What's The Difference Between a Freedom Fighter and a Terrorist.

This is simply not true, and by and large the problem with your position. They were not different missions at different times; the object of strategic bombing was to kill civilians. This isn’t my opinion or view on the matter, it is historical fact.

I can assure you that I am not mistaken, and it cuts to the heart of the matter; it is not a digression of a digression. MAD is the end result of total war in the nuclear age. The strategic bombing in WW2 was total war carried out with the materials available at the time, including two nuclear weapons in the end. Continuing to dodge this is again the problem with your position.

I’ve no problem with anything Malthus has written. He did indeed convey his point quite well, and I do not disagree with him. I disagree with you and your position.

Human Action has, by definition, excluded acts carried out by military forces during wartime from being terrorism or terrorist acts and, by his definition, the military forces of a state cannot be terrorists. What they do can be judged for its moral acceptability – based apparently purely on its intention, not its outcome – but it is not terrorism. Based on this it would appear any discusion about strategic bombing in WW2 is pointless.

But the trouble with this is that it is not that helpful as it breaks down in too many ways. There may be no clear declaration of war (a police action, supressing insurrection, supporting a friendly government, etc), what makes up formed military forces may not be clear (only full time soldiers? What about militias that are part of the state’s forces that may or may not be uniformed?), who decides what is a state (a part of a country may be trying to break away, if it succeeds it is recognised by the UN as a state, if it doesn’t its forces were never working for a state. Or a country may have been conquered, the government has ceased to exist, does that mean anyone using terror to try and drive out the invaders is a terrorist?).

With all these issues there is not as clear cut way of identifying a terrorist as Human Action seems to think, and if you cannot be objectively certain this person is a terrorist, you cannot objectively define whether their actions – agreed as aimed at killing civilians – is terrorism or not. So we come back to my original question as to why it is morally unacceptable for an individual to plant a bomb that may kill dozens while it is ok for air forces to drop bombs that will kill thousands. In both cases the intention is the same, to force the enemy into a different behaviour.

Whatever definitions of terrorism you come up with, ultimately the difference between a terrorist and a freedom fighter is a value judgement, not an absolute and objective fact. Once again you come back to a freedom fighter is on our side – taking regrettable but necessary action against the oppressive enemy (that may unfortunately involve collateral damage and the deaths of non-combatants) – and a terrorist is on theirs – using unjustifiable terror tactics that result in the deaths of innocents.

And yet I provided citations of at least three other objectives: destroying German industry (the Schweinfurt–Regensburg mission being an example), forcing Germany to allocate resources away from the front to defend against the bombers, and crippling the German transportation network.

Can you explain how it cuts to the heart of the matter? It seems unconnected to both the thread topic (what’s the difference between a freedom fighter and a terrorist?) and the digression on strategic bombing being terrorism. How does total war relate to terrorism?

So a concession is a dodge to you?

Not so. To be terrorism, the action would have to be:

  1. Asymmetrical
  2. Means that fall outside the forms of political struggle routinely operating within some current regime

I can think of state actions that would qualify: the Halabja poison gas attack comes to mind first.

That’s not what I wrote:

“Matters more” is not “all that matters”.

Perhaps, in that it meets neither of Tilly’s criteria.

Judgment must be used, yes, as it always must when applying strict definitions to the messiness of the real world. The same complaint could be lodged against use of the word “war”, yet we use it all the same, as best we can.

  1. Asymmetry
  2. Means that fall outside the forms of political struggle routinely operating within some current regime

In the case of World War Two Germany, an individual planting a bomb satisfies both criteria, the USAAF dropping bombs satisfied neither.

This is the same conclusion Dissonance seems to have arrived at. I disagree; whether one is a freedom fighter is independent of whether one is a terrorist. One can be both, one, or neither, because the terms do have a real meaning beyond political labels of approval or disapproval.

These are typical problems of “just war” theory. Way I’d put it is that identifying who is, or is not, a “terrorist” is merely a subset of a larger problem: identifying “just actions” in the context of warfare.

A bomber dropping bombs on a city is not a “terrorist” because he’s part of a regular army, and “terrorists” are by definition irregulars. This does not mean his actions are perforce moral. They could well be immoral, a “war crime”.

I disagree. The fact that the moral calculus is complex does not make it wholly subjective.

The difficulty is that war is, of course, an inherently destructive and murderous activity - yet to date no alternative to war exists as the ultimate arbiter for settling disputes.

Hence, modern people have attempted in various ways to codify rules of behaviour as to what is, or is not, acceptable when engaged in war - “just war theory”. While this is sometimes refered to in legalistic terms (bound by treaties and the like), it is probably more realistic to think of it in terms of moral pressure. The “good guys” bind their hands (somewhat) so as to remain the “good guys” and, in part, in the hope that their enemies will reciprocate.

One of those rules, for example, is that it is wrong to indiscriminately murder or rape civilians. This is an action historically (and sometimes now) undertaken by regular soldiers. When a city was besieged and resisted, forcing soldiers to assault the walls, the civilians inside could expect murder, rape and possibly enslavement.

I don’t think anyone today would argue that this customary “soldier’s law” is not morally wrong. It isn’t a matter that is purely subjective. Allowing or encouraging your soldiers to murder, rape and enslave civilians they catch after a siege is objectively wrong, no matter who is doing it and no matter what the causes of the conflict might be. It doesn’t matter whether the soldiers are regulars or irregulars - though leaders of irregulars may have no ability to actually restrain their soldery. It doesn’t matter whether this is actually an effective technique of solving disputes or not.

Similarly, “terrorism” is an acknowleged wrongful action (by most modern people) that is specific to irregulars. Planting a bomb in a nursery school used by your national, ethnic or religious enemies is simply morally wrong. This is not subjective, but objectively wrong. A “terrorist” is simply an irregular fighter whose method of warfare is characterized by “terrorism”.

Admittedly, regular troops can commit acts of “terrorism” - say, deliberately targeting that same nursery school with artillery - but, being regulars, their method of fighting isn’t characterized by terrorism, so we should properly call them “war criminals” rather than “terrorists” (the label changes, but the moral opprobrium attached to the act does not).

Al-Qaeda has a declared purpose:[

](Al-Qaeda - Wikipedia)

Thus, their intent with regards to the events of 9/11 is a politically motivated struggle in which violence will play a part in subduing their enemies and attaining their goals; in other words, they declared that they were fighting a war and they declared who the enemy was.

Since intent matters more than outcome, in your words, it seems to me that you would likely consider that the events of 9/11 were not terrorist acts, but were instead acts of war, similar to the bombings of civilian targets in Dresden or Nagasaki or Hiroshima, which you already have stated you do not consider terrorist activities.

They’d be acts of war if Al-Qaeda had standing to declare war. If the government of Saudi Arabia issued that statement of purpose and then attacked the World Trade Center, yes, that would be an act of war, and not terrorism.

Al-Qaeda is a not a state actor, and their attack on the United States is thus asymmetrical. It is also using means that fall outside the forms of political struggle routinely operating within the U.S. Thus, terrorism.

Intent matters greatly to moral judgment, yes. For instance, if one person kills another to collect insurance money, and another kills someone because they fired a rifle without regard for a safe backstop, the differing intents color the morality of the acts.

I’m sure that many Al-Qaeda members think of their struggle as a war, and this would indeed factor into moral judgment of what they’ve done, relative to other motivations. But the factual judgment is clear and obvious: terrorism.

So you are of the opinion, then, that any violent act carried out by a group that isn’t already a nation or state is an act of terror? So every rebel group is a bunch of terrorists, since they are “not a state actor”? Why do the forms of political struggle have to be routinely operating within the U.S.? Why aren’t things the U.S. does, even outside of it’s own territory, applicable?

I think the way you (or the person you cite for the definition) is seeking to craft a definition that is so narrow, it will never apply to anything the U.S. does, but will always apply to anything that is done against the U.S. (substitute the name of your favorite country for “the U.S.” if you like). In fact, defining “terrorism” as you do has the (obviously attractive to a sitting government) effect of de-legitimizing most any armed revolution or uprising.

This has the same moral conviction as my defining “theft” as “the taking, without consent of any of my posessions” but deciding that since any possessions not mine are not in the definition, that I may take other’s possessions without consent and not call it theft.

I disagree that the designation of “terrorism” is as clearly and obviously found in every situation as you and your cite would apparently like things to be.

You seem to be tripping over yourself to set things up so that, morally and legally, anything done by “your side” is okay, but things done by others to “your side” can be described as heinous and despicable.

FTR, I think “terrorism” is a bullshit term and should be discarded. If we agree that members of Al-Qaeda were not engaged in a war, then they are criminals and should be treated as such, IMO.

I disagree. Terrorism (and “terrorist”) is a perfectly useful term, albeit overused over the last decade or so as the bugbear du jour.

Seems to me you and Human are arguing at cross-purposes. Perhaps this declaration will make it easier:

  • Regulars in the armed services of a nation, while not “terrorists”, may be just as morally bad as terrorists depending on what they do. Only, rather than calling them “terrorists” and their actions “terrorism”, we tend to use the terms “war crimes” or “crimes against humanity” do describe them.

This is sort of like saying that when government officials wrongly confiscate your property through illegal expropriation, they are not what we usually think of as “burglars”. True, they may be just as bad as burglars (or even worse), and your property may be just as much taken as if burglars had taken it, but the term “burglars” has the (colloquial as well as legal) meaning that is more specific to individuals acting without official sanction and doesn’t neatly apply to wrongful expropriation by government officials.

Malthus addressed this disagreement well, but I’ll reply anyway.

If the act is using means that fall outside the forms of political struggle routinely operating within the current regime, than yes. Thus, context is key.

If a rebel group uses small arms fire to combat the state’s army, that is not terrorism. It’s asymmetrical, but not outside the forms of political struggle routinely operating within the current regime.

If a rebel group responds to shelling of non-combatant villages, with shelling of the capital, that could be be defended as a non-terrorist act, for the same reason.

If a radical group responds to the legal presence of troops in certain nations by attacking the troops’ nation in question with airliners, that’s terrorism.

If a radical group subverts an election with bombings and assassination, that’s terrorism.

Make sense?

I was substituting “the U.S.” for “current regime”, but I suppose U.S. actions outside the U.S. could be used for justification, to some degree.

It generally doesn’t appy to state vs. state actions, if that’s what you mean. We have other terms for that.

It doesn’t de-legitimize revolutions unless they initiate violence in an otherwise non-violent political process.

Terrorism isn’t the one term at our disposal to define unlawful use of force; it needn’t be broadened to include state vs. state actions, or scenarios other than the one it actually describes. English has plenty of words to go around.

I think Tilly’s definition works fine, if it’s so unclear and inobvious, can you propose a scenario in which it wouldn’t accurately label a terrorist group as such, or would inaccurately label a non-terrorist group?

Sorry, but you’ve wildly misread my intentions.

I do think that’s the sticking point, the idea that if an act isn’t terrorism, it must be morally and legally fine. That is not at all the case. Katyn Forest wasn’t terrorism, it was a war crime. That doesn’t make it somehow more acceptable!

Malthus, I understand what you’re saying, but still disagree.

The term seeks to de-legitimize the goals and de-humanize (or de-civilize or de-socialize) those it describes. Al-Qaeda does not seek terror, in and of itself, for no other reason than to revel in the distress of other humans. They have what is to them a legitimate goal they are trying to accomplish and are employing what they see as the most cost-effective (if you’ll allow me to use that term; thanx) manner open to them.

On re-read, this sentence is awkward and prolly doesn’t convey my thoughts as well as I’d intended.

What I mean is that part of the effect that the use of the term has is to de-legitimize, etc. those it describes and their acts, much the same way that calling a soldier a murderer does. In fact, it’s exactly the same way.

Human Action, let me think some more about the definition you’ve offered. I still think it’s as I described it (a narrow definition designed to excuse things that states do and demonize actions against them, particularly with regards to the U.S., etc.), but I can also see that it’s possible that the definition is so narrowly tailored because it’s the only way to accurately describe the thing they are trying to define.

If a government has bombed it’s own people, does that mean that rebels can use bombs but only bombs to cause explosions, or else they are engaging in “terrorism”?

Sure, take your time. I’ll just say that “the definition is so narrowly tailored because it’s the only way to accurately describe the thing they are trying to define” sums up my take pretty well. We have plenty of terms for unacceptable state action: war crime, crime against humanity, genocide, ethnic cleansing…

If a government’s routine form of political struggle was violence (against dissenters, say, in a political struggle, not against bandits or something like that), then a rebellion’s use of violence against that government would not satisfy the second of Tilly’s criteria, and would not be terrorism.

ETA: That’s violence against the government, mind you, not against random unlucky civilians.

“Terrorism” describes a method, not an end goal.

A “terrorist” is a person whose method of fighting is characterized by the use of “terrorism” to achieve his or her goals, whatever those are - often ostensibly to inflict fear on the civilian population of an enemy to get the government of that enemy to agree to do something the terrorist wants.

Often what the terrorist really wants is for the government to crack down hard on the population the terrorist claims to represent, exacerbating [for example] ethnic and religious divisions - and so enhancing support for the terrorist’s own cause among the terrorist’s “own people”, as it were. In this way, the terrorist hopes to inflict a “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” dilemma on the target nation: cracking down hard risks enhancing support for the terrorists; failing to take action risks the appearance of weakness, which can also enhance support for the terrorists; and the nastiness of it all erodes the will of the target nation to act.

This is in contrast in technique to the rebel or the guerilla, who (although irregular) seeks to force a more or less military decision on the target enemy state (although the same people may be both terrorists and guerillas). The terrorist, the irregular/rebel and the guerilla may share the eact same “end goal”, but they differ in technique of combat.

The end goal of the terrorist is only de-legitimized because of its association with terrorism. The end goal may be good and admirable, but most people view terrorism as dishonourable, and so the end goal becomes tained in public preception by association. This isn’t totally illogical - while good ends can be pursued by bad means and vice versa, there is a certain amount of correlation between bad ends and bad means.

Yeah, I had a whole huge post I wrote about how I have less of a problem with “terrorism” than with “terrorist” and why but the internet belched and swallowed it.

Any discussion of less than book or dissertation length will be admittedly facile, but I think there’s still a distinction to be drawn. In WWII all sides were engaed in total war in which the full resources and population were mobilized towards the war effort, with each nation fighting potentially for existence. If all of a nation’s resources and population are fully committed to total war, attacking what would otherwise be considered a civilian target is more justifiable as a legitimate military objective. Even still, there was much debate and agonizing after the war as to whether attacking some civilian targets was militarily necessary or justified, as with the Marshall inquiry or the U.S. Air Force Historical Division report on the bombing of Dresden. With outright terrorism, no such debate is necessary - attacking a civilian target is justifiable per se.

Your position is one of cognitive dissonance, and a concession is not an actual concession when you continue to defend it. You seem to want to argue that it’s okay when states do it, but realizing the hypocrisy and horror of actually defending such an idea continue to insist that it’s not actually what states do. Note that you have declared that “Pretending? Hardly. Of course bombing cities meant killing civilians. That’s not disputed.” yet you are still continuing to dispute it. Again, what do you imagine destroying German industry entailed or crippling the German transportation network entailed? The industrial workforce and those running the transportation networks who were to be destroyed were civilians. The location of these targets, factories and rail junctions, were in the middle of cities, and it was understood that any degree of actual precision even in daylight bombing with the Norden bombsight was not possible; the bombs were going to land far and wide all over the city. The British had given up on the idea of targeting anything smaller than a city in area bombing, and the US did the same as well with urban bombing on Japanese cities.

You go on so far as to pretend that nuclear armed nations aren’t actually aiming their arsenals at each others cities with the intention of destroying each other as nations, but that the obliteration of each other’s civilian populations would simply be an unfortunate side effect of honorably aiming nuclear weapons at each other. Finding yourself unable to locate any visible means of support for such an absurdity and pleading no contest to its defense isn’t a concession. It’s trying to disown an absurdity that you have been arguing. It is an absurdity that is in some ways understandable to want to hold as it resolves the central conflict of your dissonant positions, but an absurdity nonetheless.

You want to have your cake and eat it too. You can’t, not with any degree of honesty; it requires holding two conflicting ideas at the same time.

The problem is that you seem to have no idea what my position actually is.

There are multiple questions being discussed here, and they are being conflated into a mess in which we are talking past each other. To resolve this, I will now call out said questions:

  1. From the OP: What’s the difference between a freedom fighter and a terrorist?

My answer: The terms are not mutually exclusive. A freedom fighter can be a terrorist, and a terrorist can be a freedom fighter.

  1. From post 41: Can terrorism be moral?

My answer: No. It’s an immoral tactic, regardless of the ideology behind it.

  1. From post 49: What is terrorism?

My answer: The systematic use of terror as a means of political coercion.

  1. Implicit in answer to question 3: What is terror?

My answer: Per Tilly, “asymmetrical deployment of threats and violence against enemies using means that fall outside the forms of political struggle routinely operating within some current regime.”

  1. From post 51 (yours): **Were the Allied strategic bombing campaigns in WW2 immoral and not morally permissible? **

My answer: Yes, they were morally permissible, in the context of the war in which they occurred.

  1. Implicit in your post 51: Were said bombing campaigns terrorism?

My answer: No, per the definition I gave, they are not.

  1. Implicit in the bulk of your posts: Does defining an act as something other than terrorism mean that it is automatically moral and beyond criticism?

My answer: No, it does not. Countless things other than terrorism are immoral. State actions can be and often have been immoral. The fact that the action of a state acting against another state cannot be terrorism DOES NOT mean that all such actions are moral.

  1. Post 51 again: Were the Allied bombing campaigns intended to kill German civilians?

My answer. Yes! I have never said they were not. You keep hammering away as if I’ve denied this, when all I have done is point out that killing civilians as an end to itself was not the sole intent. However, even if killing any and all civilians was the sole intent, it’s still not wrong, and still not terrorism.
The nuclear stockpile stuff really has nothing to do with anything, so I didn’t feel a pressing need to start researching it. I’m fine with your declaration that the stockpiles were intended solely to destroy cities and kill civilians, because it has nothing to do with the topic at hand, which is terrorism, as the USE of said stockpiles by either superpower against the other CANNOT be terrorism as it has been defined in my posts. That was the sole concession on my part, and it was motivated by the tangential nature of the point.

freedom fighters fight for freedom. terrorists kill to inspire terror. did you really have to ask?

The problem arises when terrorists say they are fighting for their version of freedom. It’s also a problem when freedom fighters sometimes use terrorist tactics.