Say what, now?? Punctuation?
I know! Why can’t I just call her a HATEFUL ARROGANT CONDESCENDING BITCH, like a classy, sophisticated person would?
Hey! That’s my name! 
I’d be willing to share, though.
I take it you never had a pint in Wapping.
Or, as they say up there, a cunting drink.
Unless I missed something, in the quoted post and linked video there was no sign of any assault in legal terms. Which is not to say that it doesn’t happen, of course, but the question was about data on selective enforcement. If a particular account doesn’t even include any activity that would warrant any enforcement, it’s hard to see the selectivity at work.
What’s an example of a protest that has been required to move farther from a business than the public street approaching it? If it’s happened, I’d oppose that, not subject these demonstrators to a similar restriction.
To the contrary, I think you’re confused.
Well, one of us certainly is. 
Perhaps Annie could clarify what she meant.
Isn’t it odd what an ugly word that’s considered here , but you can call a guy a prick or a dick, and it’s no big deal.
When the discussion came up recently over Bill Maher using that word and twat for Palin there was so much outrage. I stay away from it because of the perception it has. As a white male I stay away from the n word too.
I’m thinking of a portmanteau such as twunt, which isn’t offensive because it isn’t even a word, but still, makes the point.
Here’s an interesting (relatively) recent case surrounding animal-rights protesters. In short, the court ruled that protesting at the employees’ houses was not protected speech, but that protesting at the place of business was broadly protected. Here are some selections:
959 A.2d 352, 2008 PA Super 237
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
SMITHKLINE BEECHAM CORP., d/b/a GlaxoSmithKline, Esther Cheung, Minnie Iwamto and Rosemary Lecompte
v.
STOP HUNTINGDON ANIMAL CRUELTY USA, Hugs for Puppies, Inc., Nicholas Cooney, David Lambon, Christopher Semick, Amandah Povilitus and John Does 1-10.
Appeal of Nicholas Cooney.
Submitted June 16, 2008.
Filed Oct. 3, 2008.
Background: Pharmaceutical corporation and several of its employees filed an emergency petition for civil contempt against animal rights protestor, alleging protestor violated injunction prohibiting picketing within 100 feet of corporation’s facilities and 50 feet of employees’ homes. The Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, Civil Division, No. 0366, November Term, 2006, DiVito, J., found protestor in contempt of injunction and amended injunction to further restrict protestor’s actions. Protestor appealed.
Holdings: The Superior Court, Nos. 2034 & 2035 EDA 2007, Klein, J., held that:
(1) protestor’s First Amendment free speech challenges to injunction’s provisions prohibiting trespassing on property owned by corporation or its employees, dissemination of employees’ personal information, and threatening, intimidating, and harassing employees were precluded by law of the case doctrine;
(2) injunction provision prohibiting all protesting outside of employees’ homes did not unconstitutionally impinge on protestor’s First amendment free speech rights;
(3) injunction provision prohibiting all protesting at corporation’s facilities overly burdened protestor’s First Amendment free speech rights;
(4) protestor was properly served notice of contempt hearing; and
(5) protestor was in contempt of injunction.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
[…]
BEFORE: ORIE MELVIN, KLEIN and FITZGERALD FN*, JJ.
FN* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
OPINION BY KLEIN, J.:
¶ 1 Nicholas Cooney appeals from the order finding him in contempt of a November 27, 2006 injunction (“the 2006 injunction”) and the issuance of a more restrictive injunction, dated June 22, 2007 (“the 2007 injunction”). Cooney claims on appeal that the 2007 injunction is an unconstitutional restriction on his First Amendment free speech rights, that the lower court impermissibly assumed extraterritorial jurisdiction in issuing the 2007 injunction, and that the lower court erred in finding him to be in contempt of the 2006 injunction. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
¶ 2 GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) is a pharmaceutical company that contracts with private laboratories such as Huntingdon Life Sciences, LTD (HLS) to conduct research on its products. Cooney is the director of Hugs for Puppies (HFP), a Philadelphia-based non-profit animal advocacy organization, and a member of the Philadelphia branch of Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC), an international animal advocacy group that partakes in various forms of protest against HLS because it believes HLS performs cruel and inhumane testing on animals. Cooney, HFP and members of SHAC began target protesting GSK and its employees in 2006 because of GSK’s business relationship with HLS. Cooney, his codefendants and other members of HFP and SHAC picketed outside of GSK’s Philadelphia facilities, as well as outside personal residences of several of GSK’s top employees. The picketers often threatened the employees with statements such as “we know where you sleep at night” and “I’ll kill you, you motherfucker!” The picketers used bullhorns, published defamatory materials, harassed GSK employees and their families and frequently blocked ingress and egress to both private homes and GSK’s facilities. On several occasions the picketers sprayed graffiti on personal property, wore bandanas to cover their faces or wore all black, and made harassing phone calls to employees.
[…]
[1] [2] [3] [4] ¶ 5 When reviewing a content-neutral injunction, FN2 this Court must ask *357 “whether the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest.” Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994). A commonly recognized government interest is “[t]he State’s interest in protecting the wellbeing, tranquility, and privacy of the home,” which is considered to be “of the highest order in a free and civilized society.” Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988). This Court has held that “courts of this Commonwealth can enjoin activity which violates an individual’s residential privacy.” Klebanoff v. McMonagle, 380 Pa.Super. 545, 552 A.2d 677, 678 (1988) (citations omitted). Additionally, as noted by this Court, “[a]s the mode of expression moves from the printed page or from pure speech to the commission of public acts the scope of permissible regulation of such expression increases.” Rouse Philadelphia Inc. v. Ad Hoc ′78, 274 Pa.Super. 54, 417 A.2d 1248, 1254 (1979). This Court has also stated, “*t is well-settled that, under the First Amendment, expressive activity may be subject to reasonable time, place and manner restrictions.” Klebanoff, supra. However, such restrictions must “leave open ample alternative channels of communication.” Id. Finally, it must be noted that the Supreme Court has held that “[t]he failure of the first order to accomplish its purpose may be taken into consideration in evaluating the constitutionality of the broader order.” Madsen, supra at 770, 114 S.Ct. 2516. It is within this framework that we consider Cooney’s challenges to the constitutionality of the 2007 injunction.
FN2. Although Cooney has not claimed the injunction is content based, given the import of the First Amendment, we nonetheless make note that the injunction is content-neutral. This means the speech is not regulated due to a disagreement with the message conveyed. See Commonwealth v. Scott, 878 A.2d 874 (Pa.Super.2005). A restriction on speech that is not content based is still considered neutral even if it might affect some speakers or messages and not others. Id. The 2007 injunction, on its face, does not seek to ban any subject matter from being protested. The purpose in enacting the restrictions is to prevent the excessive tactics used by the protesters, not to stifle the message itself. Finally, we note that a content-neutral time, place and manner regulation of protected speech need not be the least restrictive means of accomplishing the government’s purpose. Id.
[…]
[9] ¶ 11 The 2007 injunction places further restrictions on Cooney and his codefendants by prohibiting all “picketing, demonstrating, leafleting, protesting or congregating at GSK’s facilities.” (Injunction Order, provision 5(h).) This provision overly burdens the First Amendment rights of Cooney and his codefendants. The purpose of picketing outside GSK’s facilities is, presumably, to direct their message to a group of people who have the ability to bring about the change they desire. Their message would arguably have less impact if Cooney and his codefendants could only convey their opinions to members of the public at-large. While we certainly do not condone the threatening and harassing nature of their pickets, provision 5(h), in preventing any and all protests from taking place at GSK’s facilities, leaves Cooney and his codefendants with little, if any, alternate means to effectively and meaningfully communicate their message. By failing to allow for alternate means of communication, provision 5(h) violates Cooney’s free speech rights. Klebanoff, supra.
¶ 12 We note that plaintiffs’ brief details the cowardly, excessive, harassing and threatening behavior of the protestors. Nonetheless, it is the protests at personal homes, directed at specific persons that have gone beyond the pale. While protests at GSK facilities have been loud and intrusive, as documented in this record, such behavior can be controlled through less extreme means without a total ban on protesting at GSK business sites. The behavior of these defendants, including Cooney, shows that more restrictive time, place and manner restrictions may be appropriate at GSK sites. However, at this point in time and based upon this record, an outright ban is overbroad.
[10] ¶ 13 Additionally, this provision is unlike any in the cases cited above and, *360 indeed, unlike any we have found in other cases. In Klebanoff, supra, this Court noted that the defendant protesters, while banned from picketing outside Dr. Klebanoff’s residence, were still able to protest at Dr. Klebanoff’s places of business. In Madsen, supra, the Supreme Court upheld an injunction which included a 36-foot buffer zone around the entry to an abortion clinic, but noted that “[t]he need for a complete buffer zone near the clinic entrances and driveway may be debatable.” In Hibbs v. Neighborhood Organization to Rejuvenate Tenant Housing (N.O.R.T.H.), 433 Pa. 578, 252 A.2d 622 (1969), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated an injunction that prohibited the protesters from picketing outside of Hibbs’ home because Hibbs conducted his real estate business solely from his residence. These cases reiterate the idea that picketing, which is a form of expressive speech, may be subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. Rouse, supra; Klebanoff, supra. However, none of them support a total ban on picketing outside a public forum where individual privacy interests are not at stake. Therefore, we find provision 5(h) of the 2007 injunction to be an unconstitutional restraint on Cooney’s First Amendment rights.
[…]
¶ 20 The order of the lower court is affirmed as to the finding of the constitutionality of the 2007 injunction, with the exception of provision 5(h), and as to the finding of civil contempt. The order of the lower court is reversed and remanded as to provision 5(h) of the 2007 injunction for proceedings consistent with this decision. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Pa.Super.,2008.
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA
959 A.2d 352, 2008 PA Super 237
ETA: For any of you itching to use your Westlaw-fu, try this search in your state’s Federal and State case database: (ABORT! “PLANNED PARENTHOOD”) & (PROTEST! PICKET!)
Sorry, above is the entire opinion (free on the Superior Court web site) in case anybody’s interested.
Perhaps not, but that statement shifts the debate. I asked for support of the claim that abortion protesters are legally permitted to engage in acts which in other, non-abortion protest contexts, would be criminal.
Your statement simply says that the protesters create an ordeal that no one should have to go through to get health care.
That’s not quite the same as criminal.
In any event, I watched the video, which claims to take place at the worst location in the nation for abortion protests. So it seems to me that if criminal acts are taking place anywhere, it would be here.
The video ran 6:04, but the walk ended at 2:44 (and started at 1:23). So the walk portion was one minute and twenty-one seconds.
During that time, no one yelled, screamed, or physically blocked the progress of the woman. From the audio, she appears to have been followed by one woman, who speaks softly to her. This is the worst experience in the country:
Good morning, my name’s Kelly.
I want to talk to you this morning, please, before you go in and have this abortion.
On the corner, just past the abortion clinic on the corner, is A Woman’s Choice and you can get a free ultrasound.
We want to help you, whatever brings you in here for this abortion today, we want to help you. We have adoption counseling, financial counseling, free ultrasounds, whatever you need. We have free maternity homes with whatever you need.
Ma’am, what you have in you is a son or a daughter. It was decided at conception whether you’re carrying a son or a daughter.
(ANOTHER VOICE) Oh, watch the umbrella. (as the umbrella gets hung on on the awning)
(ANOTHER VOICE) Free ultrasound.
(ANOTHER VOICE) (inaudible) baby!
I’m sorry, and I know I’m not unbiased here, but I cannot regard that video as showng any objectionable tactics whatsoever.
Can you? Really?
Understood.. but that cedes the debate ground to, say, a woman who has had an abortion and now regrets it. She can say, truthfully, that she’s had a deeply personal and hurtful experience. Shall we expect pro-choice advocates to withdraw from the field, as it were, when that happens?
No, not at all. I’m just saying that I, personally, don’t have the heart to do it, which I mentioned only because you were questioning why people didn’t back you up in the argument. I normally might do so, and I’m not saying you’re doing anything wrong for calling her out, but sometimes there’s other reasons people might not want to get involved.
Creating a veritable gauntlet for people to walk through isn’t objectionable to you? Having someone who uninvited, follows you to spout their personal religious beliefs is not objectionable? When she got closer to the door more of the protestors were talking but I couldn’t make out there words. Do you suppose the free ultrasound is for the woman’s benefit or simply to try and make the point of their own belief that it’s a person, rather than not a person. I can’t know , but judging by the woman encouraging it, I can make a good guess.
That might not seem like much to someone not going through a personal struggle to begin with but IMO it’s disturbing the peace, it is criminal and they ought to be compelled to cut that shit out.
In that one video of a 2 minute walk? No. The video was not offered in demonstration of illegal activity, simply as a notable portion of a blog from escorts at one clinic, discussing the tactics of the protesters they face.
Because, as I noted, specifically, no one is keeping records of that sort of thing. It’s not within the purview of the staff inside the clinic, and it’s not why escorts are there.
Which I explicitly said is not something that can be provided.
The ACLU has asked for a Justice Department investigation for FACE Act violations by the supporters of the fake clinic that’s moved in down the block. But I’m not sure why you’d expect one video of, as you stated, less than 2 minutes of footage outside the clinic to be specifically demonstrative of illegal acts. It’s not as if they’re a part of every interaction.
You didn’t hear the man shouting the Hail Mary? All the people calling out volubly at her as she passed by? They may not have been loud, but they were screaming by virtue of the nature of the interaction. When you’re raising your voice to someone who’s not paying you attention, who’s passing by, that’s screaming. And especially so when it’s apparently obvious that your attentions are unwanted.
The misleading vests are objectionable. The use of religious guilting attempts are extremely objectionable. The attempt to coerce the client into a fake clinic for a “free” ultrasound (almost surely administered by someone who is not a trained ultrasound tech) which is a precursor to the distorted and dishonest “counseling” offered by the CPC (something which has been documented, check the testimony, under oath, before the NYC city council from earlier this year) is objectionable.
Name anything you would do in your life in which you’d find it acceptable to have multiple strangers with whom you clearly have no interest in interacting, following you down the street, rambling nonsense at you, attempting to provoke you, lining both sides of the sidewalk to vocally make their approbation of your actions known, praying loudly because they disapprove of you.
Would that be okay to deal with every time you go to the dentist? Maybe when you go to a psychiatrist’s office? Maybe when you go to your attorney or stockbroker?
How about every time you go to church, how about if a bunch of atheists lined the sidewalk outside your church to chant at you about God being a lie? Would you find that objectionable?
It’s a word. My Yorkshire-born ex husband has used it on more than one occasion.
“Veritable gauntlet?”
How much space do you estimate is between the two lines? I’m sorry, but no – that’s not a “gauntlet.”
No. You don’t have the right to walk down the street without people talking to you. As long as you’re free to disregard their speech and go about your business, you have no room to complain.
Who cares? What has that to do with the acceptability of their conduct?
Your opinion is wrong. That conduct is NOT disturbing the peace, legally speaking, and there’s not a jurisdiction n the country where this conduct would be finally found criminal. What is your opinion even based on? What are the legal elements of ‘disturbing the peace’ and how does that conduct meet them?
So – can everyone now agree that the claim that abortion protesters have some license to perform acts that would be illegal if done by other protesters – that claim has no citation to support it?
No.
No, that’s inventing a definition to suit yourself. “Shout” means to utter a loud cry; to utter in a loud voice. A shout is defined as a loud cry or call.
LOUD being the operative word.
I agree, although the differences were clear to me.
I disagree. Why? Their position is that abortion is sinful. You have no right to be insulated from that communication.
Cite?
Cite?
When I walk down the street, I am in a public space. I may not like it; I accept that in a country with the First Amendment, I take that chance.
I’d find it unfortunate, but I’d recognize that they had the right.
Holy shit!! That’s hilarious. Now my parody of “That’s why the lady is a Tramp” is sounding even better.
What was your opinion on the protesters in Wisconsin?
It seems to me they did far worse than what we saw on the video. Didn’t they?
It is objectionable when anybody, in any fashion, tries to dictate to me what I should or should not be doing to my body when it is none of their damned business.
:rolleyes: