And it didn’t work well wherever it was important. Places like Iwo Jima where the beach was not defended it had no effect on the beach landing: places like Omaha, where the beach was defended, navel bombardment was ineffective.
Effective bombardment also requires air reconnaissance. The few aircraft carried by the Japanese cruisers and battleships would have been quickly dispatched by even the most minimal US fighter cap and AA fire.
A new post to refer people to a great post by Youtuber Drachinifel, whom I linked to earlier concerning Tsushima. Here he has a Q&A session with one of the authors of Shattered Sword, Jon Parshall.
The key part concerning this thread starts at about 31 minutes where he discusses the Japanese reaction after they lost the carrier and were continuing to move the heavy guns towards the island before Yamamoto called it off.
The following is about what he said.
His opinion was that it may have been possible for the battleships to have survived the weakened US air groups “for some time” but he doesn’t think that it would have accomplished anything, especially without any formal gun support doctrine for getting troops ashore. Late in the war, against heavily fortified Japanese islands, Americans found that doing these sort of bombardments took “days and days and days” to do anything.
Parshall was “highly skeptical that they could have gotten an amphibious force even ashore, let alone taken the place. And even if they do take it, they couldn’t have kept it in supply.”
This is the definitive answer to the OP from one of the top scholars of the battle.
One cool thing is that he talked about his next project, involving the navy actions around Guadalcanal. That is another fascinating subject and I’m looking forward to reading the book when he finishes it.
Jon Parshall has done a couple of great presentations at the U.S. Naval War College including this one on Shattered Sword.
Correction:
He plugged a book by his friend, Trent Hone, Learning War which discusses the lessons the USN learned in surface combat in the Solomons.
Parshall’s book will be about 1942 and is still three years or so away.
Late to the conversation but to the OP…according to “Shattered Sword - the untold battle of Midway” by Parshall and Tully…Appendix 5…If the Japanese (whether they won or lost the naval battle) had landed on Midway it would have been a complete disaster for the Japanese with their ground invasion being quickly wiped out.
I know that this is a long thread, but that has been mentioned several times earlier, including the following:
Now that this thread has been reopened, there are some more points, although people may not respond.
As Parshall repeatedly says, the IJN didn’t have “gun support doctrine” for landings. In other words, even without CAP around Midway to keep these biplanes away, the recon crew weren’t trained in air support and the crews on the ships were trained either. They would not have been useful.
In addition, Yamamoto’s precisely-scripted battle plan called for the landings to take place at first light, meaning that Cruiser Division 7’s bombardment would be a) desultory — Parshall and Tully’s word — and b) mostly blind.
Of course, the assumption* was that the US would have few planes and few defenses on Midway, most or all of which would be put out of action by Kidō Butai’s airstrikes well before the landings. So from the Japanese point of view, CruDiv 7’s shelling may have been seen as icing on the cake, making the Marines keep their heads down until the attackers were ashore.
* Yep, there it is again.
This is where the Japanese “Victory Disease” had come into play. They were clearly believing that the US was incapable of making any improvements since the early chaotic days when the Japanese simply showing up won many of the battles.
As you said, they believed that they would have knocked out Midway’s air groups, which would have been a reasonable assumption if the US carriers weren’t there. In reality, very few US fighters remained and four carriers worth of planes would have made short work of the remaining forces.
However, they would have quickly discovered that they weren’t sufficiently prepared to fight well entrenched troops.
However, that still leaves the problem of Japan’s inability to
Whoa. Was there a power failure at the @TokyoBayer house? Or did … they … get to him?
complete sentences and thoughts.
History Buffs has just released a two-part (60 minute total) critique of Roland Emerich’s Midway.
On thing he says several times is, “I never thought I’d be saying this about Roland Emerich, but–”
His main criticism is that the Japanese strike on the US fleet is pretty well reduced to one line. “There goes Yorktown.”
Midway Atoll is REALLY small. It’s maybe a kilometer across at its widest point. Japanese battleships could certainly have at least hit it - they were good enough to hit other ships - and one has to think that dropping a bunch of gun shells on a target with such limited space would have had SOME effect. Whether it would have had enough effect, though, would have been a matter of luck; unless a substantial percentages of the artillery is hit the Japanese troops would be massacred in the water.
Capturing and holding Midway would have been a white elephant, though.
This is the problem (among others, but the main narrative problem) with the whole movie; they try to fit in every event from before Pearl Harbor to Midway, and sprint through it all. Time is wasted on stuff that is certainly a part of the larger story, like the Doolittle raid and Coral Sea, but which means the movie never has time to breathe and concentrate on Midway.
The Doolittle raid had to go in, or they wouldn’t have gotten the last $24 million from Chinese investors to make the film. And, by focusing on Richard Best & writing a part for his wife (played by Mandy Moore) they were able to pitch it as a four-quadrant movie.
But, cynicism about Hollywood sausage-making aside, I agree: they really didn’t bring the full scope of the battle into play.
Also, Bayer, IIRC the unit assigned to invade Midway was put ashore just a few months later* and was essentially wiped out to the man in a situation much more favorable then they had at Midway (though still bad)
- In the Solomons, I believe
And there, they made it ashore unopposed and were still wiped out when they attacked the American beachhead over land.
Battle of Tenaru / Alligator Creek on Guadalcanal. Parshall and Tully use it as an example of what would have happened if Ichiki and his men were dumped offshore at Midway (the Japanese barges had no way of getting over the reef, so the assault forces would have had to cross the reef and then wade 200-300 yards in water that was chest-high in places — all the time under fire).
After the first day’s debacle a couple of staff officers did suggest using the Main Body’s battleships to shell Midway, but Yamamoto smacked them down pretty thoroughly. At this point in the war the IJN had no doctrine regarding shore bombardment, because it saw its role as sinking enemy warships to the exclusion of prit’ near everything else.
In addition, the Main Body was at least a day’s steaming away from Midway (probably more). This was deliberate, since Yamamoto didn’t want to spook the American fleet into staying home by exposing his most powerful force too early.