Let’s keep our eyes on the point here, which I take to be this: Is it self-evidently the case that any form of reparations for African-Americans would be either unjust or unworkable? That’s the only position I’m questioning the wisdom of.
The questions you raise are essentially about the standard of proof if the model of reparations that were enacted involved some individual fact-finding. Should it be enough to show that your father bought a contract home in Lawndale, or enough just to show that he lived in Lawndale, or enough just to show that he did not own a home but had a middle class job, etc. Similarly, is it enough to show that wealth was improperly taken from or denied a recent ancestor, or do you need to provide some evidence that you would have inherited it. Is second-hand testimony about what happened admissible at all? Sufficient?
Those are all, of course, legitimate and difficult questions–as is the question of whether evidence should be required at all. What you haven’t persuaded me of is that they are obviously not even worthy of formal study because it is so self-evident that no scheme of reparations would ever be workable enough to be worth doing. Maybe a formal study would conclude that the only workable version of reparations would be payments for people like the guy featured in Coates’ article. Would that result be so bad? It wouldn’t be worth $5 million?
Moreover, what is the standard against which we are judging reparations for their efficiency at compensating real injury? In my view, requiring that reparations be more successful at identifying the truly injured and compensating them the appropriate amount than, say, our system of adjudicating small claims, is asking too much. And anyone whose ever been to small claims court knows what rough justice that is. Indeed, if we just gave every self-identifying African-American $20,000, I think you’d end up with a lot of people who get less than what they would have today in the absence of white supremacy, and a smaller number who get more than they would have had otherwise. That sounds like rough justice to me.
The discussion is about reparations for the injuries imposed upon African-Americans by American white supremacy. So the time period is coextensive with that history, beginning with the birth of the nation. (And, let’s be clear, Ta-Nehisi Coates is talking about payments made by the government. He is not talking about descendants of slave-owners paying, except indirectly through taxes or risk of inflation just like everyone else.)
What about everyone else who has been historically subjected to discrimination? Well, the notion is that no one else (save Native Americans) has been so thoroughly oppressed and deliberately impoverished for so long. If you think it is false that African-Americans have been uniquely injured by America, then I would expect you to argue that the Irish or Mexicans, or whomever you have in mind, have as much claim to recompense. But I think you’ll have a pretty difficult time making that argument.
Alternatively, if you think that the severity of the overall injury is an inappropriate distinguishing criterion, then I would expect you to make an argument about why it is inappropriate. But I don’t find it at all persuasive to argue that other people have been injured and not received compensation. Of course that is true. So what? Is it more important to provide some justice for the most extreme case, or ensure that everyone equally receives no justice?
Surely some justice is better than no justice. Perhaps you think that the alternative is something other than no justice–that we could spend a trillion dollars on fixing the public schools as a way to compensate the millions of Americans whose current circumstances were partly determined by past outrages. To that I say: great! Let’s add that as one possible form that reparations could take.