Based on the WWII history statistics of casualties, it seems like the Japanese lost far more than they killed when facing the UC forces.
For example at the Battle of Saipan, the US had 3000 KIA. But the Japanese forces lost 24,000 KIA (and 5,000 suicides).
Since the Japanese forces had time to entrench themselves, you would think that they would inflict HIGHER casualties upon the attackers. But their low kill to the death ratio seems present on every conflict between the US and the Imperial Japanese forces.
Were the Japanese simply bad fighters? Were their tactics based on fighting other Asian countries, and didn’t translate well against fighting Western forces?
No cite, but I remember reading somewhere that the Japanese were very badly armed. In a few cases, they were equipped with rifles that were supposedly taller than some of the soldiers, but more broadly, the Gen. Staff had not done a great job of equipping them with mission-appropriate, modern hand weapons.
Hoping some gear guru will have a much more detailed knowledge of whether my above vagaries are borne out.
I think a better comparison is the number of casualties altogether, as the American forces were more willing to take a wounded man out of action, while the perversion of the bushido code that Imperial forces were operating under required soldiers to fight until death.
Total casualties for the Marines and soldiers who fought on Saipan amounted to 786 officers and 13,438 enlisted men killed, wounded or missing in action. That is closer to parity.
The US (especially late war) did not skimp on firepower on the battlefield. Only Germany surpassed the US in the number of machine guns per unit, for example, but it is my impression that the industrial power of the US allowed it to equip it’s army with more mortars, machine guns, flame throwers, bazooka’s, and the like, than most every other army on a per-unit basis (especially compared to the Japanese, who favored light weight manueverability and bushido esprit-de-corps to get the job done).
Add in the oodles of supply, artillery, airpower, naval gunfire support, and such, all gathered at the point of attack (when the Allies had the initiative), the Japanese could not match the firepower of the Americans on those battlefields. But they still didn’t make it easy…
The suicides number might be misleading. Maybe 5k were good, old-fashioned suicides, but there were also lots of suicidal practices employed such as charging into enemy positions with no expectation of living beyond the next 30 seconds.
Also, the naval and aerial bombardments must have taken a toll on the defenders.
The Japanese never went through WWI like the Western powers did. Their army was essentially a 1916 army. Against the poorly disciplined Chinese, this worked out OK, although even then when faced with determined resistance from the German trained and equipped Chinese units, it didn’t work out so well. It also worked out OK in the jungle, at first.
Against well trained Russians or Americans equipped with modern tanks and aircraft, not so much.
Saddam Hussein’s army was also a fairly well equipped, experienced (from the war with Iran) World War I force. They never fair well against modern armies.
You’ve also got to consider that when the US assaulted an island, they were facing troops that were cut off, out of food, ammo, medical equipment, fuel, and hope. So US forces could stand off and blow the snot out of the entrenchments and only move in to mop up. The defenders might have elaborate entrenchments prepared, but only a few functioning weapons and soldiers who could barely walk due to starvation and disease.
It seems like the Japanese were fatalistic to the point that they harmed their own war effort. In many battles, they were so eager not to dishonor themselves that they’d attack at bad moments and get slaughtered by Americans who were more interested in killing the enemy than honor. A particularly zealous officer might hold out in a position rather than perform a tactical retreat out of a fear of cowardice. So the position would get flanked. Then the US troops could annihilate the Japanese with fewer casualties of their own. If the IJA officer had done the tactically sound retreat, he’d been able to infilct greater losses on the enemy in the long run. Despair and hopelessness contributed to this. For many, the idea of dying gloriously quickly was much preferred to being roasted by a flamethrower while cowering in a cave .
From the linked article:
"Staff officers on Okinawa felt that their headquarters had abandoned them and that, eventually, they would be overwhelmed and destroyed by the Americans. They expected the Americans to land six to ten divisions against the Japanese garrison of two and a half divisions. The staff calculated that superior quality and numbers of weapons gave each U.S. division five or six times the firepower of a Japanese division. This meant that U.S. firepower on the ground would be twelve times Japanese firepower or more. To this would be added the Americans’ abundant naval and air firepower. Understandably, January 1945 was a time of dark thoughts and sullen inaction for the 32d Army Staff.22
To alleviate this mood, Operations Officer Yahara prepared a pamphlet titled “The Road to Certain Victory” in which he argued that, through the use of fortifications, 32d Army could defeat the Americans’ superior numbers and technology. Building and using tunnels, what he called “sleeping tactics,” was the method he recommended as suitable and capable of success. Chief of Staff Cho deleted the few lines that were pessimistic and then had the pamphlet printed and distributed. The pamphlet’s purpose was to get the troops and officers stirred up enough to work on their fortifications, which they now did in an environment of renewed optimism.23
Work on the caves now began with great vigor. “Confidence in victory will be born from strong fortifications” was the soldiers’ slogan. The caves meant personal shelter from the fierce bombardments that were sure to come, and they also offered a shimmering hope of victory. The combination was irresistible, and units began to work passionately on their own caves. Moreover, after frequent relocation, the units were finally in the positions where they would remain until the Americans landed. The 62d Division and the 24th Division would be in their final positions 100 days and the 44th IMB 50 days before L day.24"
I always have an image in my mind of Stalin calling up Roosevelt: “Hey Frank, you know those 25 Japanese divisions still stationed in Manchuria? Yeah, I went ahead and took care of that for ya.”
Another minor factor to keep in mind is that the Japanese didn’t always stay as entrenched as they should have. In E. B. Sledge’s memoir With the Old Breed: At Peleliu and Okinawa, he talks about how often Japanese soldiers would leave their trenches at night to try to sneak up on the Marines. As the Marines were staying in their trenches and supposed to have guards (though one fell asleep in an especially tragic episode that Sledge writes about) the Japanese leaving their own trenches would often be killed. I doubt it made a huge difference in the number of casualties, but it does illustrate a different attitude about being “entrenched.”
This is pretty much what was thought by many in early February 1945 about Iwo Jima. The invasion began on 19 Feb, after extensive bombing and naval bombardment. It took more than a month to move 3 miles and extinguish the last serious resistance. It wasn’t until 7 May that the last defenders were dislodged from their tunnels.
To “mop up” a small island cost 7000 dead and 17,000 wounded; the Japanese lost 21,000 (almost all of whom preferred death to surrender).
On what islands was Japanese resistance easily and quickly overcome?
Kiska Island (part of the Aleutians) was invaded on August 15, 1943, and the US lost over a hundred men, all to friendly fire and operational accidents (and one stray Japanese naval mine). The Japanese had evacuated two weeks prior to the invasion. Operation Cottage - Wikipedia
Tarawa, fiercely defended by 4500 Japanese Marines, lasted only three days (qualifying as “quick” in the grand scheme of things), but neither side would call it “easy”. Battle of Tarawa - Wikipedia
The extent to which the Japanese soldiers ended up stuck with nothing to eat shouldn’t be underestimated. Fires on the Plain is a novel based on the author’s experiences eating the dead in the Phillippines.
In many cases, the US didn’t even bother to mop up. They’d just bomb the hell out of an island and move on, leaving its defenders to starve. An enemy force trapped on an island with no air resources and no way to get off is as good as dead anyway, so the only reason to waste your time on them is if you need the island for your own purposes.
But no one wanted to be the one to have to tell Stalin that he couldn’t do whatever he wanted. So, Stalin might have tried phoning a dead FDR to taunt him…
I probably quote John Keegan too often on the Dope, but he’s got a pretty apt one for this topic. I found it pretty quickly in my copy of The Second World War.
That’s a pretty clear summary.
edit: note the lopsided kill ratio at Guadalcanal: roughly 22:1!