I always had the impression that the big problem with the French/BEF and the Battle of France is that they were basically prepared and expecting to fight a war something like the last part of 1918.
In other words, relatively slow moving warfare dominated by infantry, and with tanks used in support roles to avoid trench warfare stalemates.
So when the Germans attacked with highly mobile armored formations (tanks AND mechanized infantry), and used those to get into the Allied rear areas and create havoc, confusion and chaos, it was something they were completely unprepared for.
Combine that with the extremely effective use of the Luftwaffe in the interdiction role, and it prevented the French from effectively organizing counterattacks after the encirclement of the forces in Flanders, and essentially set the stage for the eventual collapse of the French will to fight.
So the French were out-generaled, but long before the war started, not necessarily during the actual fight. Their doctrine and war plans were such that the French were effectively caught dick-in-hand by the Wehrmacht.
The rest of the countries mentioned would generally be expected to be defeated pretty handily by Germany, regardless of how hard they fought.
Absolutely. (And an awful moment in world history.)
Violence against Jews inside of Germany was not at all considered respectable, and certainly weakened Germany’s international image. But there wasn’t much anyone else could actually do about it short of a major invasion, which wasn’t politically possible until after WW2 started.
A short answer was that most people in most countries, and their governments, thought that they could avoid trouble and let someone else take the flak, until it was pretty well too late.
Some had been neutral in WW1, or not involved in any sort of war for longer still, others had suffered so much in WW1 that no-one wanted a war, and what appears in hindsight like an obvious progression to the events of 1939/40 was not inevitably obvious to people beforehand. That’s why the British and French governments took a chance on trusting Hitler’s “last territorial demand”, which had the side-effect of transferring to the Germans substantial Czech defences that happened to be in the Sudetenland.
Even after the war had begun, plenty (Netherlands, Norway, Denmark) thought a declaration of neutrality would be respected; and/or that they (Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria) could make their accommodation with a German-dominated Europe (rather than have to deal with the USSR) - indeed there were political forces in virtually all countries that, if pushed to the choice, would rather do that. Both sides of that argument could find justification for their views in the conduct of both sides in the Spanish Civil War.
“Collective security” was a campaigning watchword in a number of countries in the 30s, as a response to the Nazis: but that meant making a military arrangement, not only with neighbours with whom there might be no end of trade and territorial disputes as a result of the disentanglements of the central European empires after 1918, but also with the USSR. Our present-day notions of security and deterrence derive entirely from the realisation that these could only be enforced through the involvement of all the major world powers, and the two that became the most important as result of WW2 were on the sidelines throughout the interwar period.
(Incidentally, it’s not entirely true that there was no resistance at all, more that the smaller countries’ armed forces were completely outnumbered and under-equipped. Even though Denmark was overrun in a day, its armed forces did manage to kill a couple of hundred Germans in the time. France had been subject to ever greater political disunity and dysfunction throughout the 1930s, so a defeatist mood could easily spread like wildfire when the military and political leadership was seen to have failed so comprehensively so early on in the Blitzkrieg).
It’s not really accurate to say they were out-generaled; their biggest problem was that their conscription system only called up reservists for a very limited time, which meant that they couldn’t train most of the army to a very high standard. Low level officers taking initiative and tactical flexibility are not something you can train and drill effectively when your personnel are only active for a short time then go off to reserves, and your units are essentially constantly rotating people in and out in short (3 month IIRC) training cycles.
The poor performance of the French Army owes a lot more to political decisions that the generals had no control over than the army leadership itself. They weren’t perfect, but people often overlook that they got dealt a pretty bad hand by the French government. And the government didn’t want long conscription times because after WW1 the Army and forced service were not popular, so if they had increased the time conscripts served they would have probably been voted out of office, it wasn’t just an inexplicable bad decision.
Of the countries which German fought and occupied, there is one large country, one medium one and a bunch of small ones.
France was the largest of the countries, the closest in size to Germany, but still much smaller.
Country % of Total Warmaking Potential (1937)
United States 41.7%
Germany 14.4%
USSR 14.0%
UK 10.2%
France 4.2%
Japan 3.5%
Italy 2.5%
Seven Powers (total) (90.5%)
The UK and France together were about the same as Germany. However, the Cliff Notes reason that they were unsuccessful in defending France is that Germany had been preparing for a modern war in earnest from the mid 1930s while Britain and France were not. This is also why Japan was able to successfully attack the much larger US and British possessions simultaneously.
Poland was too small to defend itself and it would simply be impossible for any of the other countries.
The issue with France isn’t that it was smaller than Germany - it wasn’t and isn’t, and used to be Europe’s powerhouse. It also had way more in terms of colonial power, though whether that was a help or a hindrance is up for debate. But then WW1 happened. By the time WW2 swung by, it was still recovering from that in terms of sheer manpower ; whereas Germany was both healthy and doctrinally superior. Yet the Ardennes thing was still a gamble - one that paid of in spades, but it could have gone horribly pear shaped for Germany given a handful of ifs.
Poland was fucked either way. Russia or Germany. But then, that’s Polish history in a nutshell.
Well, many would argue they made a whopping huge mistake concerning the deployment of their armored battalions. I can’t claim to be any kind of expert in that, but certainly people who study history have often made that claim.
If only I had made it clear that I was making a nuanced point about something that people often overlook and not any kind of claim that the French generals were perfect and made no errors, and that people tend to say ‘French army bad’ while ignoring the problems caused by political decisions in France. But I certainly didn’t say anything like that, right?
France was and is significantly smaller in population than Germany, at the start of WW2 France had around 41 million people while Germany had about 69 million, while today France has about 66 million people compared to Germany’s 81 million. France’s land area is larger (especially now), but acerage doesn’t really drive army size.
Interestingly, it’s also a gamble the German general staff didn’t want to take. The plan Germany had in 1939 was going to use was basically a repeat of WWI, and was expected to drive French forces back to the Somme, and eventually win the war by 1942. While some generals like Guderian and Manstein wanted something more maneuver based, there was a lot of resistance to the idea. An officer with the Luftwaffe’s part of the plans was forced to crash land in Belgium and a copy made their way to France, and this was enough to motivate Hitler to order the General Staff to adopt the Ardennes plan, which they did only with fervent objections.
Also, political decisions in Belgium and France (combined with luck) contributed a lot to the success of the plan. Belgium wanted to remain studiously neutral even though it was obvious that Germany would invade through them again, and so didn’t participate in a lot of coordinated planning with France. Because there wasn’t a lot of coordinated planning, there was an area where the French and Belgians each thought the other was deploying more force, which meant they ended up with neither having enough force in the area. This would be a minor footnote, except that this confusion happened right in the path of what turned out to be the main German offensive.
The Polish campaign also gave Germany a great chance to test the army before engaging a major power. France and Britain didn’t get to deploy the bulk of their armies against a much weaker opponent and shake down leadership and procedural issues in a real world situation, other than small confused actions in Norway their first real test was the battle of France.
I’m standing by what I wrote before. If you want to assign blame for the defeat of France, then the first group in line are the French generals (okay, second in line, I’ll put the Germans first).
The French Army was there on the field. The French government had given the generals a military that was superior to Germany’s. The French soldiers fought when they got into battle.
The problem was military command. The French generals put their units in the wrong places. They weren’t following the course of the campaign as it occurred. It wasn’t the troops not following orders or politicians interfering - that didn’t happen. It was the generals giving the wrong orders. Their job was to manage the battle and they didn’t do it.
The only political interference that happened was when the generals began arguing for a surrender and the politicians tried to persuade them to keep fighting.
This completely misses the point of the British Empire, which spanned the globe, and contributed money, men and resources.
Yes, with the dominions and commonwealth, it wasn’t as simple as picking up the phone and ordering it. But, colonies and crown protectorates were automatically embroiled;,the British government in India committed themselves to the war without even consulting the natives.
I know, games are so much easier to win on Monday morning, aren’t they?
I have an extremely difficult time with the argument that they weren’t out-generaled when you look at the decisions on the field and prior to the war.
One particular incident exemplifies France’s lack of leadership, the replacement of the Supreme Commander Maurice Gamelin with Maxime Weygand on May 19th. In the midst of the worse military disaster in French history, Weygand’s first act was to get a good night’s sleep. His second was to spend several days on courtesy visits to dignitaries in the capital. Insane.
While the French had more tanks, they didn’t have radios in most of them. No had figured out that the best use was to mass them. Developing a mobile strategy had never occurred to the generals in the interwar years, not had they considered how to best use aircraft.
Germany had been more crippled by restrictions in their military, yet they trained better. They also did a tremendously better job at examining the lessons of WWI.
Unlike the USSR, France was too small of a country to have time to learn on the fly. Had it been several times larger, perhaps they could have, but then we’re into the should’ves, could’ves, and would’ves.
Germany: 141 divisions[1]
7,378 guns[1]
2,445 tanks[1]
5,638 aircraft[2][a]
3,350,000 troops
Alps on 20 June
300,000 Italians
Allies: 144 divisions
13,974 guns
3,383 tanks[1]
2,935 aircraft[3]**
3,300,000 troops
Alps on 20 June
~150,000 French
Compare the number of troops, 3,350,000 Germans to 3,000,000 Allies and tell me again about the supposed advantage of the British Empire. Holding zillions of square miles in the savannahs African or hundreds of millions of poor Indians did not provide troops or aircraft when they were needed.
Britain was empire rich and cash broke when the war started, as is evidenced by the Lend Lease Act because Cash & Carry couldn’t pay for it. Sure, the empire provided some advantages but that didn’t counter the difference with the greater Germany population and industrialization. Certainly not in the Battle of France.
I was curious about this too. These figures seem to be from Paul Kennedy’s *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers. *
Not having read it, I can’t say how Kennedy came up with the figures, but it seems likely to be based on GDP, iron/steel production, munitions production, etc.
I just wanted to thank everyone for their input to help me better understand. As for banding together, perhaps each little European country only thought of themselves and what’s right for their own best interests? They were too nationalistic in their own right to form pacts against the Nazis?
Also, as for France…I find Vichy France confusing. So, the Nazis come rolling into Paris with their tanks. Were they readily greeted by white flags waved by countless sympathizers? I just picture the German Army as ready to shoot first and find sympathizers later. Plus, the French being so proud of their heritage, it seems paradoxical to me that so many would so easily surrender to the Germans. Maybe someone can clarify how Vichy France came to be?
You can’t understand France’s decisions without looking back at the bloodletting of Verdun, especially since its hero, Phillipe Pétain, later became the Chief of Vichy France. In short, combined with other factors mentioned, there was a serious consideration that in trying to fight the Germans, the cure would be worse than the disease.
Churchill repeatedly urged the French to carry on a guerilla resistance, a redoubt in Bretony and at one point to turn Paris into an urban battlefield, Winston reports that Pétain’s response to his echoing of Clemenceau’s words from the prior war “I will fight in front of Paris, in Paris, and behind Paris” ‘Pétain replied … that he had in those days a strategic reserve of sixty divisions; now, there was none. Making Paris into a ruin would not affect the final event.’
Just realised I left your question partially unanswered, re why didn’t everyone else band together. It’s important not to let the post-war view of Nazi Germany as a nadir of humanity cloud your perception of events at the time, as Hitler in 1939 was by no means universally agreed to be a bad guy. He had friends and admirers in Britain and the United States, and as for the anti-semitism, the French and Poles were no strangers to it (nor were the Anglo-Americans, look up the MS St. Louis). Many in the west were adamant that there was no need to needlessly antagonise Germany when peace was still plausibly an option. As for banding together for collective security, it had been tried. By the time they realised Hitler was a threat to all of Europe, it was too late.
Also worth mentioning the opening of the war and its relation to France’s exit from it. It’s been debated at the time and since how sincere the Anglo-French guarantee to Poland was, the prosecution of the Phoney War speaks to a certain point of view (in Poland this is known as the Western Betrayal - waiting for an Anglo-French offensive against Germany to relieve them of their agony which never came. Or rather, came rather late). The year earlier the question had been asked - Mourir pour Danzig? Why die for Danzig? It caused controversy, but when the German offensive did finally come and the choice was swallow a German occupation or risk another national immolation, millions dead, millions wounded, vast swathes of the country devastated, all to honour some politician’s insincere guarantee to a Poland that itself was recently happy to play vulture on Czechoslovakia?
It’s also worth noting that the spectre of World War I didn’t only haunt the French. Churchill was very reluctant to commit forces back to France as he feared World War I mark II and suggested invasions just about everywhere else. When talking to Montgomery about being too cautious in his advances, Monty replied that Churchill had said he didn’t want another Somme.
I’ve addressed this earlier, but perhaps my response was a little too flippant.
Hindsight is 20/20. Full stop. They didn’t know what was going to happen.
Had everyone known the outcome before it started then they would done the entire thing differently. That point ought to be obvious.
The big question was what would Hitler do. Almost everyone misjudged him and thought that he would be satisfied by taking a little more space in Central Europe. People didn’t assume he would take over most of Western Europe.
International relationships are extremely complex and all of the players have varying interests. The only way to possibly have saved Poland, for example, would be to get Soviet troops to help fight. Poland was rightfully afraid that the Russians would want a piece of Poland in return.
Other countries would have been screwed no matter what they did. Denmark is a flat, one-way parkway for German tanks. Nothing could have been done to save that country.
Thanks again to those for the additional thoughts and background on France, etc. In high school, we touched on the highlights of WWII. You know, all the “common knowledge” stuff. In college, only one course looked at WWII. And, that course examined Germany from various perspectives: the effects of nationalism, the effects of a charismatic leader, etc. But, I wish I had some course to grant an overview to what was happening across the whole European theatre and how things churned into such an unimaginable nightmare!