What's the truth about France's surrender in WW2?

Factual Questions
41

It’s not that the headquarters believed the Ardennes were impossible to cross. They just believed that it wasn’t possible for a sizeable force to cross them quickly following narrow roads and launch a major attack in this area without letting time for the french army to react. And once again, the french commanders din’t expect at all a “blitzkrieg”. That for instance the german armored units would just ignore and bypass pockets of resistance and go on their merry way as quickly as possible.

Also, this part of the border had not been left totally undefended. But it was defended by reserve units of poor quality and poorly equiped, and without reserves backing them.

Beside, the allied expected the main attack to occur through Belgium and were awaiting for it. The Germans did launch an attack in Belgium, the french army and the BEF rushed in as planned. Everything seemed to happen as expected, except for the fact that the German attack (though a major one) was only a diversion move and the main thrust was intended to take place in the Ardennes. When it happened, the allied forces were caught in Belgium, had an extremely hard time trying to retreat (lack of motorized unit able to move quickly, poor logistics, roads clogged by refugees, etc…) hence were of no use until they were encircled. Actually many soldiers just marched north into Belgium, never met the ennemy, were ordered to march south back to France, and found themselves encircled without having even fought.
Once the germans had bypassed the french defense lines in the Ardennes area, there was esssentially nobody to stop them (no reserves, as I mentionned, and the bulk of the army in Belgium). Beside, the allied command still didn’t know immediatly what were the german’s intents, hence how to react. It could have been :

-Going east and attack the Maginot line from the rear

-Going south to take Paris

-Going west to cut the allied forces from mainland France (which they did), which wasn’t necessarily the most likely scenario, since the commanders still didn’t think that the german forces could move quickly enough to achieve such a feat.

42

The regiment you’re refering to was probably the only mechanized regiment, but the french forces in the area were larger than that. I googled while the hamsters were running, couldn’t find an order of battle, but found references to french divisions. It seems to me (though I’m not sure at all) there was two of them, but plain infantry using their feet to move, without much in the way of artillery and utterly laccking AA guns.

Ok. I exagerated to convey a general idea of what was happening. Indeed, essentially anything in the area which was able to float and not a duck was used for the evacuation. But the british ships (not necessarily military vessels) did by far the largest part of the job. Not only there was much more british ships than french ones, but also they had a greater capacity. And AFAIK, they did evacuate in priority the british troops (which was logical…actually, while googling I found that there the french commanders had agreed to the french rearguard being evacuated last).

As for the “whatever french soldiers happening to be on the shore when the british ships still had room”, this come from all the testimonies of french soldiers evacuated at Dunkirk I heard, and which were essentially all stating the same thing : that it was a total mess, not organized units waiting in good order to be evacuated, but a mass of mixed soldiers from unrelated units waiting on the shore and rushing towards the raft sent by the ships, but only after the british troopers present had been embarked. The units still organized were either sent south to defend the city of Lille, either used to defend the pocket of Dunkirk itself (I understand that would be the rear guard I was refering to above).

I don’t believe so. AFAIK and as already mentionned in this thread, essentially all the french soldiers evacuated from Dunkirk didn’t stay in the UK but were shipped back to ports in southern France. Probably there were some who found themselves still strandled in the UK when France surrendered, but certainly a minority. And I do not doubt that few of these choose to join the free french forces rather than coming back home. I don’t remember at all the figures, but the number of men who joined De Gaulle after he made his public call for resistance on the BBC on june 18 was ridiculously low. Ok. I found a figure : by July 1940, 3 300 men had joined De Gaulle : 2 000 in London, 400 from the navy, 300 in the Gold Coast and 600 in Egyptia (not sure what they were doing there).

43

It looks like, at the Meuse crossing, at least, the French forces were the 55th and 71st Infantry Divisions of the 9th Army. The 9th Army, under General Corap, which was assigned to defend the Ardennes, was made up of 12 infantry and 4 horse cavalry divisions. It looks like there was also, nearby, General Huntziger’s 2nd Army, which was assigned the area between the Maginot line and Pont-a-Bar.

44

The French themselves are still arguing back and forth between the “we were all noble brave Resistance fight-airs!” camp and the “We rolled over for zee Nazis” camp.

One particular Frenchwoman, Coco Chanel, lived with a Nazi officer for much of the war, sold to Nazis’ wives and mistresses, and kicked her Jewish partner out of the firm and co-opted his share of the business. She fled to Switzerland after the war to avoid prosecution as a collaborator, but came back in the mid-50s for a very successful revival of her career. She may be “Chanel” to some, but she’ll always be “Nazi whore” to me.

45

(and I’m not sure if the 9th Army was made up of the 16 divisions, or if the 2nd and 9th Army combined were made up of 16 divisions)

46

I think you misunderstood what I posted.

The German attack began on May 10. It’s hard to say precisely when the Belgian situation was irrevocably lost but by May 16 it was a clear defeat for the French and their allies. Paris fell on June 14. Petain aks for an armistice on June 17.

I’m not saying that the French could have turned the war around in the three days between the fall of Paris and the surrender. But in the four weeks between the loss of Belgium and the loss of France, there was an opportunity that was lost.

47

Ok. Indeed I misunderstood.
Well…What the allied tried to do after the german attack in the Aredennes on May 15 or so was to withdraw the armies from Belgium and northern France. They failed miserably. Dunkirk was on may 29.

Apparently, you’re stating that meanwhile and during the two following weeks, the french commanders could have organized a defense line somewhere in southern France. I doubt it. After Dunkirk, there were battles here and there, but the the french were unable to maintain a continuous front, and as a result, the germans continued to advance at a steady pace.

I suppose that you’re thinking that as soon as the germans entered through the Ardennes, the french commanders should have stated “let’s forget about the larger part of the army in Belgium, they’re toast anyway, and so is northern france” and should have concentrated their efforts on preparing such a continuous front somewhere in the south (for instance by moving the army which was defending the eastern boundary and the Maginoit line or somesuch). Or something similar.
I’ve very strong doubts because (just casting ideas as they come, I don’t have thoroughly considered the issue) :

-I can’t imagine the commanders not trying to save both the BEF and the bulk of the french army in Belgium in priority, nor not hoping that they could somehow block the german advance and use said british and french troops to do so.

-I’m not convinced that they actually had the means, without these armies, to organize such a defense line

-I suppose that the germans wouldn’t have left them doing so. If french troops not stuck in Belgium had been withdrew from northern France, I assume that the germans would have attacked and pursued them. Instead of battles in for instance Champagne, there would have been battles in, say, Auvergne, against a withdrawing french army. In order to organize defense in the south, they necesserily needed to meanwhile keep the germans busy in the north. It’s not like they could ask for a two or three weeks break, while the germans would stay idle.

-It would have been quite a desesperate move. Usually, commanders and politicians don’t decide to just leave half the country including the capital, the largest industrial centers, etc… to the ennemy with the vague hope that they could perhaps defend the rest before being totally certain that nothing else can be done (which is what happened with the attempt I already mentionned along the Loire river and was considered concerning Britanny).
-Finally, I can’t see how it could have avoided a defeat. If the french army was trashed despite half of its boundaries being heavily forfitified, the rest being defended by the best troops available on prepared positions, the presence of the british expedionnary corps, the involvment of the Belgians, etc…, how could an improvised front in the middle of France could have resisted, especially with much less men (without the armies defeated in Belgium, and without the british since they refused to send back troops in France after said defeat), much less planes, etc…? Beside, the concept of position war had just totally failed, so why do you think it would have suceeded somewhere else in France?
Then, perhaps some military genius could have done such a thing. Perhaps Paris could have been transformed in a kind of Stalingrad. But we’re in the realm of the “what if”, and I’m not really interested in these, especially since I’m not a military buff, either. But it seems extremely implausible to me. Of course, it’s just an opinion.
Finally, I wouldn’t know whether Weygand was a good general or not (difficult to say, given the situation he inherited of), but in any case, I suspect he probably did the best he could, and most probably better than a random poster on the SDMB (no personnal offense intended) could have done. Given that he failed miserably in organizing a defensive front (which he tried to do), I suppose that at best, he could have failed a little less miserably or it could have taken a little longer for France to fall.

48

That’s a way too extensive question for me to even try to answer it. I wouldn’t be qualified to do so, anyway. Very roughly and inacuratly, the typical politician/intelectual “sold out” would have belonged to the reactionnary, catholic and nationalist right wing. But you would have all the scale from the low-ranking civil servant only interested in making a good career to the overtly pro-nazi politician advocating a direct military involvment of France alongside Germany.

As for the most obvious culprit and his capacities, Petain was vice-prime minister, and had been appointed to this post during the campaign of France mainly as a PR move, since, though old, he was immensely popular and a symbol of the french victory in WWI.

He became “head of the French State” (that was his “title”) when, upon the resignation of prime minister Reynaud, the french parliament “commited suicide” and granted Petain full powers to negociate a peace with Germany and to draft a new constitution, with some minimal conditions about what the content of said constitution should be. No constitution was ever written, and Petain just stayed “Head of the french state” with whatever powers he decided he had.
The second most obvious culprit was Pierre Laval, who was appointed “head of the government” twice by Petain. The first time in 1940 and the second time in 1942, with much extended powers (he was at the same time minister of the interior, of foreign affairs, and of something else I can’t remember), and who, from this date, was the person actually in charge in Vichy France. He initiated a policy even more strongly collaborationnist (and antisemitic) than Petain previously, like for instance rounding up french Jews on the behalf of Germany, organizing a para-military “militia” which worked hand in hand with the gestapo, sending more french workers (mandatorily, not volunteers) in Germany to support their war effort, etc…

49

There’s a pretty good documentary about the French Occuptation
The Sorrow and the Pity
It’s worth checking out.

50

That must be the origin of that perfume clone, Nazi Whore #5.
:slight_smile:

51

I’m not sure if anyone else had mentioned this yet, but one of the reasons France couldn’t beat the Germans in World War 2 was because they didn’t have the men to fight a war. Over 60% of their male population was wiped out in the first world war. After a war like that, no one wanted to fight a long conflict anyways.

52

The problem with the French situation in 1940 is that they didn’t really try anything for those four crucial weeks. A few half-hearted plans were made and occasionally some small operation was launched but effectively there was no master plan. Individual divisions and brigades did what they thought was best but they needed direction to be effective.

There were possibilities. It’s true that the main attacks elements of the French Army were cut off in Belgium, but there were several factors that mitigated that problem. The Germans had also committed the main attack elements of their army to Belgium; they had nothing left to attack from another direction. Over half of the French army was still available in France; granted they were second line troops and many were committed to the Maginot line, but with Germany fully committed in Belgium, they could have been brought into play. And while the troops north of the Germans were cut off, they were no destroyed; they were still a sizable force in being that could have been evacuated or attempted a breakout.

In my opinion, the cutoff troops in Belgium should have been ordered to attack south in mass with the intent of cutting through the German lines and regrouping in France. It would have been a hard fought operation, but it would have totally stopped any possibility of a German attack and would have disrupted the German army for weeks. A sizable percentage of the troops would have made it through.

Meanwhile the Maginot line should have been stripped to a bare minumum and the troops redeployed north of Paris. With all of their frontline troops committed to Belgium and Poland, the Germans had nothing left to attack the line with anyway. These troops would have been waiting for the northern forces that broke through. By the time the Germans regrouped the French would have had the time to form a reasonable defensive line. This was after all essentially ther position several month into WWI and they managed to hold out for four years from that point.

With the French showing they weren’t defeated, Italy probably wouldn’t have declared war on June 10. New forces would have been raised in France, Britain, and their empires. Germany in 1940 in many ways had fewer resources for a prolonged war of attrition than it did in 1914.

Worst case scenario - the plan doesn’t work and France has to surrender. How is that worse than what happened?

53

Hmmm…Most certainly, there has been way less than 60% of the french male population wipped out during WWI. I just checked it out : 3,55 % of the french population has been killed in action during WWI, so, that would be roughly 7% of the male population.
Beside, it was true also for Germany. 10,5% of the active male population (I would assume this would be men between 20 and 60 y.o. or something similar) was killed in France, but the ratio was similar in Germany : 9,8%. So, if France didn’t have men to fight the war, then Germany shouldn’t have enough men, either.

54

Oooh, I love armchair generaling, nice job Nemo.

55

Nemo, such armchair generalship is all very well in hindsight but the situation wasnt so easy at the time. First off your notion that the Germans had fully committed themselves immediately in Belgium is misleading.

The initial German deployment was:

29 Divisions in Army Group B which advanced into the Netherlands and Belgium
45 Divisions in Army Group A, the forces that struck through the Ardennes
19 Divisions in Army Group C along the French border opposite the Maginot Line

and no less then 42 divisions in reserve which the Germans could employ as they saw fit.

Secondly the idea that the French could have just broken south out of Belgium and formed a new defensive line with assistance of forces withdrawn from the Maginot line ignores several pertinent factors. If its to be done in time at all it would mean making a strategic decision to abandon the Belgians, and leave the flanks of the retreating British army hanging in the air unless the British can also be persuaded to break out into the French interior rather then withdraw to the coast as they historically did. The forces attempting to breakout south would be themselves being attacked by the advancing Army Group B in the rear and any breakout even if successful which is by no means assured would necessitate the abandonment of most of their stores and equipment.

Historically by the beginning of June Weygand was reduced to about 50 divisions to face circa 130 German ones. Even assuming your timely breakout is successful, the surrender of the Belgian and Dutch and the evacuation of the British removed about 40 divisions from the Allied line up and leaves the French heavily outnumbered. And historically Weygand did evacuate most of the French forces garrisoning the Maginot line to form a new line in the north, (he left only 17 divisions in the Line to defend the entire Franco-German border). In the final phase of the campaign the Germans attacked and breach the denuded line in any event, your strategy just opens that possibility to them earlier.

I also dont see where you get your magic figure of four weeks in which the French had these missed opportunities. Belgium surrendered on 28th May, the coup de grace German offensive into the French interior began on 5th Jun so there is very little time available.

56

The figure of 45 “reserve” divisions is a little bit exagerated. By May 1940, the Germans were occupying Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, and Norway with Belgium and the Netherlands being added to the list during the campaign. The reason those divisions weren’t used is because they were already committed to other duties.

The western countries (France, Britain, Belgium, and Netherlands) began the war with a total of 152 divisions, so the 135 German divisions actually began the campaign at a numerical disadvantage.
Here’s some other figures: France started the campaign with 10700 artillery pieces, 3562 aircraft, and 3254 tanks. The other western countries added another 3274 artillery pieces, 1419 aircraft, and 950 tanks. Germany started with 7378 artillery pieces, 3369 aircraft, and 2493 tanks.

So Germany having started the campaign at a material disadvantage was hardly likely to have suddenly been able to send in a major force of reserves during the battle. The German victory was due to the fact that they used their lesser forces in a much more effective manner than the French. If the French had acted in an equally effective manner, they would have then had the strength of numbers as well.

Nor did the Germans breach the Maginot line. The Maginot line was captured from the west, not the east. It fell after the Germans had overrun France and were able to take the line from its relatively unprotected rear.

The figure of four weeks I mentioned was based on the dates I gave in that same post. The French armies began retreating from Belgium on May 16; the French high command asked for an armstice on June 17; a time span of 32 days, which I rounded down to four weeks.

57

Wrong. The forces I mentioned are solely those available for the western offensive. Total German strength on 10th May 1940 consisted of 157 divisions:

10 on garrison duty in Poland
1 occupying Denmark
3 still completing training in Germany
7 in Norway, where the Norwegian campaign was still being fought (ie at Narvik)

136 divisions were available for the western offensive disposed as follows:

29 1/2 Divisions in Army Group B
45 1/2 Divisions in Army Group A
19 Divisions in Army Group C
42 divisions in general reserve which the Germans could employ as they saw fit.

Also wrong. After subtracting from forces needed elsewhere (North Africa, Italian border etc) the divisions available to the allies on the western front were:

9 Dutch
22 Belgian
10 British
94 French

Total 135

It can thus be seen that it was only with the inclusion of the Dutch, Belgian and British forces that the french even attained numerical parity. Without them they were heavily outnumbered. In the event the heavy losses they suffered in Belgium meant the French were at a hopeless numerical disadvantage.

As we have seen the Germans did have large reserves available.

Wrong. While there were attacks from the west as well, the line was breached by the German 1st Army in Operation Tiger on Jun 14th-16th. 1st Army was part of Army Group C and its attack was from the east not west. It took them only 2 days to penetrate the line.

This is wishful thinking. From Jun 5th onwards, the panzers were rampaging across France, it seems a little odd to be counting this period as an opportunity for France.

But really this is academic, your position is one where you see the war as a chessboard in which you can make an ideal move free of constraints. The historical commanders just werent free to make decisions like just breakout and abandon one ally to its fate and leave the flanks of another hanging in the air. There were constraints both political and military that they had to abide by. They werent free to just write off Belgium. Nor did they have your advantage of hindsight, they didnt have the clarity of understanding of their predicament on May 15th that we do 63 years later.

58

Since we’re on the subject, can anyone recommend a book that deals with the allied invasion of Europe from a general’s point of view but in a “For Dummies” style? I’d like to see maps and get an understanding of exactly how many and what types of forces they believed they needed and what their thinking was strategically. Thanks.

59

James F. DFunnigan and Albert A. Nofi, in their book Dirty little Secrets of WWII mention a few of the most prominent ones. In addition to Coco “Nazi whore” Chanel, they include Maurice Chevalier, Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre. And although they don’t menion them Communist sympathizers were active collaborators until June 22 1941 (when Germany invaded the USSR), since up to that point the USSR and Germany were allied.

Other points worth mentioning : The chaos among French forces after May 10 can be in part attributed to the fact that the French relied heavily on land communications (i.e. phone lines) and that radios were rare among the forces.

Someone also mentioned that the French had better tanks than the Germans. Not quite true. Yes, French tanks had decent armor and guns. However their main drawback was their turrets. The tank commander had to fight the tank, load and point the gun and if he was in charge of several tanks, he had to coordinate their action also. About the only thing he didn’t have to do was standing on his head, while chewing crackers and whistling La Marseillaise.

60

KidCharlemagne is right about communications.,the French were wary of radio communications (they were afraid of security leaks).anyway, since the war would be fought in trenches, land lines were best (n’est ce pas)!
But really, communications in the whole French Army were poor-General Gamelin commuincated with his generals by courier dispatch riders! Gamelin was replaced by Gen. Weygend (no spring chicken either). How come the French preferred older generals? I wouldn’t have anybody older than 55 if I were facing a German invasion!