In a closed system, the amount of energy remains constant. The universe is a closed system, therefore the energy in the universe remains constant. The universe can, therefore, have perpetual motion.
“Perpetual motion machines” as we commonly think of them don’t exist because you can never totally isolate the system. Some energy always escapes the system, due to friction, heat energy released, bonds between particles breaking and releasing energy out of the system, etc. The universe itself cannot lose energy, for where would it go? The universe is the ultimate closed system, it never loses energy, its energy only changes form. One moment it’s holding together the particles in a hydrogen atom, the next moment it’s in the form of intense heat warming the Earth or destroying the city of Hiroshima.
Not so for me, even though I did have the external conditioning when I was growing up. But my “experience” was internal.
from Virgowitch:
I agree with almost everything that you said in your last paragraph except for what I quoted. My epiphany was very not-religious sect specific. If fact, it was this experience that allowed me to be more open to other religious faiths.
JustPlainBryan, you’re just not getting it. A “god” with no attributes other than existence couldn’t affect anyone, regardless of whether they wanted it to or not. Nobody could “choose” to have it affect them, because it would be incapable of doing so.
The ability to interact with people, the ability to affect them, would be an additional attribute it would have to possess. The “god” supposedly demonstrated in such arguments as Scott Dickerson’s (to which I was specifically responding) has only the attribute of existence. Such arguments do not demonstrate that “god” has the attribute of “being able to interact with people” or the attribute of “affecting people’s lives.” Logically, without that attribute, such a “god” would indeed be irrelevant.
If you speak of a “god” that people can choose to interact with, a “god” that can affect people if they so choose, then you are not talking about the “god” I was talking about. The post I was responding to did not assign the “god” it was referring to either of those attributes. My sole claim is that such a “god” would hardly be a god at all, and would be irrelevant. If your god has any attribute at all other than simply “existence”, then it wasn’t your god I was talking about.
—If God is defined as the Supreme Being, then His existence is necessary by definition.—
Lib, for the sake of further elucidation of this subject:
Is it possible that something (anything) can exist in all possible worlds? How can we know if it is possible or not?
i.e., if we have a statement in the form of X, how can we show that <>X when X is a statement about the existence of a being?
is <>X true for all X (statements in the form of “X exists”)? Only certain beings? Which ones? Why? Is the statement <>X even a valid form?
(Note: if it is a validly formed statement, then <>X doesn’t by any means imply that X->X, as far as I can tell)
From the O proof: “God exists” is a necessarily true proposition (true in all possible worlds) Call it Proposition A.
A=A is another necessarily true proposition: call it Proposition B (if I am mistaken in thinking A=A is necessarily true, then is there another proposition that is necesarily true?).
Proposition X is the greatest of all propositions: none can be greater (it is true in the most number of possible worlds possible: all of them). Is Proposition X really Proposition A, or is it B? Is it both? Is the question itself confused?
I do not believe because I was not “indoctrinated” with scripture while young. When I was old enough to happen across such scripture on my own, logical fallacy of the concept as a whole was obvious.
As I read more, here and there, throughout the years, I did indeed learn that some data presented was, if not certainly, than at least somewhat more likely, the truth. It’s quite possible that a man named Jesus did indeed live around that period of time. (In fact some say perhaps several dozen with that name lived at the time in the same area.)
We now know that it’s possible a natural earthen dam gave way allowing a small inland sea to flood a lower-lying area, which of course would have led to the “flood” references in what later became the Bible.
But the impossibility of the supposed miracles remained. God created all, but he wasn’t himself created, he just ‘is’. God is omnipotent and omniscient but supposedly didn’t know Lucifer was going to rebel, that Eve was going to eat of the fruit, and doesn’t know how his little fight with Satan over the souls of humanity will play out.
And when I ask about such things, I’m told I simply can’t know God’s plan, it’s not FOR us to know, how can I comprehend the infinite?
Just as importantly, the vast majority of the information about this subject- what some literally consider a life-and-death topic- comes from what’s essentially a bound collection of short stories and morality plays that were authored over about 2,200 years. Stories which have been translated, retranslated, redacted, edited, modified, interpreted and reprinted by peoples that also believed in the ideas of chattel and animal sacrifice. Stories which, in an era of oral tradition, were predomiantly NOT “eyewitness” accounts, which to me made such reports little more than weighted rumor.
All of which made it seem an absurdly silly and rather shaky foundation upon which to base one’s entire life, morals and outlook upon.
Yes, but the amount of energy that is available to do work is not constant, but is nearly certain to diminish over time. In fact, if the universe is infinitely old, entropy should be 100%.
With respect to (1), note that the modal ontological proofs are dealing with necessary existence, that is, existence itself. The definition does not particulate God into an attribute of existence, but identifies God as the very fabric of reality.
The phrase “Supreme Being” transliterates directly into modal symbology. “Supreme” = “necessary”. “Being” = “existence”. It does not mean a being that is particulated from the rest of existence. In fact, if there were no existence other than the physical universe, the interpretation of the proofs would necessarily be panentheistic (but not necessarily pantheistic).
Thus, by saying X instead of G, you really have changed nothing if your definition of X is still existence. But if you have defined either X or G as some attribute of existence (a particulate) then you have changed the proof altogether, and in fact have rendered it invalid, since the axiom <>G (or <>X) cannot be induced from the definition.
God, by the definition, exists in every possible world. God, by the conclusion, exists in actuality. But we could not go directly from one to the other by invoking the Modal Axiom like this: G -> G. That would be defining God into existence. We could make pigs fly the same way by defining “fly” to mean “wallow in mud”.
What we had to do was show basically what you’re asking about, namely that G is possible, or <>G. <> can be written as ~~, and is used in the final disjunctive syllogism of Tisthammer’s proof, allowing the Modal Axiom to be applied by modus ponens to deduce G.
I hope that clears that up.
With respect to (2), I don’t follow from the beginning of your questioning. “God exists” (or G) is not necessarily true in every possible world merely from the conclusion. The conclusion is that God exists in actuality. G, the definition, does not state that God exists actually, but that God exists necessarily. Proving that necessary existence exists is quite different from this proof, but can be done.
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*Originally posted by Ramanujan * what i really call into question is the existence of “free will”, that there is some entity that causes my thoughts, that somehow i am that entity, independent of my environment. i suppose you could claim that that’s not the same as intent, but whence comes this intent if not from free will? do you really think it is ridiculous to claim that free will does not exist?
[QUOTE]
Intent can only be formed by sentient beings, or at least that’s my assumption. We don’t disagree there, then. So now you’re arguing against “free will.” Do you believe your actions are predetermined for any given situation based on your hardware, software and input, that we are, in effect, machines?
I guess that’s sad.
Anyway, where are you going for lunch? When you stand at your car with no particular craving and enough money to eat whatever, what factors determine your choice? Your likes and dislikes limit your choices, but ceteris peribus, how does one choose between Chinese buffet and Mexican?
I mentioned the monkey to illustrate the absurdity of infiinite chances resulting in complex life.
And it appears to me that you are refuting yourself here. I chose my word poorly, in that possibility does not cause or create in that it is not taking an action to cause or create. But my central premise remains unchanged, you argued that infinite possibility resulted in complex life. Are you saying that you don’t believe that?
If we follow this line of reasoning, then God indeed does objectively exist because of how it affects so many people right now(which I don’t think is what you meant to say). If God does not objectively exist, then that means that people are choosing to have the concept affect them, regardless of whether this non-existent deity actually interacts with them (which would then bring the “concept of deity” into the subjective realm, which where I’ve claimed it should be all along).
Maybe for your deity.
Bolding mine. This is exactly why I think you’re not getting it. Your trying to understand deity logically, and you’re winding up at a dead end. Deity is a subjective concept, not an objective one. You’re trying to apply logic to a subjective idea.
Nope, we’re still talking about the same deity. Or maybe we’re not, since our worldviews are completely different.
You’re sole claim is only valid for yourself. My claims are valid for only myself as well.
when i asked where intent comes from, i meant within the beings that form it. do they have a sentient being inside them, perhaps, that gives them intent? do neurons have intent?
i see no way around that, in a physical universe. when i was younger, i reasoned thusly: when i make a decision, it is either 100% random, or i make it based on values and beliefs that i hold. where do these values and beliefs come from? partly from other decisions, partly from the environment, but at no point can i say “they come from me”, without arriving back where i started. so there is nothing about my will that can be said to be free.
not if we recognize machines’ capacity to be human.
i suppose it is completely random. if it’s not based on my likes and dislikes, what else can it be based on?
and i remain unconvinced that it’s completely absurd.
my point wasn’t to ‘prove’ that life is a necessary result of the infinite. just that, given infinitely many opportunities, the chances are much greater than many people consider.
Yes’m. Most of which cannot be properly dated to within a few thousand years, and since the majority of primitive man lived by sources of water out of necessity, “flood” stories will naturally predominate.
—With respect to (1), note that the modal ontological proofs are dealing with necessary existence, that is, existence itself.—
I don’t understand this statement entirely. Can you explain the concept of “existence itself” a little more, perhaps more specifically (actual existence, all possible existences) in light of the idea that defining something as having necessary existence does not imply actual existence?
And what defines the set of all possible worlds? What places constraints on what possible worlds there can be?
Wait: doesn’t Supreme translate more specifically into “existing in the most number of possible worlds.” Shouldn’t we add “, that it’s possible for something to exist in” to the end of that? And why is it possible for any being to exist in all of them?
—God, by the definition, exists in every possible world.—
Yes… but is that possible?
<>G in the proof seems to really be <>G, not any conventional <>G. If it weren’t, it wouldn’t be the same G as in G->G and the inter-substitutions wouldn’t be valid. So <>G isn’t something proven, it’s assumed.
Necessary existence does imply actual existence. In fact, that’s the so-called Modal Axiom, A -> A. (Actually, it’s the T Axiom of S5 modal logic, but most everybody calls it the Modal Axiom.)
But as you carefully worded it, defining A as necessary existence does not mean that A exists in actuality. If must first be determined that A does indeed exist necessarily. Note that in Tisthammer’s version of the proof, the Modal Axiom is stated in inference number 4: G -> G. By inference number 9, he has deduced: G. The conclusion then is G by Modus Ponens of 4 and 9.
The set of all possible worlds is the set of all worlds that have at least one true statement.
Truth, I guess. A world without any true statements is not a possible world.
Well, the greatest possible existence is necessary existence, since necessary existence exists in all possible worlds. That was what originally caught the fancy of Hartshorne — the similarity between necessary existence and Anselm of Canterbury’s description of God in his original ontological proof as “a being than which nothing greater can be conceived”.
Adding anything to the notion of existence in every possible world is Ockhamly trivial, since there is no greater scope of existence beyond that. It would be like adding information to a tautology: The yellow cat is yellow … and not black.
Being and existence are synonyms. Whatever exists in all possible worlds is being in them. As I explained before, G is not a particulate of existence, but existence itself.
You’ve lost me there. There is no “G -> G”. That would be a pretty shaky assertion.
<>G in the proof does not mean <>G, either. It means simply that it is possible that God exists in actuality. The assertion might seem trivial at first blush, but it is important to state it because it is already implied in ~<>G, a substantive denial of the positive ontological proposition (<>G). ~~G is not the same as <>G. It is the same as <>G.
“…Nice dodge Describe a god with no ‘mutually-negating descriptors’ and you aren’t left with anything people commonly call a ‘god.’ Even lib knew, when he was trumpeting basically this argument last year, that at best this purports to show an impersonal pantheistic god existing. If that god is to do anything, it has to have more attributes than simply existence…your ‘why’ leaves it in doubt whether anybody could actually call the product of your reasoning a ‘god.’ …”
What leads you to the conclusion that a god with no “mutually-negating descriptors” has no more attributes other than “simply existence”?
I did state further attributes in my chain of reasoning when I said that “if the entity I reference by the term ‘God’ exists in any part of Reality, it exists in every part of Reality.” That’s (necessary) omnipresence, not simple existence.
I’ll concede that I forgot to make clear that what I mean by the term “God” is an entity so close to the traditional western concept of the Judeo-Christian-Islamic deity that the difference isn’t worth the time. I maintain that this entity lacks mutually-negating descriptors, and thus is POSSIBLE, and thus is PROBABLE, and thus is ACTUAL-- for the reasons stated.
Though this sounds like pure Anselmianism–it isn’t.
Incidentally, you may have me confused with someone else–I don’t drive a Dodge.
