Two contradictory sets of general election polls today. Quinnipiac has all Republicans but Trump beating Clinton fairly soundly, and NBC/WSJ has Clinton beating all Republicans but Carson.
They are even contradictory on Clinton vs. Sanders’ electability. Quinnipiac has Clinton doing a little better against Republicans, NBC/WSJ has Sanders doing a little better.
The one thing both pollsters agree on is that Ben Carson is the most electable Republican. Carson’s RCP lead over Clinton is +5.2.
Re the NBC/WSJ and Q-polls, the most salient factor is when these polls were taken. The third Republican debate was on the evening of 10/28, and the NBC/WSJ poll was in the field from 10/25 through 10/29, according to RCP, while the Q-poll was out there from 10/29 to 11/2. So far, it’s the only true post-debate #3 poll.
It has Trump 24%, Carson 23%, Rubio 14%, Cruz 13%, Jeb 4%, Fiorina, Kasich, Christie 3% each, Paul 2%, and Huckabee and Santorum at 1% each, with everyone else at zero, or close enough to be rounded down.
As always, I’m anxious to see confirmation from other pollsters of what the post-deba[del]cle[/del]te looks like, since sampling error is a real thing. But if the Q-poll is on target, both Rubio and Cruz got a pretty good bump from the third debate (this was the best result for each of them since Trump started polling in double digits back in June), Trump held his own, Carson took a slight hit, Jeb and Carly continued their tailspins, and the also-rans continued to be also-rans.
Hmmm…how do I take the lunch money of the folks who apparently think Trump or Sanders will be President?
I almost agree with the first part but not the second. Hillary is far ahead in the polls over Sanders, once you get past New Hampshire (which she’ll probably win), I’m not seeing a path for Sanders for the nomination. O’Malley is a non-factor, so it’s a two horse race with one horse far in front and nothing to suggest it might change.
Trump is more likely a nominee than Sanders. Trump will connect on some punches against Carson and the more people look at Carson, the more they will realize there is nothing there.
Those seem like sure things to me, to the point where I was prepared to bet a thousand on each. I googled the site to be sure I would get my money if I won. And found out that my state (WA) isn’t allowed to participate.
Maybe. The problem with playing those kinds of odds is that you win 8 out of ten times and still lose money. You have to be confident that you’re 99% right on those “sure bets”, because being wrong once cancels out being right 7 or 8 times.
I think Sanders’ chance at IA is very low (10% or so), and his chance at NH is about 50-50. Combination of polling and gut-feel. I don’t think Sanders will go hard negative, which is what it would take to have a chance (and probably not even then).
Okay, you have a bet offering 4:1 odds that you think you have a 40% of winning. Applying the Kelly Criterion to this we find that you should bet 25% of your bankroll on this.
Betting too high is punished more severely than betting too low when Kelly betting so conservative bettors sometimes bet half the Kelly bet, or 12.5% of bankroll in this case.
Even more conservative bettors put a 2.5% ceiling on Kelly bets, but in any case this is bet with a huge positive expectation for you.
Of course if your bankroll is $0 then the Kelly bet is academic.
The Iowa caucuses only became a thing in 1976, when Jimmy Carter used Iowa as his springboard.
From 1976 to the present, there have been ten instances where one candidate won both IA and NH. That’s a pretty small sample space to characterize in “no one has ever” terms.
But wait, it gets worse. Five of those 10 instances were incumbents who faced no significant opposition (Dems 1996, 2012; GOP 1984, 1992, 2004.) That Clinton, Obama, Reagan, GHWB, and GWB, running for re-election, won both IA and NH, and didn’t go on to lose the nomination, means nothing. They faced trivial (or no) opposition.
So your sample space is down to five cases. And two of those were incumbent Presidents running for re-election but facing significant opposition (Ford 1976, Carter 1980) or incumbent veeps running for the nomination (Gore 2000) who all went into their nomination contests with a bit of an edge to begin with. These cases may have some applicability, but they don’t mean as much as when the candidate wins IA and NH absent that sort of advantage (Carter 1976, Kerry 2004) which is the situation Bernie would be in.
So your sample space is two cases that are directly on point, and another three cases that are sorta on point. A pattern defined by those cases is worth keeping an eye on, but isn’t an immutable law. And in the unlikely event that Bernie wins IA and NH, I’ll cheerfully put serious money on 2016 being the cycle that breaks the pattern.
Thus my judging that Sanders had a 60% chance of winning when he was likely to win both.
No, I realize it’s not a sure thing, nor should it be, but every candidate gets a bounce from an early primary win. Since Sanders is already favored to win NH, if he wins IA, he almost certainly wins NH, and then how much of a bounce does he get for SC and NV?
