What’s hard to understand about incompetence and unpreparedness?
Have you READ a history of World War II? Whole armies being wiped out was a thing.
My opinion of MacArthur is not very high, he was the Allied general with the biggest ego and least competence as a commander.
The confusion regarding the “act surprised” comment may extend from the orders MacArthur had received regarding Japanese intentions. The war warning that went out to Pacific commands including the Philippines was:
NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN APPEAR TERMINATED…JAPANESE FUTURE ACTION UNPREDICTABLE BUT HOSTILE ACTION POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT. IF HOSTILITIES CANNOT REPEAT CANNOT BE AVOIDED THE UNITED STATES DESIRES JAPAN COMMIT THE FIRST ACT.
The Philippines at the time were a commonwealth in preparation to being granted full independence. So while they were responsible for their own internal affairs, foreign relations would still be handled by the US government.
When the attack on Pearl Harbor came, it seemed obvious that Japan had committed that first act and US forces in the Pacific should commence operations against the Japanese. This is what War Plan Orange and Rainbow 5 both expected.
However, if you wanted to desperately believe the Japanese were not going to attack the Philippines, then you could interpret that warning order in a different way. Japan had not violated Philippine neutrality so they had not committed that first overt act. (And if you were the Philippine government, wouldn’t you be lobbying for that in the hopes of sparing your people an invasion?)
It would be analogous to the US air raid on Tripoli in the 80’s were we had to get launch and overflight permissions from other countries. While the US was carrying out the strike, it could be seen as an act of war by those countries to allow US aircraft to use their airspace.
The most generous interpretation I can offer is that MacArthur’s read on the situation was that while the United States had been attacked, the Philippines had not and launching an attack would be a first act by the Philippines, not the Japanese. Thus, the prudent thing to do (and in accordance with the warning order) was to not strike until Japan’s intentions towards the Philippines became clear.
This goes far to explain the confusion apparent in the USAFFE command structure that morning and the conflicting opinions among his staff.
Sadly, if the weather over Formosa had been more cooperative and the Japanese air attack had launched on time, it is likely the US aircraft would have been airborne at the time of the attack rather than sitting ducks on the ground.
The US fighters and bombers had spent the morning circling the island area to avoid that fate until being recalled to refuel and rearm for a strike mission that would launch immediately after lunch and hit Formosa that evening. That recall just happened to coincide with the delayed arrival of the Japanese airstrike allowing almost the entire force to be caught on the ground.
Can we drop any further discussion of this MacArthur theory?
Sure.
A recommendation for anyone interested in this topic: check out Ian Toll’s Pacific War trilogy. The first volume, Pacific Crucible, covered the war from Pearl Harbor to Midway. The second volume, The Conquering Tide, covers from Guadalcanal to Saipan. The third volume, Twilight of the Gods, will be released in September and will cover the final eighteen months of the war.
Great thread. I feel like I should get college credit for reading it.
Honest question:
How much more fight did our carriers and Midway have in them? They have limited aviation fuel, limited pilots, limited munitions and lost a lot of their planes. The US aircrews took a severe beating that day (something the Japanese knew) and one carrier was (mostly) out of the fight. Midway had been attacked; I am not sure its runways were in operation and their fuel supplies and munitions (for planes) were intact.
Sure the US could re-supply but when? From where? There were no supply ships in the area.
I believe carrier pilots were landing on Midway to rearm and refuel; Army guys were threatened with a Navy pilot’s .45. As I recall from books, crews kept the Midway runways operational.
Off the top of my head, despite the annihilation of the torpedo squadrons, TF16 still had about 4 squadrons of SBD’s on hand (organic units and survivors from Yorktown) and a similar number of fighters. Japan had two light carriers (one with the Main Body, one with the invasion force) with around a dozen or so mostly obsolete aircraft each.
Not sure about carrier stores, but there’s no reason to believe they were yet an issue. Spruance pursued the Japanese about 400 miles west of Midway and broke off pursuit before entering the Japanese land-based air umbrella of Wake Island.
His fuel for the destroyers may have been a problem, WWII destroyers used fuel prodigiously and needed almost constant refueling. But even if Spruance had to order up tankers from Pearl, the carriers could still harass the IJN. With pretty much unchallenged air superiority, Spruance only has to stay about 100 miles or so away from the Japanese fleet to conduct operations at his leisure.
So order up some tankers from Pearl (maybe a three-day trip for them, it’s nice to be working reasonably close to your main base) and run east to meet them. Resupply and run back west to resume ops around Midway. Maybe even move south this time since there is no way for the Japanese to track you. At best the Japanese get 24 hours of no carrier based attacks.
I dont think they need to waves guns around. lol.
That may very well be a “war story”.
This is the only relevant point. Quibbling over how strong remaining US air assets were, or how strong the Japanese thought they were, is pointless. Yamamoto would have been utterly insane to keep his fleet somewhere that the Americans still had the ability to sink his ships with airplanes, and he did not have the capability to do the same to them.
That said, after Hiryu was destroyed, the Japanese did not immediately withdraw. (At that point the Japanese really did not know how much damage they’d done; the Americans were very aware they had sunk four carriers. Superiority in operational awareness on the part of the Americans was a recurring issue in this battle.) However, the day after, the Americans lost track of where the Japanese force was. They did eventually manage to sink a heavy cruiser but only because it had collided with another cruiser, damaging both, and slowing them down.
A recurring theme in this battle, and a lot of Pacific War naval battles, is the two sides repeatedly losing track of where the other was. This was an era when the ability of ships to physically damage one another coulc occur at ranges where they often could not detect one another. There was no effective long range surface radar and so detection was done with seaplanes and submarines, and was as much a matter of luck as anything else, and reports from scouting assets were often wrong or vague. Battles like Midway were like two heavyweight boxers being asked to fight with blindfolds on, feeling around the ring for one another, waving their fists in front of them, trying to listen for their opponent. But one they found one another, it got violent and decisive in a hurry.
Also, as Doolittle proved a couple months earlier, Americans were not totally averse to sending long range bombers on one way missions. How many bombers could Hawaii put in the air on June 7.
“One way” in that they planned to land on Chinese airfields. Hornet was sighted and the aircraft had to launch early, too far away to make the planned airfields.
And they launched anyway. No reason the same sacrifice would not be made to defend Midway.
I’m pretty sure high altitude bombing of naval targets (i.e. moving ships) was a total bust. Although, at that time, I think they were still fooling themselves into thinking it worked.
I agree. The Japanese would have been very hesitant to test that theory with their capital ships.
Very well said. Blind man’s bluff was a lot of it in every theater. The Bismarck engagement certainly could have gone very differently had the different forces stumbled on each other at different points in the timeline than really happened. Just to name another famous skirmish.
Jutland in WWI was the same. Highly contingent on who saw who when.
IMO not really.
The Doolittle raid was designed from the git-go as a very high level political statement. It was a pinprick attack whose value was 90% aimed at US morale and 10% at puncturing the Japanese homeland’s illusion of invincibility. Even had the attack gone perfectly to the US plan, the damage inflicted would have been derisory.
It was a feel-good PR stunt. As such they were willing to take extra risks that ordinary ops would not.
Had things gone a little worse for the Raiders and they’d all ditched at sea before reaching Japan, it’s possible the story of the totally failed mission would have remained secret until the 1960s.
Conversely, had they not been spotted when they were, and been able to launch from closer to Japan as planned, every airplane that didn’t get shot down was expected to survive and be repatriated eventually. With the crews being brought back quickly, since they were a) heroes, and b) in much shorter supply than airplanes.
None of this is meant to take away from the Raider’s individual bravery & brass 'nads. But from HQ’s perspective it was utterly different than defending a small island base in the early days of the war.
Desperate spots in warfare sometimes turn risky missions into one-way or suicide missions. But the idea of launching a squadron of e.g. B-17s out from Hickam fully intending to bomb the IJN then ditch at sea is a non-starter. And trying to recover them at Midway under siege where they couldn’t be serviced, re-armed, and relaunched is almost as useless as ditching them.
Force preservation isn’t everything. Losses and attrition are expected to happen. But force preservation is certainly something that plays large in every battle plan. You’re going to need those assets again tomorrow. Spend them wisely, don’t waste them. Ceding the enemy a 100% defeat in detail of your forces by planning for a guaranteed suicide mission only works when you have a very very high probability of getting 100% defeat in detail of the enemy too.
Sometimes David & Goliath works out well for David. But it’s sure not the way to bet.
Plus, high level bombing of ships was (or would become) notoriously ineffective.
But the use of B-17s against the IJN at Midway actually isn’t as much of a far-out hypothetical as it may seem: it actually happened. The airfield had already been expanded to accommodate B-17s ahead of the battle.
Though little known today (because it was inaccurate), early reporting on the battle of Midway actually made it seem as if the battle had been won in large part due to high level bombings from B-17s because the pilots reported hits where there were none (due to difficulties in assessing the fall of bombs from such a high altitude and a tendency to be overly optimistic in assessing battle damage done to the enemy). While the Army made a big deal of its supposed successes, the Navy kept its force movements and its level of involvement classified for months after the battle:
Marine ground forces worked night and day to prepare the defenses of the islands, and Marine Aircraft Group 22 (MAG-22) based on Midway was brought up to strength to include 28 fighters and 34 dive bombers.88 The primary aim of Midway’s air commander, Capt. Cyril T. Simard, USN, under whom all AAF planes operated, was to discover the enemy fleet as early as possible and to strike it before it could draw within carrier range of the island. Accordingly, on 30 May, in order to place the heavy bombers as far forward as possible, six B-17’s of the 26th Bombardment Squadron (H) were flown up to Midway, followed on the next day by six more from the 431st Squadron, two from the 31st, and one from the 72d.89 In addition to these forces, two casually attached squadrons en route to the South Pacific, the 18th Reconnaissance and the 69th Bombardment squadrons, each contributed two torpedo-carrying B-26’s which were flown up to Midway, along with six of the Navy’s new TBF’s.90 With all these reinforcements, Midway was badly overcrowded. By 3 June, Captain Simard had available on the tiny islet a force of 30 PBY’s, 4 B-26’s, 17 B-17’s, and 6 TBF’s, all in addition to the planes of MAG-22. Behind Midway and off to the northeast the carriers Yorktown, Enterprise, and Hornet had rendezvoused on 2 June after racing up from the South Pacific following the Coral Sea action. This was something the enemy did not know and would not know until the dive bombers struck him.
Preliminaries to the Battle of Midway opened on the afternoon of 3 June, when at 1623, nine B-17E’s led by Lt. Col. Walter C. Sweeney, Jr., of the 431st Bombardment Squadron surprised the transport force with its supporting craft some 570 miles west of Midway, dropping 36 x 600-lb. demolition bombs from 8,000 feet. The claims were substantial, including five direct hits and several near misses; they were representative of the scores credited after the subsequent missions of the engagement, for Maj. Gen. Willis H. Hale, who became commander of the Seventh Air Force on 20 June, firmly believed that a fair percentage of the bombs had struck home. Assessment was difficult and in part was based upon the statements of the handful of enemy survivors picked up after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was it possible to interview a number of the survivors of this initial action. And even their testimony had suffered from the destruction of records, from the lapse of three and one-half years between the action and interrogation, and from the fact that the Japanese officers reporting were not always aware of the source of the bombs which were dropped upon them. But their evidence indicates the necessity of a radical scaling down of the original claims as sent in by the Seventh Air Force. At any rate, in some cases these enemy officers stood on the decks of the targets and were in a fair way to determine when and by whom they were bombed, better perhaps than pilots who bombed from 20,000 feet and saw tall geysers spout up around their rapidly maneuvering targets, for it has been demonstrated repeatedly that damage to carriers is particularly difficult to assess from the air. With this in mind, it would seem that the first attack produced a probable hit upon one transport, causing a small fire which was extinguished without delaying the ship, but that the combat craft escaped damage in the attack.95
The impact of Midway upon the concept of Pacific air war held by the Navy and the AAF was considerable, setting off a train of debate which continued long after the sea battle had ended. in the light of the Japanese evidence and because of the very limited number of B-17’s involved, there can be little question that AAF contribution was insufficient to check the enemy’s advance.
I was on vacation two weeks ago then just started a new job, so I hardly had any time to really look at this. I want to go back to the OP and some following posts. This post will only be concerned about Whack-a-Mole’s posts, but I intend to continue.
[quote=“Whack-a-Mole, post:1, topic:917029”]
That said, why couldn’t the rest of the very large fleet almost at Midway’s doorstep continue? Two battleships, five heavy cruisers and numerous other ships were in that fleet.
[/quote]On a previous post, I recommend Shattered Sword by one of the authors of combinedfleet.com, which is a great resource for understanding the IJN, and that book would completely answer your questions. For people without that much time or interest, there are other resources online.
The first things may be to read is the wiki article which shows the actual strength of the IJN fleet.
Note that main body of the fleet and other elements contained far more warships than would have been required for a “simple” invasion of some poorly defended islands. The purpose of drawing the US fleet to Midway in order to destroy is simply part of the historical record.
As has been noted above, the Japanese weren’t expecting enemy carriers in the location, so Nagumo wasn’t particularly being overly cautious. There was also supposed to be a submarine picket line in place which they has expected would be able to have seen the carriers. The plan was flawed and the subs were delayed leaving their base and the carriers were not detected. The IJN believed they had the element of strategic and tactical surprise on their side so that it would only require a single attack from their carriers to destroy the American base and the aircraft there. It was expected that it would take three days for the American carriers to arrive so the IJN carriers wouldn’t have to deal with both threats at the same time.
Secondly, at this early stage in the war, both navies were still learning about searching, and both sides were not having great results with it. This can be seen in the carrier battle in the previous month where both sides missed each other at times and misidentified ships.
The IJN had a different strategy concerning searching and Parshall covers this in Shattered Sword, where they didn’t want to divert potential offense firepower in order to have a more robust search pattern. However, part of the later criticism of the Japanese search pattern is that they had a single phase search and not a two-phase search but this early in the war they weren’t conducting two-phase searches.
For these reasons, the Japanese search efforts cannot be used as evidence against the well documented position that the battle included the purpose of destroying the American fleet.
Parshall’s answer to your OP would be that there were dual purposes. The Japanese intended to invade and hold Midway and also the lure out the US fleet and destroy it. While part of the Japanese military had recognized the complete impossibility of invading Hawaii, other groups were making plans for an anticipated invasion.