Shodan, fascinating point.
For God, I do not kill my child. For my ethical system, I do.
That leads into the point I was going to make, one that’s not original but that bears repeating in this argument.
There are two (and, if you ask me, a half) possibilities when determining the relationship between “good” and “God.” These possibilities all assume that both Goodness and God describe real phenomena.
- God is not by definition good.
- God is, by definition, good.
If God is not by definition good – if Goodness has a value independent of God – then presumably we as humans have a way of evaluating whether a given act is good or not. If that’s the case, then we should refer to our independent means of evaluating good or evil when trying to figure out whether an act is good or not.
If God is by definition good, then the word is meaningless, having essentially the same value in an ethical argument as the word “Vorp,” defined as “What Daniel does.” Who cares whether you’re acting either good or vorp? It’s just a useless word, and we need to come up with a different word to discuss whether an act is ethical, worth doing, etc.
(The one-half a possibility is that there’s a means of judging goodness independent of God, but that in our experience God is so reliably good that trust in him is well-placed. Personally, I don’t think the Biblical account backs up this view)
In either case, I’m not compelled to do what God tells me to do: either I’ll evaluate his request on its goodness, or else calling the act “good” is meaningless. Killing my child is a prima facie evil act; unless this God guy gives me very strong arguments for doing it (and “Trust me” is a lame argument), I’ll refuse.
On the other hand, if my child is an al-Qaeda operative, then I can evaluate the goodness of sacrificing him independently, and I hope I’d come to the conclusion that I must make this sacrifice – that he must make this sacrifice – in order to save other people.
Daniel