So, I’ve seen people on the SDMB complain at various times about security measures that seem to only serve the useful purpose of making people feel more secure (notably at airports). Reading online, I’ve noticed that folks seem to have similar problems with things like contingency plans in airliners for water landings when it seems doubtful that a wide-body airliner can survive a water landing (actually, does anyone know if one can? Like, have they tested this?).
So, the question I have is, assuming that the existing safeguards are adequate (ie: would-be terrorist hijackers are detected and arrested by the police before they can carry out their plans, airliners and their crews are reliable enough that they very rarely ever find themselves plunging into the sea, etc.), is there anything particularly WRONG with a feel-good safety measure?
I figured IMHO is a good place for this post, if it gets too heated, I guess the Mods can feel free to move it to GD (I mean, it’s not like I can STOP them from doing that if they choose…)
Specifically the “security theater” ones:
Money - These people/devices/processes cost money, much of it paid for by an industry where running close to bankruptcy is the norm. This money could be spent on more effective measures, or on improving the standard of living around the world (the only thing which will ever really get rid of terrorism, IMHO). The time spent in dealing with this useless stuff increases travel times, which has a direct impact on the effectiveness of business travel.
Rights - Many of these process are degrading (every woman traveller I know has complained about the “pat-downs.”) They’re discriminatory (try boarding a plane with the name “Mohommad.”) They’re poorly implemented: how many congressmen, grandmothers, and babies have been denied travel because of the “foolproof” no-fly lists? They’re very often an excuse for a continual erosion of basic freedoms (like the freedom to travel without having to constantly show your “papers.”) There doesn’t appear to be any accountability or grievance process - if you’re on the no-fly list, or selected for screening on every flight, or want to travel with a group of arabs – you’re screwed, and there’s nothing you can do about it. Hope you like car travel.
Mostly, though: they don’t work. How “doesn’t work” can’t be an effective argument against doing something escapes me.
For me it’s the distict impression that “feel good measures” are a direct result of the following logic:
a) The terrorists hate us for __________ and want to hurt us.
b) Something must be done!
c) We’re doing something.
QED: Profit! (or Success!)
Which doesn’t really add up but very few people do the math themselves.
Yes.
One reason is cost. Those so-called ‘security measures’ cost money. If you’re spending money, spend money on effective safety measures.
Cost aside, why should it be OK to inconvenience thousands of people without a reason? You’re going to tell thousands of people they can’t bring a drink on a 6 hour flight for no purpose?? People without boarding passes can’t approach the gates why?
And in some circumstances, innocent people actually end up suffering. People who pose no threat get shot on the tarmac. Canadian citizens who are simply changing planes at a US airport to get deported to Syria.
The ‘feel-good’ measures actually end up feeling pretty bad.
The problem I have with many feel-good measures (aside from the fact that their intellectually dishonest, which offends my sensibilities) is that many of them are counterproductive and incite needless debate. [thread=382670]Gun buy-back programs[/thread] are a perfect example: it’s a photo-op for politicians to claim that they’re “getting guns off the streets” and “reducing crime” while wasting tax dollars and doing essentially nothing to reduce possession of firearms by criminals and breaking the chain of evidence so that even if a firearm is found to have been used in a crime it can’t be legitimately traced back to the perpetrator.
If you want “feel-good”, go see one of those creepy, stalker-esque Tom Hanks/Meg Ryan movies. Don’t waste time and tax dollars with nonsensical policies and restrictions that accomplish nothing of value.
Stranger
Here’s how I’d approach the general topic. First, I don’t think that feel-good measures are a bad thing by definition. That is, I allow for the possibility that a feel-good measure could be a good thing. Then, weigh the costs and benefits. **TimeWinder ** gave some good examples of costs re: air travel.
On the other hand, what if the general public only accepted air travel after 9/11 because they saw tangible evidence of security feel good measures? To some extent this should be factored in as a possible benefit–consider the alternate universe where people just wouldn’t get back on the planes, the airline industry takes an even bigger hit, and business travel gets completely re-engineered and involves private planes. Or consider another alternate universe where the government didn’t put universal feel-good measures in place, but we had a lot more “vigilante” security measures by fellow passengers.
None of this is to dispute that some of the specific feel-good measures regarding air travel may have not been cost-effective. It’s also possible for a specific feel-good measure to run counter to ethical or moral principles. That would be for the courts to decide.
Moving away from government to business, consider some of Disney’s feel good measures. The simple fact is when the lines are long at a theme park means you are getting less for your money. So Disney has become expert at managing the wait experience with feel-good measures that don’t actually solve the problem–specific milestones, decorations, character visits, etc. As a for-profit business, surely they do this because it is cost-effective for them.
To sum up, feel-good measures, like other measures, need to be considered on their own merits against the alternatives.
Harriet makes a good point about weighing costs and benefits. With respect to feel-good security measures, though, the presumed benefit of “feeling good” may actually be a substantial cost. If people assume that they are secure when they are actually not, it can leave a much bigger security hole, simply because people aren’t being vigilant, or are being vigilant in a foolish or misguided way.