Alright, I see I haven’t been entirely clear.
The comment I made about not wanting certain genetic material passed on is (as I see it) at best a secondary, “while we’re at it” point. I do not have evidence that [insert bad criminal characteristic here] is genetically inherited. I don’t know one way or the other; to my mind, it doesn’t make any difference. I raised the point more to deflect anticipated responses along the lines of, “But that would involve preventing certain genetic material from being passed on, and that’s a bad thing!!”, which as it turns out no one has raised. My reason for thinking sterilization an appropriate part of punishment for certain actions is NOT eugenic, NOR is it because I think it would function as a deterrent. The reason it seems like a good idea to me is strictly because it would prevent children being born to people who have given pretty strong evidence through their actions that they are unlikely at best to refrain from causing serious harm to their children, whether deliberately or merely through lapses in judgment. I can give an argument for my position that doesn’t depend on any views about genetics, mistaken or otherwise. While I think it’s indeterminate, at this point, what if any role genetics plays in behavior, how about we stipulate for the purpose of discussion that we have absolute, uncontrovertible, certain proof that behavior is NOT genetically determined, from which it follows that preventing certain genetic material from being passed on is neither good nor bad?
Most of you think that procreation is a right and not a privilege, I gather. I’ll go on the record as saying I disagree, very strongly, but my argument doesn’t depend on procreation being a privilege. Let’s assume that procreation IS a right; here’s the argument I offer.
I accept the following principle:
§ if A’s exercising his right to X in circumstances C would cause undeserved grevious harm to B, then A does not have the right to X in circumstances C.
For example, I think that we all agree that my right to shoot a gun ends where you begin. This is because while we recognize that I have a right to shoot a gun, my doing so in the appropriate relation to you will cause you undeserved grevious harm. You may not agree that this is a good example of §. If that’s the case, please recognize that my argument depends on §, not on this example, so objections of the form “but you don’t have a right to shoot a gun anyway” or the like would be missing the point.
My initial argument, then, is as follows:
[ul]1) § (premise)
2) A’s exercising his right to X in circumstances C will result in grevious undeserved harm to B. (premise)
3) A does not have the right to X in circumstances C.[/ul]
This argument is valid, by modus ponens: if 1) and 2) are both true, the truth of 3) follows. Now it may be that you think it’s not sound; that either § or 2) are false. However, if you accept §, then you have to accept 3) for cases where 2) is true.
However, you probably think that this argument doesn’t have any bearing on real life, because we are not omniscient and cannot know for certain what another person will do. I then offer you:
(P)if A’s exercising his right to X in circumstances C is very likely to result in undeserved grevious harm to B, then A does not have the right to X in circumstances C*
The motivation for § also motivates (P*); continuing with my previous example, I don’t have the right to shoot a gun into the woods between our backyards because doing so is likely to cause you undeserved grevious harm.
[ul]1) (P*) (premise)
2) A’s exercising his right to X in circumstances C is very likely to result in undeserved grevious harm to B. (premise)
3) A does not have the right to X in circumstances C[/ul]
I think if you accept the first argument, then you would accept this one. That is, I don’t think anyone would accept § but not (P*), but that is the only relevant difference. However, you might still object that we can, at best, have good reason to believe that 2) is true, and that this is not enough for the second argument to apply. Therefore, consider:
(P) if we have very good reason to believe that A’s exercising his right to X in circumstances C is very likely to result in undeserved grevious harm to B, then we should prevent A from X’ing.**
[ul]1) (P**) (premise)
2) We have very good reason to believe that A’s exercising his right to X in circumstances C is very likely to result in undeserved grevious harm to B. (premise)
3) We should prevent A from X’ing (1,2)[/ul]
Again, my dear friend modus ponens. I think (P**) captures our epistemic situation more accurately than either (P*) or §, but I think the same reasons one would have for accepting § or (P*) would also suffice for accepting (P**). The only objection I can think of to (P**) that won’t also apply to (P*) and § is something along the lines of: we’ll never have a good enoughreason to believe that it’s likely enough that… which is not so much an objection to the truth of (P**) as it is a claim that (P**) would never apply in real life. What I’m curious to see, though, is what reason someone would have for denying the truth of (P**), (P*), or §.