Will the Iran standoff lead to a new Cold War?

From “Kennan’s Comeback,” by James Pinkerton, in Tech Central, 2/22/06 – http://www.newamerica.net/index.cfm?pg=article&DocID=2896:

Is this outcome probable?

Quite possibly; it may even be a Republican goal, to create a new bogeyman when people weary of terrorism being waved in their faces.

I’m not sure what’s in it for Iran’s “friends” in that scenario.

Oil.

I’m not sure that’s enough to explain all the bellicosity and risk involved. Doesn’t Russia have a fair amount of oil on its own?

In the end, I don’t think China is going to want to lose the US as a market for its goods, so I doubt it would position itself on the opposite side of a Cold War. Pakistan has problems with Islamic militants that make me doubt it would ally itself with Iran. Russia? Who knows. Ultimately, I think those countries would be taking a very lonely position, and oil alone probably wouldn’t make it desireable.

Yes, but it needs money.

Then “oil” isn’t the answer to that part of the question (although I see where that’s all going). Like I said, I just I don’t see those countries - especially China - following a path that will alienate so many other nations.

It doesn’t seem to bother America; it might not bother them as well.

But we have not yet alienated a major trading partner.

Very few countries supported the Iraq war, but in almost all cases, the leadership of those countries didn’t care enough about Saddam to say or do anything about it. Supporting Iran would be a much more divisive move.

This is ridiculous. All these armchair politicos see everywhere they look are great big phantom alliances springing up all over the place. India would never be in a serious diplomatic or military “alliance” with Pakistan. Any alliance that included Pakistan and China would almost by definition be to the detriment of India since it is not in either China or Pakistan’s interest to increase India’s share of global influence or military power in any way.

Pakistan isn’t likely to enter into an alliance with Russia because it hasn’t had much of a relationship with it before. Pakistan’s military primarily buys its weaponry from the US, Western Europe, or China - unlike India which has had a long relationship with Russia and buys a good deal of Russian arms and ships. Further, the de facto reason for Pakistan’s military to even exist is to either defend from/attack India. Pakistan is a regional power only, in much the same way (albeit with a far larger population) as South Korea is, since its military is primarily purposed for defending against a North Korean attack.

While Russia and China have a long-standing relationship, both diplomatically and commercially, Russia would squarely be on the losing end of any broad alliance with China whose goal was to directly confront the US. Any Chinese victory in a serious military confrontation would immediately result in Russia losing further sway over its central Asian satellites, as they looked to China for leadership and protection. Further, Russia also heavily depends on its trade links with Western Europe and is certainly aware of the precarious position of its enclave in Kaliningrad. Russia might be willing to team up with China diplomatically, as it has in the past with all the friendship treaties they’ve signed, but Russia’s position economically and geo-politically is not strong enough to weather a sustained anti-US, anti-Western Europe diplomatic and military stance.

Well, if you’ll read the whole article, Pinkerton is drawing a parallel between the current situation and that at the end of WWII – when we had just defeated one enemy but a new potential enemy loomed on the horizon. At that time, there were three schools of thought: “Conciliators,” such as Henry Wallace, who wanted friendly relations with the Soviet Union; “Rollbackers” such as James Burnham, who wanted to fight the Soviets; and “Containers” such as George F. Kennan, whose thinking was the basis of U.S. strategy in the ensuing Cold War: Don’t fight them directly, just maneuver and block and outspend them. Which ultimately succeeded. WRT Iran, Pinkerton is comparing modern neocons to the “rollbackers” – and I think we can imagine how a total war with Iran would turn out (Iraq multiplied several times, in cost and body count); and arguing that a “containment” strategy would be most effective in the long run.