I’m missing your point here. Could you expand on that a little?
Dualism, the question of whether there is a non-physical element to ourselves or not, is a very old philosophical problem. I haven’t yet seen a thoroughly convincing argument one way or the other, although I personally lean against dualism.
Francis Crick ( of Crick and Watson, discoverers of the structure of DNA) has argued in his book The Astonishing Hypothesis that dualism is wrong. The basis of his argument was to focus on one small element of consciousness, vision, and demonstrate that it arises from physical processes. We’re not just talking about optics and light-sensitive cells in the retina but about the qualia of vision, e.g. the perceived “redness” of red. It’s an interesting read, but his conclusions can be disputed. “The Astonishing Hypothesis” of the title is the idea that there is no soul or spirit, which I guess shows that Crick didn’t know philosophers have been fighting this one out for some time.
Mathematician Roger Penrose on the other hand has argued in his book The Emperor’s New Mind that the human mind can perform non-algorithmic operations and so must be more than something simply material as understood by current physics. It’s not really a pro-dualist book however - his conclusion is that there are currently unknown physical mechanisms at the quantum level that are necessary for conciousness. I only skimmed the book so I can’t really comment on how convincing he is.
Lekatt has suggested on these boards that the brain is analagous to a televison set - it is necessary to produce the pictures and sound, but it is not the source of the pictures and sound. The fact that we can make the picture go black-and-white by poking around inside a TV does not prove that we have found the source of colour. This neatly counters the arguments about the effects of drugs or brain damage on the mind - Lekatt’s suggestion is that you’ve affected the reciever, and the “spirit” remains inviolate.
Lekatt’s argument bothers me on two points. Firstly, if I have a soul, it is a pretty important part of me, the governor of who I am and what kind of a person I am. If brain damage or drugs results in me losing parts of my memory, or only drawing the left hand sides of things, I can accept these as “reciever damage”, analagous to a damaged TV set losing the sound and half the picture. However, brain damage or drugs can also change personality, and I have trouble accepting that as reciever damage. Drug-induced paranoia for example seems to me to be a change in the soul, and if drugs can change the soul then the “soul” is physical.
The other problem with the TV analogy is that the TV signal affects the material world - it induces small modulated voltages in the tuning circuits. You can detect the TV signal in other ways, or infer its existence from close observation of the workings of the TV. As I type this, waves of potential are shooting down the nerves in my arms to my hands and causing the muscles to contract and press the keys. Backtracking the signals to my spinal cord and up into the convoluted network of neurons that is my brain, you can in theory follow the signals - that neuron was tripped by that one, that one by this one etc. until you get to the neuron[s] that were tripped by the “soul”, the non-physical entity. Poke around in the brain enough, you have to find the “tuner.” And if a physical neuron or whatever can be affected by the non-physical “spirit” world, then we can build our own physical tuner and detect the “spirit” world, something that as far as I know hasn’t been achieved.
Lekatt’s beliefs are based on his interpretation of a powerful personal experience which I don’t feel entitled to comment on. He could claim that we don’t know enough about the workings of the brain to refute his TV analogy, and he’d be right. But hopefully some day we will know enough to answer this one for sure. In the meantime, I direct you to the transcripts of the 2003 Reith lectures “The Emerging Mind” which details all kinds of things about the brain and how it can go wrong.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/reith2003/lecture1.shtml
Lecture 1 among other things documents a problem called “Capgras’ syndrome” where the patient sees familiar and loved people as imposters “that’s not my real mother!” A large amount of the material documented would seem to me to be problems affecting the “soul” and not the “receiver”, and therefore weigh against the dualist model. The lecturer’s book Phantom’s in the Brain (by V. S. Ramachandran) is also well worth getting hold of, both fascinating and entertaining.