X: He is a clear and present danger because he is the only arab leader who publicly call for the destruction of America and its people
Cite? When did Saddam Hussein “publicly call for the destruction” of the US (except when we were at war with Iraq)?
there is enuf justification found after the fact with the brutality, conventional weapons arsenal, documentation of weapons programs and plans to twart UN inspections, the issue of WMD, which may not be minor, is not the totality for justification to go to war.
Well, they told us that it was the major justification, that the danger from Iraqi WMD’s was so great and so imminent that we could not afford to wait any longer, or to complete UN inspections, before invading. If what they really meant was “Saddam Hussein is a bad guy and there are lots of good reasons to get rid of him even if he doesn’t pose a desperate imminent threat”, then that’s what they should have said, and we would have considered the case for war based on that.
He challenges the UN authority with every turn and even small defiances are considered great moral victories. He blows himself up greater and greater up to the point where a challenge is set and the one who blinks loses.
Sorry, but this sounds to me like incoherent boogeymanning. Exactly what is it you are claiming that Hussein was undertaking against the US and/or the rest of the world? Exactly what were the specific dangers that these undertakings posed? What was the assessment of those dangers based on?
Invading other countries because you think that not invading them means in some vague way that you’re “blinking” and therefore you “lose” is not grown-ups’ foreign policy. When you start a war, you have to know specifically what it is you’re trying to accomplish or prevent, and how you’re going to go about it, and what the likelihood of the various possible outcomes will be, and how you would handle them in each case. I am seeing very little evidence that we really had a realistic, clear and workable strategy for any part of this beyond the nuts-and-bolts combat and conquest operations.
They followed intelligence information they believed were reliable.
It’s by no means clear yet whether they really believed it. Certainly, as others have pointed out, even at the time there was well-publicized criticism of the quality of the information. The Administration seems simply to have ignored or downplayed whatever didn’t support their goal of going to war with Iraq.
It would be incompetent and highly irresposponsible NOT to act when there might be a chance of impending danger.
But your action has to be appropriate to the level of the threat. You can’t take any aggressive action you feel like just because you think that there “might be a chance of impending danger”. And you have to make sure that your action doesn’t just move you out of the frying-pan into the fire by exposing you to other dangers that are even harder to avert.
Chaos may have its own dangers, but is far less that organized violence.
The thing is, though, Saddam Hussein’s regime wasn’t carrying out any “organized violence” against us. I have no doubt he would have liked to, but so far there is no convincing evidence—and there wasn’t any convincing evidence at the time—that he was getting anywhere with it.
I fear that too many people, looking for some kind of single face to put on the enemy (since we haven’t yet managed to find Bin Laden), have seized on the idea of Saddam Hussein as sort of the root of all evil. He was opposed to us, he was bad, he wanted bad weapons, he didn’t cooperate with the UN—we must be safer now that he’s deposed, right? This sounds to me more like a clutching at psychological reassurance than a levelheaded weighing of real-life dangers and opportunities. Hussein isn’t some kind of Sauron or Lord Voldemort whose destruction automatically strikes at the heart of all the evil and terror in the world—he’s just a bad guy who ruthlessly exploited power (much of which we helped to give him). There are plenty of other power-exploiting ruthless bad guys out there. We have to ensure that we haven’t made the Iraq/Middle East situation worse for ourselves instead of better, before we can embrace the comfortable conclusion that deposing Saddam was worth it.