Changing the subject, the claim isn’t just that IBM sold equipment that was later used: it’s that IBM New York controlled IBM Berlin throughout the war, and that IBM New York supplied specialist material (through South America) during the war, supporting both the Holocaust and the German war effort.
Either because ‘it’s just business’ or because ‘war is wrong and we’re actually fascists’.
I’ve been really curious about this because I’m not sure how this would actually function. I can’t see either the U.S. government or the Nazis allowing this and, well, it would be treason to both. Do you happen to have a good source on the facts here?
Yes, it sounds like treason to me.
No, for their own reasons the Nazi regime continued co-operation and protected assets in a way that was different than the American government.
First, if you you’ve already lost four of your best carriers, you will likely fare much the same way if you press on. At least, from the front line perspective.
Second, even if Kondo went right in to take Midway, the US will just bring in its remaining Atlantic force and drive you back. Midway was not planned to be fortified, and capable of beating back a concerted attack. It was just meant to be a seaplane base. It can’t even dock big ships.
Third, your best surface force has been destroyed and you’re failed in your primary objective, which is to draw the US navy out on the onset. Now they’re as wary as hell, and will fall back to the US west coast, and in a few months, come at you with much more than you would care to tangle with.
The point would be to buy Japan time to consolidate its conquests in SE Asia and Pacific and, possibly, strengthen their case for a negotiated end to the war.
Aside from the fact that others have discussed the possibility of taking Midway at that point (highly questionable), they couldn’t have done so without air cover; they’d have been blasted into smithereens just trying. The U.S. forces took some losses, but at that time had effectively uncontested air superiority and could pick off any attack at leisure.
No more gains were possible; the only option was avoiding additional losses. While the IJN had a huge problem with Sunk Costs, in this case they rationally looked at the situation and correctly decided to retreat with what they had. Even if somehow they took Midway, they could not expect to do so without additional ship losses which would have made their military situation worse AND could not expect to inflict more damage on American forces that might compensate. Additionally, one point you may be missing is that the IJN could not reasonably defend Midway if they had take it considering the damage they had suffered, which effectively ruined any strategic gains. The USN could have waltzed in at any point and reclaimed it, making any additional effort a futile exercise in throwing away resources.
Except as pointed out before, and in Shattered Sword, they would have failed- and badly. The attackers didnt have proper landing craft, they’d have to wade 100 yard thru waist or shoulder deep water, against marines dug in with heavy weapons. Not to mention the defenders outnumbered the attackers 3:2. Generally if attacking you want 3:1, 2:1 is marginal. The IJN had 2:3.
Kinda like those movie scenes where the Little Guy hits the Big Guy as hard as he can, then stands there nursing his knuckles while the Big Guy just looks annoyed before moving in.
I guess what I am missing here is an analysis of just how capable the US was at continuing air operations? Yorktown was pretty smashed, the torpedo bombers were all but wiped out and high altitude bombing from Midway was a total bust. Not to mention the air crews…indeed everyone on the carrier…had to be exhausted by this point.
How much longer could the US carriers (now two really) fuel and sortie attack waves against the enemy? How much fuel did they have left? How much ammunition? Did they have resupply on hand? Could they resupply in these circumstances?
It seems to me the US carriers kinda shot their wad and didn’t have much left in them after the battle without some time to pull themselves back together. And even if they could go back out after Japanese ships how much more damage would they do? If they weren’t out of ammo and had tired pilots before surely they would be soon with continued sorties. Japan still had some 30+ warships out there (not to mention a couple dozen or more support ships). That’s a lot of shipping to sink.
Forget US air superiority. My doubt is that any amphibious landing could proceed without Japanese air support.
That has been mentioned but Midway is very small with no hills and at most some tree cover. Assuming Japanese battleships and cruisers could bombard the place I am not sure how anyone there would manage to survive for very long.
I think we’re homing in on the issue and it’s a factual error: the American air forces were indeed stretched, bu the Battle of Midway was a three-day affair and it wasn’t constant fighting all the way. With one exceptional combined air attack, which at the time was a day behind, the American air crews had some time to rest and refit during the engagement. In fact, they did not stop fighting after breaking the Japanese air power and continued to harass the Japanese forces, which was only stopped when they fled the battle zone entirely.
I do not know if I could readily go and answer all of those questions because there’s a lot of details to drag out of each one. However, the American forces were still actually hunting targets, so assuming they were completely out of aviation fuel, bombs and bullets seems improbable. Yes, I’m sure the carrier armament stocks were low but they no longer has to worry about Japanese air power which simplified the situation immensely and to their advantage. American carriers were not fleeing in desperation and unable to fight. And their logistical tether was not only shorter but much richer which means that if necessary theycould potentially bring in reinforcements,
There was a final episode to Midway that you may have missed, because the Japanese actually did try this and got caught out. This occurred in the wee hours of the morning on June 6th. Had a larger Japanese force been sighted they would have been sitting ducks, as despite the presence of two battleships they were outnumbered and would have been critically vulnerable to being destroyed. They simply didn’t have the firepower to repel a concerted air attack, and the plan you present involved deliberately going to the one place that the American forces are definitely guarding.
[OK, the strikes on the Akagi and Hiryu were more like11 and 7 hours in the past when the cruiser-led squadron was sighted trying to break for Midway. But the main task-force battleships were well behind the force spotted at 3 am and could not have advanced in time. And any moment they delayed assembling was another hour for the carriers to regroup, rest, and rearm. I have been trying to find a detailed map but I think most of the battleships in the entire assembled fleet were actually still hundreds of miles behind at the time.
I’ll let someone else respond the idea that bombarding Midway would accomplish anything.
You asked for it. From Shattered Sword, Chapter 18 (“Scuttlings”):
Still, there were men in Combined Fleet’s staff who could not, or would not, let go of the notion that victory could somehow still be wrested from the enemy. Kuroshima and Watanabe, the two staff officers with perhaps the greatest emotional investment in its planning, came up with the idea that the Main Body’s battleships should continue advancing on Midway the following morning and pulverize it with their heavy guns. Carrying what he later termed his “crazy explanation” up to the bridge in a frenzy of excitement, Watanabe laid out his plan. Yamamoto listened to his staff officers politely, then said, “I am sure you have studied in the Naval Staff College that Navy history teaches us not to fight against land forces with naval vessels.”
A suddenly chastened Watanabe responded that he had. “Your proposal is against fundamental naval doctrine,” Yamamoto ground on, “And it is too late now for such an operation. This battle is almost coming to an end.”
…
Ugaki lost no time in piling on his own disapproval. “You ought to know very well the absurdity of attacking a fortress with a fleet!” he said, continuing, “It is the plan of a fool without a brain to challenge a hopeless game of go again and again out of desperation!”
A) Just because it was doctrine did not mean it was without flaw (considering Japanese naval doctrine failed them many times this should be obvious).
B) Midway was nothing like a fortress. Far from it.
C) The US bombarded islands throughout the war in the Pacific and followed with landings. Nothing new or special there.
FWIW this thread has convinced me that following on with the invasion of Midway was a really bad idea for the Japanese but that quote didn’t help.
The problem is that in the fog of war, the Japanese didn’t know what they were up against. In period of time after they lost their carriers and the decision to withdraw, they actually believed there were more US carriers in the area than the three, so they didn’t know how much danger they were in.
You miss the point about the inability of the US to sink every Japanese warship. The Americans didn’t need to. All they needed to do was to prevent the landings and any warships they sunk were additional bonuses. As has been shown repeatedly in this thread, the Midway defenders could handle it on their own, even without air support, but having even a little support would make their task that much easier.
Asked and answered in this very thread. It wouldn’t have done enough. If you have specific questions refer back to the several posts which discuss this in great detail.
A) No. This is not obvious and this has already been discussed in this thread. Japanese naval doctrine actually called for land based air support for invasions. Against air supremacy would have be suicidal, something that Yamamoto very well knew.
B) See above. Asked and answered.
C) Already this has been asked and answered in this thread. We had a discussion already concerning the how no one did amphibious landings like the Americans, and the Japanese did them particularly poorly. They lacked the ability to take Midway.
So let’s assume that Yamamoto reverses himself and agrees to let his BBs attempt to blast Midway into submission. Then what?
Tactics are derived from doctrine, so without a doctrine there are unlikely to be tactics defining how a situation is to be approached. IJN surface forces trained intensively for action against enemy vessels, and had little or no — I’m inclined toward the latter — idea of how to proceed against land installations when it comes to things such as targeting, spotting fall of shot, relaying corrections &c. They did make an attempt later at Guadalcanal, but despite dumping an enormous amount of ammunition on Henderson Field they never did manage to put it out of commission.
Sure. It would have killed defenders, destroyed the airfield, and blown up defenses. Some.
But very likely not enuf to let the IJN take the island, since they were under such a huge disadvantage.
Not to mention the bombarding ships would have been sitting ducks for carrier strikes.
By June 1, both Sand and Eastern islands were ringed with coastal defenses . Six 5-inch guns, 22 3-inch guns and four old Navy 7-inch guns were placed along the coasts of both islands for use as anti-aircraft and anti-boat guns.
Midway Islands' Undaunted Defenders - May '96: World War II Feature.
Sure they did- and the bombardment never destroyed the defenders. It made things easier, but not easy.
Couple thoughts here.
Okay, that’s three. Hi, no, I can’t.