insurgents. If production capacity is going up but our percentage of intercepts is also going up, is that success or failure?
Basically, yes. Things get marginally better every time we kick down a door and find an insurgent. Things get marginally worse every time an insurgent ambushes US or Iraqi Gov’t forces.
I’m not sure that I agree that the security metrics are bound to improve, but I know that death tolls always rise. If there are 500 dead Iraqi civilians, the only way we’ll see fewer than 500 dead is if they suddenly start voting in Ohio. 
But seriously – I think I’ve addressed your stated concerns with the security metrics.
Are you going to address the other metrics? For example, the economic measures: kilowatt-hours of electricity generated, barrels of oil pumped, businesses started? I wouldn’t take the administration’s numbers in these categories at face value, but I think it would be difficult to conceal failures in these areas.
I don’t contend that things are going well, but I think that this plan is the first glimmer of hope I’ve seen in a while. NPR did some fact-checking of his speech on Morning Edition today if you want to get an equally-partisan view from the other side of the aisle (yes, the report on NPR was slanted left, because it was providing counterpoint to a speech that was obviously slanted right).
One more thing: I think it was a total chicken[del]shit[/del]hawk, ham-handed, pandering political song-and-dance to choose the US Naval Academy for the venue. It was a policy speech, but it was very partisan, and I think it sucks incontinent donkeys to use officer candidates as window dressing. He is their commander, so they can be ordered to attend; but under the UCMJ, they are prohibited from attending several equally-political functions in uniform, or on government time. If I were going to attend that speech, I’d do it out of uniform, and make sure I was on leave. It was a low move, it compromises the apparent integrity of the USNA, and as someone who can vote in Maryland, I’m going to make sure each of the politicians who was in attendance hears my opinion on that.
No, but you do tell them:
If military orders don’t include a plan for failure, you get something like Stalingrad:
Not an attempt to Godwinise - Bush is no Hitler - merely a comparison of idiotic strategies.
The problem I see with the report on intelligence in the “plan”
is that these are merely numbers of reports from Iraqis without any indication of what happened as a result of the reports. How many reports were “dry holes” and how many actually resulted in some use to us?
We know that the US pays to put good news in newspapers. Do we also pay for intelligence tips from Iraqis? That could explain the rise in reports. It’s well known that the offer of a reward for information in the US results in all sorts of “information” being offered. GW ascribes the increase to growing frustration with the insurgents but I don’t have a lot of confidence in his reliability as a reporter.
I think you have wildly unrealistic expectations if you think Bush (or any president in his situation) is going to give that level of tactical detail to the public. Soldiers have their rotation schedules, so they know when they’re supposed to ship out. I know many have been extended, but I don’t think anyone is sent to Iraq “for the duration”.