I don’t understand this statement at all, in context with the rest of your posts about what is and is not speech. It seems that the arguments you are making against other forms of speech necessarily invalidate sign language as a legitimate form of speech. Can you clear this up for me at all?
No. They are not another kind of speech. They are being treated with libel laws, because they are both speech, AND libel.
Say what? There is no such animal. There is a right not to be murdered, but…
Snotty or no, my summery covers all that can be discerned from your statements.
If I took two small American flags, set them on fire, and then used them to spell out a political message in semaphore, would that consitute speech?
Indeed it was. In case there’s any confusion, I think, Scott, you’re both being rude and are incorrect. (Not to mention that, if you think there’s no right of assembly, you need to reread the first amendment).
Likewise: I’m nitpicking your definition of speech for the very good reason that if the courts adopted it, we’d quickly descend into a morass of trying to define language, choosing whether it referred only to natural language or to natural and artificial language, whether it referred to sign language and if so whether it referred to gestures that were part of sign language but not used by a signer and so forth.
Another example of the difficulties raised by your definition: if ASL has the flipping-the-bird symbol as a word in ASL meaning, basically, “Fuck you!” then I’m sure that you’d agree an ASL person flipping the bird at the guy who cuts him off would be protected speech, right? Similarly, if I’m some annoying schmuck who just likes flipping people off but who is doing it as a rude gesture and not as language, you’d say that a state can legitimately pass a law criminalizing my act, right?
So how do you deal with the schmuck’s lawyer who claims that I was using a recognized word in ASL to express my speech and have a first-amendment right to do so? I guarantee that this situation would arise if we adopt your definition of speech.
My definition leads to no such complications.
Daniel
When I claimed there was no such thing, I meant gross violations, not right too assemble. He seemed to be blaming the massacre on the right to assemble, not the real cause.
Also, you seem to think there is something to what Moto is saying. However, as I see it, my summery, and that of Miller, DMC, and others, seem to come to the same point. He has no idea what he wants. Why defend such a thing?
That doesn’t make any sense, but it may just be that you’re not speaking (excuse me, Mr. Moto–writing) clearly. He suggests that the Boston Massacre was a violation of the right to assemble, not a result of the right to assemble. In other words, it makes no sense to say that he’s blaming it on the right to assemble.
If you think that it wasn’t a violation of the right to assemble, [url=http://www.bostonmassacre.net/academic/essay4.htm]you’re in the minority**. While a person can argue that the assembly wasn’t peaceful (there were snowballs and ice thrown at the soldier), most of the commentary I’m seeing on it disagrees–and certainly at the time it was viewed as a violation of the right to assemble.
HOWEVER, that’s beside the point. Nobody is denying a right to peaceable assembly, at least not in this thread. The question really seems to be over what constitutes first-amendment-protected communication, and how a communication receives such protection.
Mr. Moto, I asked before, but I’ll ask again: are you similarly penurious with the media you consider to be covered by freedom of the press? Do you, for example, deny that radio is covered by freedom of the press?
Daniel
Aw, crap. you’re in the minority.
Then campaign advertisements are covered, but not contributions. If you’re willing to state that campaign contributions are not speech, then you’ll be consistent in your arguments, and I won’t have any issue with you stating that flag burning is also not speech. I won’t agree, but you’ll be consistent.
So, is your stance that campaign contributions are not speech, and therefore not protected by the first amendment?
It might not make sense, but that is how I read it. I see now that such an interpretation makes no sense, but in my eyes, neither does any of what he has said i=on the subject.
Is this post speech?
I think I’ve got it:
Mr. Moto defines speech as “anything I think is worth protecting.” Stuff he doesn’t think is worth protecting is therefore not “speech,” and can therefore be muzzled or squelched as he sees fit.
Right.
All I was asking for was a clarification of what kind of expressive conduct could be permitted, and the consistent justification for this. Because courts seem to treat such conduct as speech one minute, and conduct another.
Mr. Moto, I offered a potential definition above (the speech portion of any act is that portion of the act intended to communicate a concept, and must be judged independent from any other consequences of an act. Thus a single act has both speech components and conduct components, but you can’t base a law on the speech components.
You may outlaw my running down a residential street at 3 am yelling, because that’s outlawing the conduct portion of my behavior. However, you must then outlaw my yelling no matter what it is: you may not outlaw my yelling “RISE AGAINST THE OPPRESSORS, MY COMMUNIST BRETHREN!” but allow me to yell, “LET’S GET THEM DANG COMMIES, YEEHAW!”
Similarly, you may not outlaw the Communist Brethren message when communicated through various forms of conduct (sign-painting, shouting, pyrosemaphore, charades, sculpture): that’s the very antithesis of freedom of speech.
As you can see, an act may be treated as both speech and conduct, and your ability to restrict the act depends on which aspect of the act you’re treating.
Daniel