So as I understand it, if Putin so much as sends an armored car into Estonia by mistake, this would lead to immediate open conflict between all the member nations of Europe and Russia. Russia would begin to lose the conflict, and resort to using nuclear weapons to even the odds, which would then inevitably lead to escalation and most major cities in Europe, Russia, and the United States (or basically the civilized world minus Asia) as smoking radioactive craters.
This doesn’t seem stable. Since Putin lies all the time, even if it was a mistake, who would believe him? Since we’ve given an incompetent geriatric con man/reality TV star control of the entire U.S. nuclear arsenal and military, how likely would a reasoned, diplomatic de-escalation be?
The main difference is that we have an alliance and Russia doesn’t. As for using nukes, the only rational reason for Russia to use nukes(and Putin is a rational actor) would be if the nation itself was threatened. A war with Russia over the Baltics would have more in common with Desert Storm than WWI or a Cold War-era WWIII. Russia would occupy, we’d mass troops and tell them to get out, they’d believe we wouldn’t actually do it. Putin might even threaten to use nukes as Saddam threatened to use chemical weapons. Then the war would come, we’d drive Russia out of the Baltics and state quite clearly that this is our sole objective, that we have no designs on Russian territory or on regime change. It would be a lot bloodier than Desert Storm, but the outcome would be no less in doubt.
Back during the Cold War, Russia did have an alliance, called the Warsaw Pact. In addition, both sides did try to push the boundaries a bit, e.g., the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. One thing that stopped the Cold War from becoming a hot war was MAD (mutually assured destruction) – if one side went too far, MAD might mean the destruction of their own country by the enemy.
Oh, I know about the Warsaw Pact but that wasn’t really an alliance so much as an extension of the Soviet Union. They would have been about as effective as Germany’s unwilling allies in WWII. All but the East Germans would have disentegrated in short order. There was no popular support for those governments and their armies were full of unwilling conscripts. I’ve actually talked to former vets from countries in the Warsaw Pact and they have been pretty much unanimous in saying they weren’t going to fight and not many of their fellows would have either. It would still have been the Red Army pretty much alone against NATO.
NATO is an alliance of states that would discuss any problem affecting any member.
If a single Russian armoured car entered Estonia, the Estonian Government wouldn’t bother notifying its allies. They would send a protest to the Russian Ambassador.
Two of the reasons why things are different today:
First, the views on the cost of war are different. Unfortunately, pre-WWI military thinking emphasized the advantage of decisive military action - Google “cult of the offensive” if you wish. This was destabilizing because all countries thought they would have to be first to draw their guns, so to speak. I do not believe NATO subscribes to this philosophy, for various reasons. Russia may see some advantage to striking first and then seeking to negotiate, but that is speculation.
Second, the nature of the alliances are important. Imagine two hockey teams with two ultra-aggressive enforcers on each side. There are going to be fights all over the place, with the rest of the teams being pulled into the melee. If two chess clubs are having a competition, nobody on either team is inclined to start a fistfight, so the teams aren’t likely going to be drawn into anything. I think we can agree that the most assertive foreign policy in the NATO alliance belongs to the US, and I can’t see anyone in the US chomping for war with Russia.
The WWI alliances were by and between the European powers. Any one of which could be comprehensively defeated by the others if they chose to gang up in the right configuration. Many alliances were mutually incompatible; ie. A promised to defend B against C while also promising to defend D against C. But meantime C & D have agreed to mutually defend against B. Leaving A having made contradictory promises once B, C, & D start shooting.
IOW, it was a multilateral mess.
The current alliances are essentially US + some friends vs. Russia + some friends.
IOW, it’s a bilateral situation. Which is much simpler and more crisis stable. Nobody is expecting a fratricidal war between NATO members. Nor between Russia’s current list of allies.
The other critical difference is that a full-on war in Europe was necessarily an existential crisis for the European nations. Fighting a war of existence is not optional. Which was the WWI scenario.
Conversely, a full-on war in Europe is *not necessarily *an existential crisis for the US and Russia, although it may well be for the European nations. That’s the former NATO/WP or current NATO/Russia et al, scenario.
The US and RU *can *choose to sit out. Yes, Article 5 says otherwise, but that’s words on a paper. The other countries, not so much. For them it remains an existential war they can’t choose to not participate in. It was impolitic and reckless of Candidate Trump to point this distinction out. But it was factually accurate.
Is the current situation the ideal smart one? Nope. Any time the world has powerful imperialist, totalitarian, or kleptocratic nations on the prowl we’re collectively at risk. But we are not in a situation that’s directly analogous to early 1914. Nowhere close.
Henry Kissinger said in a book of his that Asia in the 21st century is starting to resemble Europe in the 20th. Lots of very powerful, rising nations, and none of them like each other.
But the proper question isn’t “alliances equal WWI redux,” it is, “When are alliances stabilizing andnwhen are they destabilizing?” I’m pointing out two huge reasons why the WWI perspective does not apply today.
The pre-WW1 setup featured multiple sides who all felt they could win, or at least come out ahead in a war, and that the troops would be home for christmas.
The current setup features two sides, where the side inclined to think of military action against western nations as a legitimate tool of politics is severely outgunned military, and the side that is ahead in power less inclined to see military action between developed nations as beneficial to them.
As I understand it in Pre-WW1 many companies were eyeing territory and wanted to use the war to grab resources. So say Germany wanted the caucuses for its oil or another country wanted a region for its timber and coal.
But nowadays with multinational companies and worldwide trade a country doesnt need to own say oil wells, they can just buy the product and refine it elsewhere.
Whether or not everyone really thought their troops would be home for Christmas (it’s often been said, but I believe may be somewhat exaggerated), I think it’s a key point that multiple parties believed they could end WWI in a better position than they started with.
Whereas, even if the US and NATO would be favored to win a war with Russia, I don’t thing anyone believes such a war would benefit us. That’s probably true even if you leave nukes out of the picture. Before WWI there was still some naiveté about just how truly horrible war could be.
I think this ^^ is really the punchline for the thread.
The US sometimes gets a little optimistic about how non-painful a small war will be (see Iraq & Afghanistan), but there’s not much doubt that a full on war in Europe is a thing to be assiduously avoided.
The only time it makes sense to launch a war (or to participate in an optional one somebody else launched) is when doing so prevents something even worse.
Certain excitable folks have posted here that attacking NK would be a good idea because it would prevent something worse: a nuclear armed NK with some non-zero capability against Japan or the US. This idea doesn’t get much traction by more knowledgeable observers precisely because it doesn’t pass that test.
One big element which deserves a mention here, is the strategic planning and execution of WW1.
It wasn’t the alliances by themselves which were problematic, it was the fact that some of the primary strategists of the big players, had based their plans around relative pace of mobilization.
Germany had long before decided that if war were to come while Russia and France were allied, that they would attack France as absolutely soon as possible, even if the primary foe were Russia. Their survival depended on it. Once Russia declared war on Austria Hungary (due to their alliance with Serbia), the Germans were committed to invade France.
If anything, the fact that nations can go to a war footing much more rapidly now, makes it LESS likely that wars will erupt on their own like that. The fact that everyone CAN grab their guns so fast, means that they have time to figure out what’s really going on before they do.
I agreed with all of your post up to this point. The mobilization of the necessary heavy combat forces to Europe would take the U.S. months, not days. This is probably on balance stabilizing under current circumstances.
I think this is mostly right. Mind you, I think NATO is on net a bad thing and I think it does have a destabilizing effect, but unlike the pre-WWI alliances I don’t think it’s seriously destabilizing and I don’t think a major war is likely anytime soon, although I wouldn’t rule it out. The prospect of a war between Russia and the US doesn’t keep me up at night, for exactly the reasons you state.
Whatever the effect of transnational alliances might be, per se, all serious politicians both in Russia, America, and their respective allies are much more cautious today than in 1914, because we realize that international war is a much more costly proposition. Even if you don’t include nukes: Latin America has no nuclear powers, but there hasn’t been a significant war between Latin American countries since the mid-1930s, and I’d guess that’s largely because the Chaco War demonstrated just how costly a war would be.
Or else when you have enough plausible deniability (i.e. “we’re intervening in a civil war, or supporting the legitimate government against an illegal insurrection”) that you think you can get away with not triggering the other side too much. Vietnam isn’t the worst example here: was that a civil war, an aggressive American action, or a defensive American action?
I was going to make the same point Igor made, about mobilisation in WWI. The German plans for mobilisation were exceptionally detailed and involved complex rail movements all designed to get the Army to the front - and it couldn’t be stopped! Once the order for general mobilisation was given, it had to proceed according to plan. If it stopped, there would be a terrific traffic snarl on the rail Ines and possibly major accidents, as trains that were scheduled to be past point A by 10 am were stopped, but another train was supposed to pass Point A at 10.10 am came down the line.
That meant that there couldn’t be a pause for reflection, or possibly to change plans in response to an offer fe another country.
But if Germany could not stop mobilisation once the order was given, neither could France or Russia. If the Germans showed no sign of slowing down their mobilisation of troops to the French frontier, then the French had to proceed with their mobilisation, as a matter of self-defence. And Russia had to proceed with its mobilisation, both because the Germans were mobilising and to meet their treaty obligations to France and Serbia.
That sort of rigid mobilisation is a thing of the past, thanks to air transport and motor vehicle transport, as well as communication abilities between the central commands of the military and their forces in the field. Modern militaries are much more flexible than the European armies were a century ago. That in turn gives greater tactical and strategic choices to military commanders and their political masters, so that there is no equivalent to “Herr Kaiser, you have the order to mobilise two days ago and it cannot now be stopped.”
The prevailing theory in 1914 was that the country which mobslised first would win. It was an accurate assessment IMO. And onc which probably applies to an extent today.
The difference is the nuclear dimension. In 1914, the powers that be were worried about continuing diplomacy lest it hinder the mobilisation times. Today everyone is worried about stopping diplomacy, lest you end up in nuclear war.
Since 1945 till today, I can think of several incidents that without the threat of nuclear annihilation would have led to war.